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Abstract 
 
The UK fresh produce industry faces a number of challenges, including new 
pests and diseases, foreign competition and the cost of and access to 
seasonal labour. ‘Innovation’ has been promoted to meet these challenges, 
but the sources of innovation, and what holds it back, have not been 
explored. This thesis aims to: 1) identify the sources of innovation in the 
fresh produce industry, 2) determine the barriers to innovation in the 
industry and 3) seek ways to improve the overall innovative capacity of the 
sector. It does so by using the Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) 
approach as an underpinning framework within a case study design. 32 
industry practitioners, including growers, technologists, researchers and 
retailers took part in semi-structured interviews, which were analysed 
using Framework Analysis. 
 
The study finds an increasingly consolidated and competitive industry, 
influenced heavily by retail groups and the need for constant innovation. It 
describes ‘types’ of innovation and their interlinked nature, as well as the 
inherent uncertainty around innovation and the difficulties in ‘measuring’ 
change. It finds that innovation often originates overseas and through 
experimentation or interaction with a given product or process. It describes 
both positive and negative communication in the industry and explores 
other blocking mechanisms to innovation including horizontal and vertical 
fragmentation, diverging innovation agendas and a “defensive” innovation 
culture. 
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It also identifies a number of enabling factors for change. Interactivity and 
network formation are recognised as vital components of the innovation 
system. However, considerable emphasis is placed on non-systemic factors, 
such as entrepreneurialism. These findings are combined with existing 
literature in a functional-structural analysis to offer recommendations to 
bolster innovative capacity in the industry.  
 
The study makes several original contributions to knowledge, particularly 
with respect to the AIS approach: that innovation systems routinely extend 
beyond national borders, facilitated in part by another understudied issue – 
producer organisations – is an area for further research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Rationale 
 
The UK fresh produce industry faces a number of challenges: exotic pests 
and diseases, input prices for oil, foreign competition, limitations in water 
abstraction, and restrictions on seasonal labour from overseas (National 
Horticultural Forum, 2011a). It must meet these challenges against a 
backdrop of climate change, a growing population and dwindling natural 
resources (BIS, 2013). Innovation through research and development (R&D) 
has been promoted to stem these problems and improve competitiveness in 
the fresh produce industry and wider agricultural sector (National 
Horticultural Forum, 2011a; see UK Government, 2010); however, the ways 
in which innovation emerges in the industry or is constrained – if at all – 
have received scant attention. 
 
Over the last decades, the previously dominant agricultural R&D regime has 
evolved along increasingly demand-driven lines, challenging the ‘post-War’, 
linear model of agricultural extension and creating new problems and 
opportunities for innovation in agri-food systems (Klerkx, Aarts, & Leeuwis, 
2010). 
 
At the same time, UK agricultural productivity is also lower than that of 
many of its competitors (BIS, 2013). Some have suggested that the failure to 
‘translate’ basic research into applied, farm-level solutions is contributing to 
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lower-than-expected national agricultural performance (Pollock, 2012). 
However, it is increasingly recognised that innovation is not a linear process 
of transferring technological knowledge from scientists to end-users (Klerkx 
& Leeuwis, 2008b, p. 261). 
 
In light of these interconnected issues, the Agriculture and Horticulture 
Development Board – the UK levy board responsible for commissioning 
research on behalf of levy payers – agreed to co-fund a project to explore 
these issues. As such, the questions framing this research project are: 
 
1. What are the sources of innovation in the UK fresh produce industry? 
2. What are the barriers to innovation in the fresh produce industry? 
3. How can innovative capacity be enhanced? 
1.2 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, a detailed literature review 
provides an overview of the UK fresh produce industry before summarising 
existing literature on innovation and the role of knowledge as it relates to 
innovation. Innovation in the agricultural context is then considered, 
followed by an explanation of the current theories and frameworks being 
used to explore this issue. 
 
In Chapter 3, the methodological approach used to answer the research 
questions is explained, and justifications for its use given. 
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Chapter 4 outlines the findings of the research by exploring the key 
categories that have emerged during the analysis of the primary data 
collected during the project. 
 
In Chapter 5, these findings are discussed in a critical manner drawing upon 
further literature to contextualise the findings outlined in the preceding 
chapter. 
 
In the final chapter, conclusions and recommendations are made based on 
the analysis developed of the previous two chapters. 
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“Innovation is serendipity, so you don’t know what people will make.” – 
Tim Berners-Lee  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, innovation is explored in its most general sense – starting 
with what defines “innovation” – before moving onto specific theories of 
change. Next, the complex relationship between knowledge, technology and 
innovation is investigated. 
 
How innovation and knowledge have been studied in the agricultural 
context is then explored by introducing the fields of extension science and 
systems-orientated approaches. Finally, the systems theories that relate 
most directly to agriculture are explained – such as Agricultural Innovation 
Systems and Farm Systems Research – followed by a summary of what is 
understood about the ‘sources’ of innovation. 
 
In the first instance, however, it is necessary to cover the focus of this 
project: the fresh produce industry and the evolution of industry support in 
terms of research. 
 
2.2 The UK fresh produce industry 
 
The fresh produce industry encompasses the production, processing and 
sale of fruits, vegetables and ornamental plants in the UK. The potato sector 
is also within the scope of this project, though it is not generally considered 
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to be ‘horticulture’. “Produce” is a general term for fruits and vegetables that 
are sold “fresh” (or at least in a ‘harvest-like’ condition). Today, however, a 
good deal of produce goes on to be processed in some way, be it cut and 
frozen – cauliflower, for instance – or for use in prepared food. The UK 
horticultural sector includes more than 300 individual crops (Defra, 2013). 
 
The industry was worth roughly £4 billion (Defra, 2017) in 2016 1  and 
employs 30,000 permanent workers, and over 55,000 seasonal workers2 
(primarily from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe) (Defra, 2013). In 2006, 
it was reported that 50% of horticultural holdings were under one hectare 
in size (Promar International, 2006); however, the same report argued that 
consolidation of the industry into larger units was increasing, a viewpoint 
shared by many participants in this project (see Section 4.2.1). The data 
corroborates this only to a certain extent, though accurate information on 
business consolidation is difficult to find (see Figure 1). A more relevant 
transformation in the industry is the new forms of organisation and vertical 
integration that have emerged in recent years (see below). 
 
                                                        
1 This figure reflects output at market prices (including potatoes). 
2 This figure excludes the ornamental sector; the UK garden industry employs over 
250,000 workers (Defra, 2013). 
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Figure 1 Number of horticultural farms in England by farm size over 5-year intervals (small = 
1-2 full-time employees, medium = 2-3 full-time employees and large = 3+ full-time 
employees), compiled using Farm Business Survey data. The notable increase in the number 
of holdings in the 2005/2006 bracket is likely due to a methodological artefact in Defra 
statistics (see Appendix 2). 
At the same time, the land under horticultural cultivation has roughly halved 
since the 1950s whilst production peaked in the mid-1970s and 
subsequently returned to post-War levels, implying an improvement in 
overall productivity (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Total production of horticultural crops in ‘000 tonnes (excl. potatoes) against total 
cultivated area in ha. 1950 – 2011 in the UK, compiled using Defra Basic Horticultural 
Statistics. 
Over the same period, the UK’s reliance on imported horticultural goods has 
increased in contrast to its exports, which have remained fairly static (see 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Total UK imports and exports of horticultural products in '000 tonnes (excl. potatoes) 
1950 - 2011, compiled using Defra's Basic Horticultural Statistics 
The vast majority of UK produce is sold through multiple retailers, with just 
four retail groups accounting for 74% of total sales (Promar International, 
2006). The value of horticultural goods has also increased (see Figure 4), 
though, as shall be shown in Chapter 4, this has not necessarily meant an 
increase in return to growers. 
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Figure 4 Value of horticultural products marketed in the UK in £ millions 1985 – 2013 
(adjusted for inflation), compiled using Defra's Basic Horticultural Statistics 
However, in recent years the market share controlled by the “Big Four” 
(Tesco, Morrisons, Sainsbury & Asda) has decreased, primarily due to 
competition by the “Discounters” (Lidl, Aldi), who, it is claimed, have also 
been responsible for growing produce markets (Searle, 2016). How this 
impacts upon innovation is discussed in Section 4.2.1.1. 
 
Over the last several decades, one particular growing system has become 
especially popular with commercial fruit growers and specialist vegetable 
producers: polytunnels. These structures, properly called “Spanish tunnels”, 
can be seen across the UK and are used to grow a variety of soft fruit, and, 
increasingly, tree fruit as well. Since their introduction by Haygrove in the 
late mid-1990s, polytunels have facilitated the doubling of turnover per 
hectare (to become the most valuable horticultural crop in the UK) and 
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extended the growing season from six weeks to six months (Calleja, Ilbery, 
& Mills, 2012) Most interestingly, perhaps, these structures have ‘equalised’ 
regional differences between England and Scotland, minimising the problem 
of geography. 
 
Despite the success of polytunnels in the soft fruit sector, a number of 
reports over the last ten years have made clear the challenges facing the 
industry as a whole (Brian Jamieson & Associates, 2008; National 
Horticultural Forum, 2011a; Promar International, 2006), as well as its 
evolving structural conditions and changing funding landscapes, which have 
undergone significant change. Today, the primary organisations responsible 
for horticultural R&D are the UK Research Councils (primarily the 
Biotechnology & Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) for basic 
research) and the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) 
for more near-market, applied research, which is funded by a statutory levy. 
Yet, this was not always the case. 
2.2.1 New landscapes 
 
Over the last few decades a major shift in the way the agricultural sector is 
supported has occurred, not only with regards to research – although that 
has been the area of most significant change – but also the kinds of financial 
support producers and others can expect from government. In the 1980s a 
reimagining of the role of the state took place, with stronger emphasis on 
market-based, demand-driven approaches to the provisions of goods 
 23 
(including agricultural research and extension services3) (Klerkx, de Grip, & 
Leeuwis, 2006). 
 
In the UK, this manifested itself in the privatisation of the formerly public 
extension service, ADAS (Agriculture Development and Advisory Service), 
from the mid-1990s, which had until then been funded by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries & Food (MAFF), and the emergence of a more 
competitive, tender-based research environment. Of England’s 30 former 
dedicated agricultural research institutes (a potted history of which has 
been compiled by de Silva, 2012), only three remain (Hermans, Klerkx, & 
Roep, 2015). However, the creation of “agricultural knowledge markets” has 
resulted in new problems for those organisations ‘producing’ knowledge, 
and those organisations and individuals ‘seeking’ it (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 
2008b); at the same time, the notion that innovation is a linear process in 
which knowledge is created by researchers to be passed out to industry has 
been repeatedly challenged (see Section 2.4.1). 
 
It has also been suggested that gains made in the scientific realm have not 
had proportional impact in a practical sense (Pollock, 2012). Gone, claims 
Pollock (2012) is the “Golden Age” of scientific discovery and subsequent 
extension of new farming knowledge. Instead, a number of problems – 
including a shrinking applied research budgets and academic incentive 
structure which de-prioritises strategic needs – hampers efforts to 
adequately support the farming sector (Pollock, 2012). 
 
                                                        
3 See Section 2.4.1 for more on extension services. 
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Given that new knowledge is a fundamental part of innovation (see below), 
these circumstances permeate all aspects of UK agricultural change. 
2.3 Innovation 
 
Innovation is a pervasive issue in both academic literature and policy 
debates (Malerba & Brusoni, 2007, p. 1), and arguably the “buzzword” of the 
21st century (Phillips, Karwandy, Webb, & Ryan, 2013, p. 2). Why, then, is 
innovation important? And, in particular, why now? 
 
Aside from the more obvious consequences of innovation – it is considered 
central to economic growth (Kline & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 7) and has the 
capacity to create jobs, or to destroy them (Edquist, 2005, p. 1) – the rate of 
innovation and obsolescence is today considered to be accelerating (N. 
Brown, Rappert, & Webster, 2016a). In a post-Recession world, innovation 
has taken on new dimensions as a means of economic recovery (Hausman & 
Johnston, 2014). For others, the importance of innovation – and specifically 
‘technology’ – is its ability to shape society. Sociologists such as Castells 
(2010), for example, suggest that networks, underpinned by the 
development of information technologies in the 20th century, have become 
the dominant form of human organisational structure. These developments 
have led to practical knock-on effect in the social sciences; social network 
analysis (SNA), for instance, has been used to map knowledge flow in rural 
New Zealand (B. A. Wood et al., 2014) and technology adoption amongst 
farmers in Texas (Ramirez, 2013). 
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Whilst innovation is important, it is not easily understood. Our conception 
of what innovation is and how it ‘comes into being’ has evolved over time. 
The breadth of research on innovation has manifested itself in a multitude 
of handbooks on innovation, each with a different “twist” or focus (Malerba 
& Brusoni, 2007, p. 1).  
 
Indeed, the many faces of innovation ensure it remains hard to define. 
2.3.1 Defining innovation 
 
It remains challenging to develop an agreed definition of innovation, as 
there is not a “… single, simple dimensionality to innovation” (Kline & 
Rosenberg, 2000, p. 7). Nelson & Winter (2000, p. 82) note that “innovation” 
is most commonly used as a portmanteau to cover the range of processes by 
which human technologies change over time. Some definitions account 
primarily for discreteness, with reference to “an” innovation. Other 
definitions interpret innovation as broader, technical or systemic change. 
 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883 – 1950), known as the ‘father of innovation’, was 
the first to explore and define technical change in a systematic way. He 
enumerated five ‘types’ of innovation: 
 
1. The introduction of a new good or quality of a good 
2. A new method of production 
3. The opening of a new market 
4. The discovery of new resources or intermediates 
5. A new organisational form 
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It is clear that Schumpeter’s categorisation is comprehensive but does not 
give explicit reference to ‘implementation’, or the process of getting a new 
idea or product into use. According to Elenkov & Manev (2009) innovation 
is the “… process of generating and implementing new ideas” (author’s 
emphasis) (see also Leeuwis, 2004, p. 12). Indeed, the spread and 
implementation of innovation is the focus of considerable academic 
attention: Roger’s Diffusion of Innovations (first published 1962) Edquist & 
McKelvey’s Systems of Innovation (Edquist & McKelvey, 2000) and, more 
recently, work on the ‘Multi-level Perspective’ (see Geels, 2005) each 
examine at various scales the transitions involved in socio-technical change. 
 
Phillips et al. (2013, pp. 4-5) point out that even the assumption that 
innovation equates to “doing things better” is uncertain. New technologies 
often emerge in a relatively primitive condition that is not necessarily 
‘better’ than the product or process it replaces. Instead, they argue, adoption 
– the decision to use a particular product or process – is determined by 
whether the users of an innovation perceive some benefit in using it. 
 
Likewise, the ambiguity of the word “new” is controversial. How ‘new’ does 
something have to be to qualify as innovative? Given the root of the word – 
the Latin novus, meaning ‘new’ – it is unsurprising that some feel ‘newness’ 
needs to be invoked in any comprehensive definition of innovation. At the 
same time, it is not always possible to discern where one innovation begins 
and another ends; take, for instance, an example of agricultural innovation 
as explained by Feder (1993, p. 216): 
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“… high-yielding varieties (HYVs) in particular, are in fact a package of 
interrelated technologies (for example, fertilizer, herbicides, and chemicals). 
Accordingly, one major focus in the literature in recent years has been the 
investigation of the decision-making process characterizing choice of the 
optimal combinations of the components of a technological package over 
time.” 
 
The co-dependency of innovation on other innovation – and the need for 
aligning social factors – requires us to think beyond innovation in the 
singular sense (i.e. “an” innovation) and to innovation as a process of larger 
technical change, such as that found in the innovation systems tradition: 
 
“... innovation is neither research nor science and technology, but rather the 
application of knowledge (of all types) in production to achieve desired social 
or economic outcomes. This knowledge might be acquired through learning, 
research or experience, but until applied it can not be considered innovation.” 
(A. Hall, Mytelka, & Oyeyinka, 2006, p. 13) 
 
In some sense innovation pulls other words into its ‘orbit’: the term 
“technology” is commonly used to refer to a discrete product or process – 
and is almost synonymous with “innovation”. Yet it is often conflated with 
innovations of a highly visible sort – airplanes, vehicles, computers – to the 
potential neglect of ‘invisible’, but equally important, incremental 
innovation. As Kline & Rosenberg (2000, p. 282) observe, such minor, 
cumulative modifications can have large impacts over a long enough 
timeframe. 
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Figure 5 An ‘all-encompassing’ vision of innovation, demonstrating the need for change across 
multiple domains (Klerkx, van Mierlo, & Leeuwis, 2012b) 
As for “knowledge”, this is either a necessary component of innovation or, 
as Edquist & McKelvey (2000 pp. xi) would have it, innovations are in fact 
part of a larger process in the development of knowledge of economic 
relevance. Indeed, the importance of knowledge for modern economies is 
exemplified by the rise of the “knowledge economy”, in which the 
production of knowledge has proliferated (Powell & Snellman, 2004) – this 
is no less true in the agricultural domain, where the “technology transfer” 
(TT) approach to development has given way to systems theories of change 
that promote knowledge exchange and social learning (see Section 2.4.2). 
 
Klerkx et al. (2012b, p. 458) suggest that innovation is a co-evolutionary 
process – a combination of “... technological, social, economic and 
institutional change”. As such, the exchange of technical knowledge is not 
the only prerequisite for innovation, a position that permits the possibility 
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of diverse sources of innovation, as well as a variety of barriers to innovation 
stemming from the complex interplay of these factors. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the definition above is considered the most appropriate. 
 
However, beyond demonstrating the complexity of innovation, there is little 
to be gained from lingering too long on its definition; some authors dispense 
with the need to define the term at all, or simply use “technology” as a 
portmanteau for the same (Frenken, 2006), suggesting that there is an 
instinctual understanding of ‘what we’re talking about’ when we talk about 
“innovation”. 
2.3.2 Understanding innovation 
 
Innovation is today the focus of a number of different academic disciplines, 
and, as our understanding of the subject has expanded, so too has the 
number of lenses through which innovation can be examined. What began 
with attempts to model economic growth now seeks to account for how a 
wide range of factors – including policy, institutional arrangements, learning 
and conflict – determine innovation outcomes. 
 
A brief history of the development of approaches to understanding 
innovation is given, before exploring these trends in an agricultural context. 
2.3.2.1 Exogenous and endogenous growth 
 
As Phillips et al. (2013, p. 14) note, the most extensive literature on 
innovation, growth and development is found within the neoclassical 
economics tradition and its “extensions”. 
 30 
 
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith (1776) and Jean-Baptiste Say 
(1803) touched upon innovation and technical change. In A Treatise on 
Political Economy: or The Production, Distribution, and Consumption of 
Wealth (first published in 1803) Say noted that increases in wealth 
originate: 
 
“From the increased command acquired by human intelligence over 
productive powers… a power has been rendered available for human 
purposes, that had not been known before, or not directed to any human 
object; as in the instance of wind, water and steam-engines: or one before 
known and available is directed with superior skill and effect, as in the case 
of every improvement in mechanism, whereby human or animal power is 
assisted or expanded. The merit of the merchant, who contrives, by good 
management, to make the same capital suffice for an extended business, is 
precisely analogous to that of the engineer, who simplifies machinery, or 
renders it more productive.” (Say, 2001, p. 163) 
 
In the middle of the twentieth century, economists concerned with 
macroeconomic trends were developing a model for long-run economic 
growth. It was found that neoclassical models developed during the 1950s 
predicted an eventual ‘steady state’ of zero per capita growth (Barro & Sala-
i-Martin, 2004, p. 61). In this scenario, the amount of new capital produced 
is only enough to keep pace with natural population growth and to replace 
the capital lost due to depreciation over time (known as diminishing returns) 
(Acemoglu, 2008). However, industrial output has continued to outpace 
population growth since the Industrial Revolution; technological change was 
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the presumptive missing factor (Grossman & Helpman, 1994). As Grossman 
& Helpman (1994, p. 26) note: 
 
“Surely the earth’s (relatively) fixed stocks of land, natural resources, and 
raw labor would impart diminishing returns to accumulated inputs if those 
inputs were forever combined to produce a fixed set of goods by unchanging 
methods.” 
 
Neoclassical growth theorists recognised this modeling deficiency and 
“patched it up” by including technological progress as an exogenous factor in 
such models (i.e. there is some rate of technological change affecting the 
model, but the determinants of that rate exist outside of the model). The 
same was true for population growth, which was likewise included as an 
exogenous factor in variations of the neoclassical Solow-Swan model (Barro 
& Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 18).  
 
The importance of the Solow-Swan model lies in what it tells us (and does 
not tell us) about long-run growth; economic models that do not account for 
improvements in productivity enter a steady-state in which output per head 
equals the cost of maintaining capital per head as the population grows. If 
we include both population growth and productivity growth as some 
exogenous rate of change, it results in long-run economic growth. However, 
this only indicates that having some positive rate of productivity 
improvement leads to long-term growth and not what factors govern such 
growth or the rate at which it changes over time (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
2004, p. 18). The ‘how’ of innovation is thus relegated to a “black box” in 
neoclassical economics. As Rosenberg notes in Exploring the Black Box, 
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economics “… was content to treat – or perhaps a more appropriate 
operational verb would be “to dismiss” – technological change purely as an 
exogenous variable, one that had economic consequences but no visible 
economic antecedents” (Rosenberg, 1994, p. 9). 
 
This was an important development: the determinants of technological 
change cannot be ‘boiled down’ to a fixed, exogenous rate. It has been 
suggested that differences in rates of technological change explain the 
differences in economic performance between countries (Barro & Sala-i-
Martin, 2004); this must be true, or every country – every region – would be 
endowed with the same technological capabilities and level of productivity.  
 
It would appear that technological change is dependent upon internal 
factors in the economy of concern. Berliner (1976) notes that the innovative 
performance of one economic system over another is no measure of the 
quality of that economic system if we ignore the historical and cultural 
traditions of the society built upon it; a society that has long fostered 
scientific enquiry, technological prowess and entrepreneurial spirit would 
be expected to be more innovative than a society not exhibiting these traits. 
This is supported by Freeman, who notes that the performance of the 
Japanese and later South Korean economies from the 1980s relative to the 
economies of post-Soviet eastern Europe, despite comparable investments 
in R&D, yielded vastly different results (Freeman, 2000, p. 47- 48).  
 
Clearly, more complex factors were at work. Such observations, and a 
renewed interest in economic growth since the 1980s, have led to the 
development of endogenous theories of growth, in which the determinants 
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of growth were explicit in the models themselves (though, it should be 
noted, these remain ‘neoclassical’ in their basic assumptions about the 
world). Put simply, factors within the economy could determine the rates of 
technical change or even population growth over time. For example as GDP 
increases, fertility rates tend to decline and long-term growth can be seen as 
predominantly dependent on government action via taxation, protection of 
intellectual property and provision of infrastructure (to name only a few 
mechanisms by which an economy can be shaped) (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
2004, p. 18). 
 
At the same time, neoclassical models of growth contain another contested 
assumption: perfect rationality. Firms and people cannot predict with much 
accuracy the impact of their endeavours, whether launching a new product 
or investing in one, meaning that even if they are acting in their own rational 
self interest, they are not doing so from a position of complete certainty 
(Rosenberg, 1994, p. 5). As such, organisations and individuals are 
described as having bounded rationality (i.e. they can only know so much 
about the consequences of their actions and about the economic world they 
inhabit). That innovation carries with it inherent uncertainty is a 
cornerstone of agricultural innovation systems thinking (Section 2.4.2). 
 
Nelson & Winter (Nelson & Winter, 2000) speak of the need for an economic 
theory that saw technology as undergoing continuous evolution.  
2.3.4 Evolutionary economics and path dependence 
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In a withering assault on the neoclassical imagining of innovation and 
economic growth, Clark & Juma (2013 preface) claim that: 
 
“... the world described in most economic models is not the world in which we 
live... it is a world of determinate solutions to pre-specified problems, where 
economic phenomena (i.e. those to which property rights can be assigned) 
can be separated from everything else and where there is no uncertainty... 
[ours] is a world of complexity, relative ignorance and irrelatedness 
[author’s emphasis], where our present state has an evolutionary history... it 
is an ‘open system’, non-linear, indeterminate world...”  
 
As such, the field of evolutionary economics takes inspiration from 
Darwinian natural selection where innovation is mediated by similar 
pressures as found in biological systems. From this point of view, 
technologies are both artefacts of technological evolution and units of 
analysis, “... the design of which takes place by trial-and-error learning” 
(Frenken, 2006, p. 3). The evolutionary character of such change is dubbed 
“path dependence”, which, simply put, implies that past technological 
developments define the possibilities of future technological change (Garud 
& Karnoe, 2013; Rosenberg, 1994). An example of path dependence is the 
rise and dominance of industrial agriculture, epitomised by high use of 
mechanisation and agricultural inputs such as pesticides and fertilizer. Of 
course, from an economic point of view this makes sense: increasing scale 
reduces the cost of input per unit output. However, the post-War model of 
agricultural subsidy and support was, in several key ways, designed to 
support industrial agriculture (see Clapp, 2012, p. 11). In this way, the 
dominance of industrial agriculture is maintained, an example of what 
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proponents of the Multi-level Perspective would describe as an incumbent 
“regime” (Ingram, 2015). 
 
The application of evolutionary economic theory to the task of 
understanding how economies change over time continues unabated (see 
Malerba & Brusoni, 2007) and the importance of evolutionary economics to 
the study of innovation has manifested itself in a number of ways: models of 
economic growth must now account for how businesses imbed 
organisational learning over time (Dosi, 2007) or the interplay between 
economy, society and natural environment in debates on sustainability (see 
van Griethuysen, 2002). However, this also represents the gradual 
recognition of factors beyond “simple” rates of growth or productivity. That 
R&D policy or approach towards intellectual property, for instance, are 
recognised as having a bearing on real-world innovation, and that such 
processes provide a degree of path dependence to technological 
development, shows that there is more than one ‘level’ to the study of 
innovation. 
2.3.5 Theories of innovation, change and transition 
 
A number of ‘general’ theories of innovation seek to explain how innovation 
works in practice, treating it not as some fixed rate of change in an economic 
model or mysterious process inside a “black box” but as a process that must 
be understood in its own right. Each introduces new language and concepts 
– sometimes from other fields – to emphasise competing or complementary 
factors governing innovation. 
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2.3.5.1 Diffusion of Innovations 
 
Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations (1962), now in its fifth edition, is 
considered a seminal work in this regard. It introduced what have become 
common terms in innovation studies, such as first and early adopters, and 
laggards. Concerned primarily with how a given innovation – defined in this 
case as an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new to an individual 
or another unit of adoption – spreads through an economy, Rogers suggests 
there are several factors that determine the rate of adoption and success of 
a given innovation:  
 
1. Characteristics of the innovation itself, such as its comparative 
advantage over similar products, its complexity, and compatibility 
with existing systems determine the likelihood that it is implemented 
by a unit of adoption 
2. A communication channel is the means by which different individuals 
or other units of adoption spread the knowledge associated with a 
given innovation, its functioning shaped by degree of homophily – the 
‘sameness’ of its participants – found within the channel 
3. A third element of the diffusion process is time; the “innovation-
decision process” occurs over time and involves, in the first instance, 
learning of the existence of an innovation to the eventual adoption or 
rejection of that innovation 
4. The final factor taken into consideration is the social system in which 
an innovation is to be embedded. A social system is defined here as 
the set of interrelated units that are engaged in solving common 
problems, be it a collection of peasant farmers or group of doctors in 
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a hospital. A social system includes the ‘rules and norms’ people 
adhere to and re-produce, as well as the opinions of ‘change agents’ 
or ‘champions’, who carry an innovation along. 
 
Certain aspects of the diffusion scholarship have been challenged and 
revised over time. For example, how an innovation might be “re-invented” 
for a specific context could not originally be accounted for in the early 
iterations of the theory (Rogers, 1983, p. 17). However, the work of Rogers 
and others remains concerned with causality: how, and why, do innovations 
spread over time? It relegates the origins of innovation to, firstly, the 
recognition of a problem, and, secondly, the development of a solution to 
that problem through formal, purposive R&D. Interestingly, many of Rogers’ 
observations are built on the work of rural sociologists investigating change 
in an agricultural context in the United States during the 1940s and ‘50s. Yet 
contemporary theories of agricultural innovation place far more emphasis 
on the ability of farmers to contribute to innovation themselves and the 
often haphazard, experimental and informal way that new practices in 
farming originate (Chambers, Pacey, & Thrupp, 1993). In a similar way, 
innovation is reduced to a linear, market-driven process in which there are 
no “feedbacks” or possibilities for failure (the linear model of innovation): 
 
Research  Development  Production  Marketing 
 
In terms of measurement, diffusion scholars tend to rely on the rates and 
proportion of adoption of a given innovation over time and amongst end-
users. An “S-shaped” curve is commonly used to model this diffusion, the y-
axis depicting the prevalence of the innovation and the x-axis representing 
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time and the five categories of adopting unit: innovators, early adopters, 
early majority, late majority and laggards. The steepness of the adoption 
curve indicates the speed at which a given innovation spreads. 
 
This remains an influential way of thinking about innovation, but since its 
initial publication, other theories of innovation have begun to expose the 
dynamics of diffusion in other ways. 
2.3.5.2 (National) Systems of Innovation 
 
Coupled with the growing influence of evolutionary economic perspectives 
on economic theory at the time (discussed in Section 2.3.4), the Systems of 
Innovation approach that emerged in the 1990s emphasises the importance 
of complex, endogenous determinants of innovation, drawing on the work 
of scholars now readily associated with innovation: Carlsson (2002), 
Rosenberg (1994), Lundvall (2007), Nelson and Winter (2000).  
 
Stemming from the recognition that innovation must involve some kind of 
learning process, and given that learning is an inherently interactive 
endeavour, Systems of Innovation scholars pay particular attention to 
interaction between the innovating parties in a given system. As Edquist & 
McKelvey (2000) observe, it is interactivity that “paves the way for a 
systemic approach”. Indeed, writing with regards to what he perceived of as 
the ‘agricultural system’, Spedding (1988, p. 15) notes that for the word 
“system” to mean anything, it must be something that can be contrasted with 
a non-system. For Spedding, a system can be explained through the phrase: 
“behavior as a whole in response to stimuli of any part”. In this respect, it is 
 39 
how the actors in an innovation system interact, and the institutional regime 
in which they interact that determines the generation, spread and rate of 
adoption of innovations. The interplay between the public and private 
sectors in a specific country, for instance, has a bearing on innovation; these 
factors themselves being rooted in the history, language and national 
culture of that nation (2000, p. 73). Of course, the increasingly globalised 
nature of the economy – and innovation – is recognised, though this remains 
concerned with flows of knowledge at and between different geographic 
scales (see Gertler & Levitte, 2006). 
 
The term National Innovation Systems has, as Lundvall (2007, p. 95- 97) 
explains, become widely used both by policy makers and scholars (though 
not necessarily ‘correctly’). It also forms the basis for other, more specific 
analytical frameworks, such as Agricultural Innovation Systems (discussed 
in the next section). The National Innovation Systems approach often 
involves quantification of certain national indicators such as R&D 
expenditure and rates of economic growth to assess the functioning of the 
system. 
 
What innovations systems research has in common is summarised by 
Edquist & McKelvey (2000) in nine parts: 
 
1. The centrality of innovations and learning processes: innovation is 
given to be the product of various learning processes. This includes 
‘learning by doing’, whereby an individual gains knowledge about a 
product or process and determines ways in which it might be 
improved, and searching for new economic knowledge through R&D. 
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Such a focus is retained in agricultural innovation systems theories 
(AKIS, AIS, see below).  
2. Holism and interdisciplinarity: systems approaches, in general, can be 
characterised by the desire to capture the wide array of factors that 
determine the nature of innovation. In order to achieve this, it is 
unlikely that one discipline will be sufficient illuminate such a range 
of factors. 
3. Historical perspective: given the lag between the technical invention, 
transformation and economic application of an innovation, a 
historical perspective is the ‘natural’ frame to explore the emergence 
and spread that innovation. 
4. The difference between systems and non-optimality: in the Systems of 
Innovation approach, the differences between different systems, be 
they national, regional or sectoral, are the subject of focus and, as 
such, should not be ignored. A comparative approach is therefore 
necessary in some way, but with the rejection of any notion of 
optimality or a “perfectly functioning system” in evolutionary theory, 
comparisons should be made with systems that actually exist. 
5. Emphasis on interdependence and non-linearity: it has long been 
recognised that firms do not innovate in isolation, but rather take 
part in the process of combining knowledge from multiple sources 
(such as universities and other research institutes), a recognition 
that has driven the development of the Systems of Innovation 
approach.  As explained above, it is the interactions between 
constituent parts of the innovation system that is the subject of focus 
for practitioners; the emphasis on the complex nature of these 
relationships is both an advantage and challenge of the approach. 
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Such relationships are held to be reciprocal, exhibiting feedback 
mechanisms and “loops”, and, evidently, cannot be thought of as 
‘linear’ or unilateral. 
6. Encompasses products technologies and organisational innovations: 
mainstream economic theory tended to treat innovation as processes 
decreasing employment or other inputs per unit of output. However, 
product innovation – be it the personal computer or a 
pharmaceutical – is clearly also a source of important technological 
innovation. Likewise, organisational innovation has clear impacts 
and, importantly, can be necessary to embed new technologies, in 
concordance with those broad definitions of innovation outlined in 
Section 2.3.1. 
7. Centrality of institutions: not only relevant to innovation, but a 
“striking” component of the innovation systems approach is the 
emphasis on ‘institutions’. Conceived of differently by various 
authors, institutions might be thought of as normative structures that 
support, stimulate or even, sometimes, hinder the process of 
innovation and its diffusion. For instance, government policy, law or 
funding for research constitute an institutional regime. 
8. Conceptual ambiguity: the very scope of innovation systems research 
presents conceptual obstacles (exacerbated, one might argue, by the 
inclusion of various scientific disciplines) stemming from the 
vagueness of certain terms. Even the term “national innovation 
system” is troublesome, the limits of which are either given to be 
unclear or even unknowable. Edquist (2000, p. 29) himself notes that 
there is no clear “… demarcation between a system and its 
 42 
surrounding context”. The limits of the fresh produce “system” are 
defined in Section 3.2.1. 
9. “Conceptual frameworks” rather than formal theories: innovations 
systems approaches remain rather loose and informal relative to 
“hard”, immutable theories. As frameworks, they provide avenues for 
further research, as opposed to the more rigid, predictive capacity of 
formalised theory; this philosophy is maintained in the present 
project. 
 
Given the complexity of the factors at work, the dominant model of 
innovation, or ‘linear model’, has fallen out of favour with those 
investigating innovation. Kline & Rosenberg (2000, p. 16) suggest the idea 
that innovation is initiated by research is wrong “most of the time”, leading 
us to question the directionality of the linear model. Innovation does not 
occur “in a bubble”. It is perhaps worth noting that the physical and 
biological sciences do tend to move through “recognizable major stages” 
(Kline & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 23) and may represent industries where this is 
true most of the time. Innovations also generate benefits “far from the 
industries in which they originate” (Kline & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 280). 
Indeed, predicting the impacts of innovation can be troublesome (see 
Section 4.3.4). 
 
A further ‘place-based’ innovation systems framework relates to “clustering”, 
or the process by which firms and not-for-profit organisations co-locate in a 
specific geographic region inside a national innovation system. Increasingly, 
city regions are seen as hotbeds of innovation and economic growth 
(Phillips et al., 2013, p. 30), but precisely why this should be the case – and 
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why businesses and other organisations should co-locate rather than spread 
evenly across an economy of concern – is subject to debate (whether 
government policy can or should mediate this process is also an area of 
concern).  Common to most explanations of clustering is the benefit a firm 
can derive from proximity to a skilled labour force, supporting industries 
and knowledge “spillovers”, in which relevant information passes quickly 
between different organisations (see Phillips et al., 2013, p. 32). Clusters can 
also form around certain natural resources. In the case of farming, this can 
provide a company with place-specific production and marketing 
opportunities (protected designation of origin schemes for wine, for 
instance, serve to enhance this situation) (see Musso & Francioni, 2015). 
 2.3.5.3 Transitions and the Multi-level Perspective 
 
In certain contemporary theories of innovation, a systemic focus is 
maintained but it is the ‘transition’ of these systems that is the focus of 
attention. System Innovation (as opposed to Systems of Innovation and 
Innovation Systems) is concerned with how entire systems transition 
between states (often towards more sustainable configurations). Here, a 
system is conceived of as a broad societal function: the food system or 
transport system, for example. In need of more than what Elzen et al. (Elzen, 
Geels, & Green, 2004, p. 1) dub “incremental”, end-of-pipe innovations, these 
systems require “… new technological artefacts, new markets, user 
practices, regulations, infrastructures and cultural meanings”. 
 
Stemming from the recognition that the many competing theories seek to 
explain different aspects of systems innovations, Frank Geels (see Geels, 
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2004) proposes using the integrative framework of the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) to understand these transitions. Originating from a 
combination of sociology of technology and evolutionary economics, MLP 
theorists suggest that there are three heuristic levels to be considered when 
investigating systems innovations; the socio-technical regime, or body of 
practices, rules and ways of defining problems that are embedded in the 
institutions of a given system: the socio-technical landscape, in which 
technological ‘trajectories’ are embedded, corresponds to the material 
infrastructure of society, such as the placement of cities and factories. A 
landscape is stable, rigid, even, containing “slow-changing” factors like 
cultural values and political opinion, but is not without shocks, such as war 
or natural disaster; technological niches are the third component of the MLP, 
which in contrast to the ‘incremental’ innovation of the regime, generate 
radical innovation fostered in ‘safe’, protected spaces (niches). Selection 
criteria, to use Darwinian terminology, operate differently in niches when 
compared to elsewhere. For example, the jet engine and the laser were both 
developed through military research programmes, sheltered from ‘the 
market’ at large. As such, niches provide spaces for the learning processes, 
such as learning by doing and social network formation that are associated 
with new innovations (Hippel, 1988; see Rosenberg, 1994) – a subject that 
will be returned to in Section 4.5.2. Although the regime, landscape and 
niches provide a degree of structuration, which confers stability on the 
system, it also makes it difficult for novelties to ‘break through’; existing 
regimes are ‘entrenched’, reinforced by the institutions, cultures and 
economics of the current modality. Others have pointed out the need for a 
‘guiding’ vision to orientate an innovation system (Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, 
Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2007). 
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Importantly, the MLP adds a crucial element to the investigation of systemic 
failure of innovation systems – the notion of directionality (Weber & 
Rohracher, 2012). In this vein, “direction” implies that systems can move 
towards (and away from) certain, existing technological regimes. 
 
As Weber & Rohracher (Weber & Rohracher, 2012) point out, innovation 
systems theories remain dominant in policy debates – promoting the 
maximisation of innovative capacity in firms and other organisations – but 
are “less suited for dealing with the strategic challenges of transforming 
systems of innovation, production and consumption, and thus with long-
term challenges such as climate change or resource depletion”. Instead, they 
promote the MLP and associated Strategic Niche Management and 
Transition Management. These refer to the creation of protected spaces for 
technological niches, and, for example, understanding how innovation 
niches interact with the current regime (see Ingram, 2015), and the broader 
aim of managing such transitions respectively. 
2.4 Innovation in agriculture 
 
The study of innovation in agriculture has a long lineage. Indeed, many 
‘general’ theories of innovation have made use of case studies that focus on 
innovation in farming (such as Roger’s Diffusion of Innovations, discussed 
above). A focus on formal research and extension dominates the early 
academic work in the field, and though this has never been entirely 
supplanted, the idea of formal research being at the heart of agricultural 
innovation has been challenged from the 1980s onwards by observations 
 46 
about the sources of innovation in farming. The innovations systems 
approach would go on to offer a new way to envision technological change 
in agriculture, and it is the evolution of these ideas that is the subject of the 
remainder of this chapter.  
 
It can be supposed that the privileged place agriculture holds with regards 
to academic, governmental and organisational attention can be in part 
explained by importance of food and nutrition. Few governments, if any, 
adopt a purely free market approach to food production and provision, 
which has manifested itself in state-sponsored research and in other tools 
to improve agricultural productivity. In the post-War period, governments 
in most countries took a strongly interventionist, incentivised approach to 
agriculture (Clapp, 2012, p. 11). In the UK this took the form of guaranteed 
prices and quotas for milk and grain, with agricultural research being 
supported through various government agencies (such as MAFF and later 
Defra). A focus on yield led to an industrialised, high-input form of 
agriculture in the developed world – in turn, and through ‘one-sided’ trade 
negotiation led in the main by the United States, this model of agriculture 
became the de facto blueprint of Western state policy (see Clapp, 2012).  
 
A more ‘hands-off’ approach to agriculture has replaced this model since the 
1980s in many places, with those connected to the industry now required to 
commission research directly or support agricultural research through levy 
payments. It is not coincidental that this new arrangement began to appear 
as the dominance of the ‘neo-liberal’ model of economic growth, with its 
emphasis on trade liberalisation, gained supremacy in policy circles. Food 
has become increasingly commoditized and transnational food corporations 
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now hold considerable power across the food supply chain and with respect 
to governance, practices and norms (Clapp, 2012; see also Clapp & Fuchs, 
2009). 
 
Case studies from and researchers’ experience in the developing world – 
where state-funded agricultural research has tended to dominate over 
private – has also been instrumental in the development of more general 
theories of agricultural innovation and farming-focussed research 
methodologies (Darnhofer, Gibbon, & Dedieu, 2012). For example, both 
Röling’s Extension Science (1988) and Chambers’s Farmer First (1993), each 
hugely influential, made use of considerable groundwork in developing 
countries (Kebebe, Duncan, Klerkx, de Boer, & Oosting, 2015; see also Schut, 
Klerkx, Rodenburg, Kayeke, Hinnou, Raboanarielina, et al., 2014a; Spielman, 
Ekboir, & Davis, 2009). Agriculture tends to form a greater percentage of 
national employment and GDP in developing nations when compared to 
their wealthier counterparts (Clapp, 2012, p. 7) and are the focus of much 
more humanitarian and developmental attention. In some sense, developing 
world agriculture has become a test-bed for understanding or at least 
building theory, notably by those involved in research at international 
research institutes (see M. B. Douthwaite, 2002). Interestingly, the goals of 
agricultural research today are the source of conflict; one ‘battleground’ of 
this “Contested Agronomy” being for whose benefit agricultural research is 
carried out, a distinct line drawn between the needs of different groups of 
farmers, often, but not exclusively, along the global divide of ‘north’ and 
‘south’ (Sumberg & Thompson, 2012). Certain suites of technology, and in 
particular genetic modification of food crops, have come to symbolise this 
divide. 
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Charting the broad trends in agricultural development, the work of Pardey 
and Alston, and other agricultural economists, has demonstrated the 
changing face of global agricultural research spending and, importantly, its 
real-world impact in terms of productivity (Alston & Pardey, 2014; Alston, 
Babcock, & Pardey, 2010; Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, & Wood, 2006). More 
importantly, perhaps, is evidence that investment in agricultural research 
does not result in diminishing returns; there are no so-called ‘low-hanging 
fruits’ in agricultural research that mean subsequent endeavours are less 
impactful (Alston, Pardey, & Smith, 1999). However, such work has 
uncovered a declining rate of public investment in agricultural research in 
favour of private (Alston et al., 1999) as well as a growing divide in the level 
of investment in agricultural research between the developed world, the 
large developing economies of Brazil, China and India, and ‘the rest’ (of the 
world) (Pardey et al., 2006). 
 
Innovation is not only a consideration at the macroeconomic level, however. 
A number of microeconomic studies, primarily focused on the individual or 
farm as a unit of analysis, are common, notably within the ever-evolving field 
of extension science (see next section). 
2.4.1 Extension science 
 
Extension science is an academic field concerned primarily with the 
effective management and communication of agricultural science. The 
practice of extension itself has many definitions (see Leeuwis, 2004, p. 24- 
25), and these range from the passive: 
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“… assistance to farmers to help them to identify and analyse their 
production problems and to be aware of the opportunities for improvement” 
(Adams, 1982 pp. xi) 
 
To the more interventionist: 
 
“A professional communication intervention deployed by an institution to 
induce change in voluntary behaviours with a presumed public or collective 
utility” (Röling, 1988, p. 49) 
 
One can trace the roots of this tradition back to rural, out-of-college lectures 
linked to Oxford and Cambridge universities in the mid-1850s, and, perhaps 
further still if one includes one of several agricultural societies created for 
this function in the early 19th century (to say nothing of ancient Egyptian 
hieroglyphics depicting discussions related to crop management or ancient 
Chinese woodblock “handbooks” used to disseminate agricultural 
knowledge) (see G. E. Jones & Garforth, 1997). During the British 
Agricultural Revolution the country saw a distinct growth in output of 
agricultural patents and books (well documented by Ang, Banerjee, & 
Madsen, 2013), and by the time of the Irish Potato Famine (1845 - 49), calls 
were being made for the Royal Agricultural Improvement Society of Ireland 
to send lecturers to Ireland to assist in disseminating information about 
crop-rotations and other root vegetables (G. E. Jones & Garforth, 1997). 
 
It was in France that the first wholly state-funded extension service 
appeared in 1879, though such organisations would remain, in France and 
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elsewhere, small-scale and limited in scope and contact with farmers until 
the middle of 20th century (G. E. Jones & Garforth, 1997). The post-War era 
of agricultural research and extension in the global North, tasked with 
eradicating food shortages, was considered a “golden age” of extension in 
which research and extension practices operated in harmony (see Pollock, 
2012). The successes of this model, and its failures, have had a notable 
impact on modern theories of innovation in agriculture, notably the AIS 
tradition (A. Hall, 2007). On the one hand, the ever-changing social and 
natural environment that farmers face, and, on the other, a scaling back or 
even wholesale privatisation – as in England – of national extension services 
since the late 1980s/90s has resulted in new challenges for extension 
practitioners (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008a). These factors, and their 
relationship to innovation, form an important part of this thesis; the loss of 
public extension services in England is still being felt, several decades after 
the event (see Section 4.8). 
 
However, some of the tasks associated with public extension services have 
been taken over by private business and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) (Leeuwis, 2004, p. 17) Matching the supply and demand of 
agricultural research in this new arrangement is known to have been 
problematic (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b), and is, at least in part, the impetus 
for this project. With regards to innovation processes, Klerkx & Leeuwis 
(2008b, p. 261- 262) isolate five key challenges faced by agricultural 
entrepreneurs, comparable to small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs) 
in other industries, that have emerged in the wake of the decision to 
privatise formerly public extension service: 
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1. Adequately articulating demands: SMEs experience difficulties in 
defining their needs to knowledge-producing organisations, and the 
“cognitive distance” between the different actors involved – farmers 
and academics, say – may cause co-ordination and learning problems 
2. Developing adequate resources and competencies: whilst public 
extension services were supply driven – “technology push” – and 
largely prescriptive, the current situation requires entrepreneurial 
initiative, such as developing competencies around knowledge 
acquisition and learning to bolster absorptive capacity4 (see Chauvet, 
2003). This is made difficult for SMEs as they often lack the time and 
funds required to invest in acquiring new knowledge or technology. 
Indeed, this proves a major barrier to innovation (Section 5.2.1.1). 
3. Dealing with market failure: the market for agricultural knowledge is 
increasingly heterogeneous, leading to information/knowledge 
asymmetry between actors, as well as difficulty identifying services, 
or what Bougrain & Haudeville (2002) call an “information gap”, 
something that is returned to in Chapter 5. 
4. Financing agricultural R&D and services and knowledge provision: 
agricultural entrepreneurs now have to mobilise funds to take 
advantage of the kinds of knowledge that were previously provided 
for free; likewise, knowledge providers, such as research institutes 
and universities, now have to compete for contracts with clients in a 
market that is increasingly “pluriform” and served by non-traditional 
                                                        
4 Cohen & Levinthal (1990, p. 129) define absorptive capacity as: “the ability to 
value new external information, to assimilate it and to apply it to commercial ends”. 
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providers of agricultural R&D and knowledge. In this procurement 
environment, uncertainty increases costs for everyone involved. 
5. Overcoming systems failures: due to strategic interests, weakened 
institutional linkages and inherent differences between types of 
actor in the agricultural system, “knowledge infrastructures” have 
become more closed (see Section 4.9). 
 
The challenges noted above consist of both factors at the institutional level 
(such as market failure) and at the personal or firm level (developing in-
house resources). Some of these issues are present in the fresh produce 
industry (see Discussion). 
 
Today, extension science remains an important discipline for understanding 
agricultural innovation (especially in those places that maintain state- 
supported agricultural research and extension). It is impossible to list the 
range of problems to which extension science has been applied: the term 
“extension science”, for instance, registers 4,700,000 results using Google 
Scholar (as of November 2016). However, a number of unifying themes and 
methodologies can be discerned: the adoption of new innovations by a 
target group is the most common area of concern, including the 
identification of disabling and enabling factors governing this process, 
primarily at the personal level (income and education, for example) (see 
Ghadim & Pannell, 1999; Jacobson, Sieving, Jones, & Van Doorn, 2003; 
Maheshwari & Plunkett, 2015; Mercer, 2004; Sajeev & Gangadharappa, 
2011): the exploration and/or facilitation of knowledge sharing amongst 
target groups is another (P. Brown, Hart, Small, & de Oca Munguia, 2016b; 
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Materia, Giarè, & Klerkx, 2014; Pangborn, Woodford, & Nuthall, 2011; B. A. 
Wood et al., 2014). 
 
Yet, as times have changed, so has agricultural research and extension, at 
both the conceptual and practical levels. The Diffusion of Innovations 
tradition enjoyed strong popularity amongst extension practitioners, 
resulting in what Röling describes as a preoccupation with ‘progressive 
farmers’, or those deemed to be at the forefront of innovation (Röling, 1988, 
p. 4). Röling (1985), describes a subsequent preoccupation with knowledge 
systems, building the base for later theories of Agricultural Knowledge and 
Innovation Systems (AKIS & AIS, discussed below). Some have sought to 
change how we conceive of extension practice entirely. Cees Leeuwis 
(2004), building on the work of influential scholar Anne van den Ban, calls 
for the re-invention of agricultural extension; noting that as the challenges 
for farming change, so too must the organisations that support them. In a 
widely cited volume that reinforces Wageningen University’s place as a 
world-leader in the subject (indeed, the Netherlands remains a key source 
of new ideas for the UK fresh produce industry, explained in more detail in 
Section 4.5.1) Leeuwis’ Communication for Rural Innovation (2004, pp. 3-10) 
outlines, in the first instance, some of the ways in which agriculture has been 
challenged and what that entails: 
 
• Food security and intensification: despite the fact that a range of social 
factors can negatively influence food security – bad governance, 
detrimental trade relations etc. – food production remains a key 
means of alleviating food insecurity as global demand increases. 
Given increasing limitations on land use, competition for water and 
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the failure of Green Revolution technologies 5  in sub-optimal 
conditions, agricultural options that do not rely on the intensive use 
of prescribed external inputs such as fertiliser, pesticide and high-
yielding crop varieties may be needed. Indeed, Feder (1993) shows 
that the agri-climatic environment is the most significant factor 
determining the spread of agricultural technology (see also Fujisawa, 
Kobayashi, Johnston, & New, 2015), suggesting the relevance or fit of 
a new idea to a given setting is vital, a theme returned to in Section 
4.8.4. However, underpinning this need for flexibility will be 
technical and social innovation. 
• Poverty alleviation and income generation: improvement in 
agricultural development stands to benefit poorer people directly – 
greater income through farming – or indirectly – since agricultural 
development is regarded as a condition for non-agricultural 
economic growth. Of course, resource-poor farmers also struggle to 
acquire external inputs associated with conventional farming 
elsewhere, reinforcing the need for alternative forms of 
intensification. 
• Sustainability: the detrimental effects of agriculture, such as soil 
degradation, habitat destruction and water pollution (to name only a 
few) have led to calls for a more sustainable agriculture. As such, this 
means agriculture should make better use of resources. However, as 
several authors have pointed out (see Röling & Wagemakers, 1998) 
                                                        
5 Scholars such as Prabhu Pingali (2012) are less dismissive of Green Revolution 
technologies, highlighting the role they have played in increasing global food 
production (as well as congruent poverty reduction). 
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sustainability cannot be looked at in a purely biophysical way, but 
with regards to how humans shape ecological systems. 
• Globalisation and market liberalisation: the world economy, for a 
variety of reasons, has become increasingly orientated around the 
‘free market’, supported by World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules 
and advances in communications technology. In turn, this provides 
both constraints and opportunities for agriculture. 
• Knowledge intensity and commoditisation: many of the challenges 
named here can only be met by developing and harnessing more 
sophisticated and appropriate knowledge – as the importance of the 
so-called “knowledge economy” grows, a firm’s competitive 
advantage is dictated less by relative advantages such as labour costs 
and increasingly by the timely use of knowledge. At the same time, 
knowledge, with the privatisation of extension services and 
competition for research funding, has become a marketable product 
for which a price must be paid. A result of this is a reduction in the 
free exchange of knowledge across the sector. 
 
Leeuwis goes on to describe how agricultural extension must evolve in the 
future, branding this new imagining “communication for rural innovation”: 
 
• Collective issues: in the past, extension theory has focussed on 
supporting individual farm management and promoting “farm-level 
innovations”. However, today many of the challenges faced by the 
agricultural sector ‘transcend’ the individual farm household, 
requiring new forms of co-ordinated action and support, among 
farmers as well as other stakeholders. It is a mistake, Leeuwis 
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reminds us, to view innovation as being individual in nature; 
innovation often requires an alignment of various social and 
technical factors to happen. Such a view requires us to look at things 
like diverging interests and different perspectives (examples from 
this research are discussed in Section 4.2), rather than, as in the past, 
focussing on the narrower process of adoption at farm level. 
• Co-designing innovation, not dissemination: a tendency amongst 
extension organisations to promote, as Leeuwis describes them, 
poorly-adapted and pre-defined innovations that were developed by 
researchers with little regard for farmers’ priorities or problems has 
been well documented and challenged (Chambers et al., 1993; Röling, 
1988; see Van Veldhuizen, Waters-Bayer, & De Zeeuw, 1997). Given 
the challenges listed above, “pre-defined” innovations seem less 
appropriate for the complex solutions required in modern 
agriculture. Indeed, local contexts often demand that innovation is 
adapted (or “re-designed”), encompassing new processes of learning 
and negotiation. Instead, greater emphasis needs to be placed on 
innovation design and adaptation, whilst recognizing that it is only 
through stakeholder interaction that complex and suitable 
innovation can occur (collective innovation). In this vision, extension 
organisations facilitate innovation processes by, for instance, 
translating the views and concerns of the farming community and 
external researchers, rather than disseminating discrete innovations. 
• Matching the social and technical dimensions of innovation: 
innovation, even if technical in nature, often requires change at the 
social level to work in particular settings. A recent example – of many 
possible examples – can be found in the case of alternate wetting and 
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drying (AWD) irrigation in rice production, which, although shown 
to reduce water consumption without harming yields, has seen 
limited adoption amongst rice farmers; in Nepal, a number of social 
factors such as current water-extraction practices and similar, 
locally-developed techniques, were found to have prevented the 
spread of AWD (Howell, Shrestha, & Dodd, 2015). Leeuwis (2004, p. 
13) notes that innovation has a lot to do with creating support 
networks and negotiating new arrangements between stakeholders. 
• Catering for diverse interests: it has been assumed that agriculture 
moves in one particular direction, exemplified by the language of 
Diffusion (see page 24). For instance, “first adopter” and “laggard” 
suggest everyone involved in farming should be moving in the same, 
knowable direction. Of course, even farms that operate under similar 
conditions can develop along different, but economically viable, 
paths. We see diverse business strategies and aspirations in farming. 
In earlier work, Leeuwis (1989) found that so-called “laggard” 
farmers adopted a similar number of innovations when compared 
with those that followed extension advice more closely. As such, 
extension organisations can expect to cater for diversity (as 
demanding as this may be in practice). 
• Brokerage: when funded by government agencies or donors, 
extension organisations often find themselves in a “broker position”, 
having to mediate different interests. In the first instance, national or 
regional governments might be interested in fostering a certain kind 
of development (strengthening exports for example) and 
organisations tasked with realising this endeavour must 
demonstrate that they are doing a good job. At the same time, those 
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same organisations must maintain their credibility in the eyes of 
their immediate customers who might have entirely different 
priorities. Building such credibility is the subject of Section 5.5. 
 
As the field of extension science itself adapts to the changing conditions of 
extension regimes in the real world, other frameworks have emerged to 
explain the complex processes of change in the agricultural world that help 
understand, and contextualise, the role of such endeavours in fostering 
agricultural development. 
2.4.2 Systems-orientated approaches to innovation in agriculture 
 
Innovation systems theories have found a home in agricultural innovation 
studies. The emergence of systems approaches in agricultural innovation 
stem from a recognition that problems in agriculture are increasingly 
understood to be “... complex, uncertain and operate at multiple levels, from 
the field to the global supply chain, and involve social, economic, 
institutional and technological change” (Turner, Klerkx, White, Payne, & 
Everett-Hincks, 2015b, p. 1). As Hall (A. Hall, 2007, p. 5) notes: 
 
“In 1998 a small group of researchers in India started to experiment with the 
innovation system concept as an analytical aid to help understand why 
otherwise promising research and development projects failed to bring about 
desired social and economic changes.” 
 
Today, a family of related (but different) approaches, including AKIS, FSR 
and AIS, continue to make use of ‘systems thinking’. Such a view represents 
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“current” thinking on innovation in agricultural systems, indicating the 
profound challenges to, and replacement of, the research-extension-farmer 
model of agricultural change that, like the agrarian sciences associated with 
it, can be considered positivist and reductionist in outlook 6  (Koutsouris, 
2012). 
 
Klerkx et al. (2012b) chart the development of these theories in agriculture, 
noting that although systems enquiry in an agricultural context has matured 
in relative isolation from other systems traditions, there has been a degree 
of cross-fertilisation. Several broad stages of thinking can be discerned: 
 
1. Adoption and diffusion theories: these are characterised by the 
Technology Transfer (TT) paradigm initiated by Rogers (Rogers, 
1983) and include a strong emphasis on social systems, but treat 
institutions and policy as external factors influencing rates of 
adoption. 
2. Farm Systems Research (FSR): this perspective emerged in response 
to perceived inadequacies of the more linear approaches to 
agricultural innovation. FSR aims to take a holistic account of 
agricultural change by “... capturing the interactions between farms 
and their natural, social and economic context” (Darnhofer et al., 
2012, p. 3). 
3. Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS): this 
tradition also grew out of dissatisfaction with the linear model of 
                                                        
6 That being said, Klerkx et al. (2012b) position the Diffusion tradition within the 
systems lineage given its focus on social networks and mass media (social systems). 
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Technology Transfer but traces its lineage to extension science. It 
focuses on the organisations interactions between different actors as 
they produce, adapt, transmit and store knowledge. In its earliest 
incarnations (see Stenvang et al., 2013) AKIS adopted a “hard 
systems” view; the system in question has a ‘solid’ boundary and 
common purpose, which exists independent of the observer and, by 
extension, can be “engineered” towards an unambiguous goal. 
However, AKIS has come to be epitomised by “softer systems” 
thinking in which it is accepted that the boundaries of a given system 
will be understood differently by different people within it (an issue 
returned to in 3.1.2). As framework for understanding, AKIS has been 
particularly influential; the European Commission, for example, has 
framed recent policy debates around a conceptualisation of the 
European agricultural innovation system as an AKIS (EU SCAR, 
2012). 
4. Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS): growing in tandem but 
separate from AKIS, is AIS, which was instead influenced by National 
Systems of Innovation thinking. It differs from AKIS in its scope, 
broadening the horizon to include all relevant organisations in 
agricultural innovation (and not only research and extension 
systems) (Hermans et al., 2015, p. 38). Innovation in this context is 
given to be the result of multiple interactions between farming 
systems, supply chains, policy environments, and economic and 
social systems (Klerkx et al., 2012b). As Klerkx et al. (2012b) explain: 
“... the main achievement of the AIS approach thus appears to be that 
it has further broadened the scope of analysts and interventionists 
on the complex interactions between a multitude of players and sub-
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systems that characterize innovation”. Not only is this the most 
“recent” in the family of systems-orientated approaches to 
agricultural innovation (Klerkx et al., 2012b), it also represents the 
most pertinent approach to tackling the kinds of complex problems 
that are the concern of this project (Schut, Klerkx, Rodenburg, 
Kayeke, Hinnou, Raboanarielina, et al., 2014a, p. 1). 
 
Given its focus on issues similar to those framing this thesis, it is worth 
exploring the AIS approach in more detail; diagnostic AIS approaches have 
been used to identify the barriers to innovation in various settings (see 
Polzin, Flotow, & Klerkx, 2016; Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & 
Barnard, 2015a) and even in parts of the UK (Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012). 
 
Taking an AIS perspective, Klerkx et al. (2012b) describe different views 
regarding what can “enable” and “disable” innovation, though it should be 
acknowledged that the idea of optimising innovation systems hinges upon 
one’s precise conceptualisation of the agricultural innovation system and its 
components. An infrastructuralist view of the AIS sees its purpose as being 
to support agricultural innovation, and its success is thus determined by the 
extent to which it enhances or hinders agricultural innovation in a rather 
static manner; a process view of AIS sees the innovation system as a self-
organising system of networks, that come and go in the pursuit of novelty. 
An inherently dynamic process with clear influences from the Multi-level 
Perspective, the configuration of the value chain in such systems is seen as 
moving ever towards an alternative to the ‘incumbent regime’, perhaps even 
threatening it entirely (A. Hall & Clark, 2009). As such, this view of the 
innovation system borders on the idea of system innovation – the 
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transformation of a system to a new, innovative configuration (see Elzen et 
al., 2004; Geels, 2005). In turn, a well-functioning AIS is, according to this 
perspective, determined by the extent to which niches can be supported and 
system transition encouraged (see Section 2.3.5.3); lastly, the functionalist 
view of innovation like that described by Hekkert (2007) sees the 
innovation system as providing several important functions. Klerkx et al. 
(2012b) note the similarities between the evolutionary perspective on 
evolution here: a biological system cannot function without each of its 
components – organs – fulfilling some function or other.  
 
By mapping such functions and the interactions between them, one can 
pinpoint areas of ‘systemic failure’ to inform policy (see Turner, Klerkx, 
Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a for example). As such, it is possible to 
assess the functioning of this system against its supposed ‘functions’ in a 
systematic way (see Hekkert et al., 2007; Kebebe et al., 2015; Suurs, Hekkert, 
Kieboom, & Smits, 2009; Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 
2015a). The seven functions of innovation systems are as follows: 
 
1. Entrepreneurial activities use the potential of new knowledge, 
networks and markets to create value (see Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b). 
Such activities can also include lobbying and attempts to ‘restructure’ 
institutional environments. 
2. Knowledge development is considered a fundamental prerequisite to 
innovation (Kebebe et al., 2015, p. 70) and the ability to create new 
knowledge a vital component of effective AIS. Creation of new 
knowledge is not restricted to formal research establishment; 
farmers and agro-businesses can also be a source of new knowledge. 
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3. Knowledge diffusion through networks is particularly important to 
further develop and adapt knowledge and innovations, and to “scale 
them up” (by garnering support in terms of favourable policy and 
market conditions) and “out” (by increasing the number of users). In 
other words, to enhance the “co-evolution of social, technological, 
institutional and market changes” (Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, 
Williams, & Barnard, 2015a, p. 3). An emphasis on the importance of 
innovation ‘platforms’ and networks where this interactive learning 
can occur is common in AIS literature (Kilelu, Klerkx, & Leeuwis, 
2013; Klerkx et al., 2013; Schut, Klerkx, & Sartas, 2015). 
4. Guidance of the search concerns the creation of a “vision” for the 
innovation system with which to orientate other system functions 
(such as entrepreneurial activity and knowledge development). 
Turner et al. (2015a) stress that ‘innovation agendas’ can be used to 
this effect. Mylan et al. (Mylan, Geels, Gee, & McMeekin, 2014, p. 22) 
also note that shared meanings, expectations and a clear vision for 
the future can stimulate innovation by reducing uncertainty and 
providing a sense of direction to innovation processes. 
5. Market formation concerns the development of markets for novel 
products or existing products made in new ways, which can prove 
challenging due to resistance from the consumer and/or ‘incumbent 
players’. 
6. Resource mobilisation involves the management of the human and 
financial resources to undertake activities within the AIS; this 
includes funding for research and subsidies for certain technologies 
for example, as well as to attract appropriate expertise in “innovation 
trajectories”. 
 64 
7. Creation of legitimacy is necessary to counteract resistance to change 
inherent in existing systems of production, trade and consumption. 
 
Structures are the actors, institutions, interactions and infrastructure that 
determines the operation of these seven functions: 
 
1. Actors are individuals, firms and other organisations, that tend to be 
delineated by their economic activities (i.e. NGO, business, 
government). 
2. Institutions range from ‘soft’ (habits and routines) to ‘hard’ (rules, 
norms and strategies) factors shaping the activity of actors. 
3. Interactions are the dynamic relations between different actors. 
4. Infrastructure refers to either 1) physical infrastructure (such as 
roads or existing technology, 2) knowledge infrastructure, such as 
research and extension facilities or 3) financial infrastructure such as 
grants, subsidies and financial programmes. 
 
A plethora of ‘types’ of system failure exist between these functions and 
structures (see Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005). Weber & 
Rohracher (2012) provide an outline of these failures, which fall into the 
broader categories of market, structural and transformational failure. 
However, as Woolthius et al. (2005, p. 614) suggest:  
 
“Most problems in the innovation system will not be uni-dimensional but will 
consist of a complex mixture of causes and effects, and involve several 
actors.” 
 
 65 
Although there are differences between these conceptualisations of the 
AIS, several common “enabling factors” and disabling factors” or “barriers” 
to AIS performance can be discerned (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Enabling and disabling factors for AIS performance (adapted from Klerkx et al., 
2012b) 
Enabling factors Disabling factors 
• Learning within and between firms 
and organisations in order to 
innovate 
• Strengthening individual and 
collective capabilities to innovate 
• Demand and supply-driven science 
and technology 
• Innovation agents focusing on 
complex and dynamic interactions 
• Network-based knowledge 
dissemination 
• Both embedded and dis-embedded 
knowledge dissemination: in both 
tacit and codified forms 
• Decentralized management of 
innovation processes  
• Infrastructural: 
o Lack of investment in both 
physical structures (roads, 
telecoms) but also research 
and development facilities 
and financial infrastructure 
• Institutional: 
o Ranging from “hard”, 
formalised laws or 
regulations or lack of IP 
protection, to “soft” norms, 
values and culture that 
hamper innovation 
• Capabilities: 
o Lack of technical or 
organisational capacity to 
adapt to or manage new 
innovation 
• Market: 
o Relations between market 
participants, lack of 
trust/transparency or 
monopoly 
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Because a systems perspective places emphasis on interaction between the 
component parts of a given system, “... creating and fostering effective 
linkages amongst heterogeneous sets of actors” is the primary goal of AIS 
enquiry; however, this can also be hampered by social, economic, technical 
and cultural divides (Klerkx et al., 2012b, p. 468; see also Oreszczyn, Lane, & 
Carr, 2010). These can happen due to the use of different incentive 
structures for private and public actors, or between formal (scientific) and 
informal (indigenous) knowledge (see Section 4.7.1.2). Going further, Hall 
(2007) outlines the types of organisational attitudes and practices that 
“restrict” or “support” innovation (some of which emerge in this research) 
(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 List of restrictive and supportive attitudes and practices for agricultural innovation 
(adapted from A. Hall, 2007) 
Restrictive attitudes and practices Supportive attitudes and practices  
• Mistrust of other organizations 
• Closed to other’s ideas 
• Secretiveness 
• Lack of confidence 
• Professional hierarchies between 
organizations and disciples  
• Internal hierarchies  
• Top-down cultures and 
approaches  
• Failures are covered up 
• Limited scope and intensity of 
interaction in sector networks 
• Trust 
• Openness 
• Transparency 
• Confidence 
• Mutual respect 
• Flat management structure  
• Reflection and learning from 
successes and failures 
• Proactive networking 
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Systems-orientated approaches to agricultural innovation are now 
established in European (EU SCAR, 2012), African (Kebebe et al., 2015; 
Kilelu et al., 2013; Sumberg, 2005) and Australasian research (Turner, 
Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a), as well as being promoted by 
the World Bank (World Bank, 2012). A key strength of these approaches, at 
least from the perspective of this project, is the comprehensiveness with 
which they treat the possible sources of innovation – the final topic of this 
literature review. 
2.4.3 Sources and drivers of innovation 
 
As Kline & Rosenberg (2000, p. 283) stress “… it is a serious mistake to treat 
innovation as if it were a well-defined, homogenous thing that could be 
identified as entering the economy at a precise date – or becoming available 
at a precise point in time”. How then, can the sources of innovation be 
explored? 
 
Sources of innovation (if one is interested in a more robust answer than: 
“humans”) are not necessarily the focus of any academic tradition: rather, 
each tradition has its own foci regarding the direction and nature of 
innovation. For the neoclassical economists, rational and self-optimising 
agents – with an emphasis on the “firm” – allocate an optimal amount of 
resources to the innovation process in order to enhance individual and 
social welfare through technological change. A key assumption here is that 
such actors can make rational choices with the (presumably complete) 
information they have at their disposal; as shown above, this is not 
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presumed to be the case in other disciplines. Here, the attention is not on 
sources of innovation itself, but on the sources of economic growth (Edquist 
& McKelvey, 2000, p. 225). 
 
For evolutionary economists, innovation is highly path dependent, meaning 
there are limited ‘avenues’ down which technological change might be 
directed. Such change is subject to ‘selection’ by the economy, but as 
proponents of the multi-level perspective would have it, radical innovation 
originates within protected “niches” of learning and experimenting that are 
sheltered from these selection pressures until they are able to ‘stand alone’ 
in the market. Incremental innovations, in this tradition, are seen as 
inevitable ‘artefacts’ of the regime in which they are nested. 
 
In the Systems of Innovation tradition, it is recognised that “the manner in 
which innovations are generated differ significantly from one industry to 
another” (Kline & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 280). However, Freeman (Freeman, 
2000, p. 46) offers something a little more concrete in discussing data that 
began to emerge in the 1970s and 80s: 
 
“... it became increasingly evident that the success of innovations, their rate of 
diffusion and the associated productivity gains depended on a wide variety of 
other influences as well as formal R&D. In particular, incremental 
innovations came from production engineers, from technicians and from the 
shop floor… formal R&D was usually decisive in its contribution to radical 
innovations but it was no longer possible to ignore the many other 
contributions…”  
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If the sources of innovation differ slightly according to the above theories, 
the drivers of innovation do not: these are primarily ‘economic’, with 
innovation providing some sort of competitive advantage for the innovating 
party. As the findings of this research show (see Section 4.4.1), this is no 
different for the UK fresh produce industry, though there are other, 
significant drivers of innovation to be considered. 
 
At least one author has gone beyond these perspectives to examine the 
sources of innovation in a systematic manner. Eric von Hippel’s Sources of 
Innovation (1988) sought to elucidate the origins of products belonging to 
several categories of equipment7. A notable finding of this work is that it is 
often the practitioners working with certain equipment who either develop 
or modify the products they use in daily life. One might choose to link this to 
a major shift in thinking about agricultural innovation during the 1980s, in 
which the previously dominant model of agricultural development was 
challenged (see 2.4.2) in light of observations about farmers as sources of 
change (see Chambers et al., 1993). However, von Hippel goes on to list the 
multitude of sources of innovation across a number of sectors, finding that 
the functional source of innovation varies by industry. This, one might argue, 
is more in keeping with the ‘systems’ perspective, which takes innovation to 
be the result of collaboration between different industry actors. As Hall (A. 
Hall et al., 2006) notes: 
 
                                                        
7 von Hippel defines the innovator as the individual or firm that first develops an 
innovation to a useful state – this is what he calls the “functional” source of 
innovation. 
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“Innovation requires knowledge from multiple sources, including from users 
of that knowledge; it involves these different sources of knowledge 
interacting with each other in order to share and combine ideas; these 
interactions and processes are usually very specific to a particular context; 
and each context has its own routines and traditions that reflect historical 
origins shaped by culture, politics, policies and power.” 
 
A weakness of von Hippels work, relative to systems-orientated approaches 
for example, is that it disregards institutional, society or organisational 
innovation, focussing exclusively on products instead – it likewise 
diminished the role of knowledge in innovation. Rosenberg (Rosenberg, 
1994, p. 12) suggests that the stock of “presently available” scientific 
knowledge must present some constraints as to what is technologically 
possible, simultaneously permitting a range of technological alternatives to 
be “… taken up within the frontiers of that knowledge”. It is in this sense that 
research – if aimed at generating knowledge – feeds into the innovative 
process, becoming a prime tool in social and technological change. 
Audretsch (1999) claims that the most important ‘input’ into the innovation 
process is new economic knowledge, and that the primary source of new 
economic knowledge is R&D.  
 
However, systems-orientated approaches have opened the eyes of 
researchers to the multiple sources of new knowledge that exist (see Biggs, 
1990; A. Hall, 2007). Rather than seeing researchers and universities as the 
ultimate sources of such knowledge, or firms or even farmers, innovation 
occurs through the interaction of these agents: 
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“... innovation as a social process of integrating different pieces of 
information held by different people, is subject to the whole range of social 
and institutional factors that pattern people’s behaviour and interactions.” 
(referencing Engel, 1997; A. Hall, 2007, p. 7) 
 
Hall (2008, p. 17) goes as far as to suggest that there is no longer a single 
source of information and technology. The linear model of innovation, in 
particular, fails to capture such complexity. As Ingram (2014) suggests, the 
linear model of innovation does not account for the multiple goals and 
interactivity of modern agriculture. 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has described the main features of the fresh produce industry 
and the changing nature of agricultural research in the UK. 
 
It then tackled the problem of defining innovation – as well as its importance 
–  before describing classical approaches to studying growth, beginning with 
the neoclassical tradition that failed to adequately take account of 
technological change and subsequent development of evolutionary 
economic theory, which sought to capture some of the complexities of 
technical change that neoclassical economists could not. 
 
Next, it turned to the broader theories of technological change, which have 
attempted to explain real-world innovation, starting with Diffusion theory 
and moving onto National Systems of Innovation and Innovation Systems 
approaches, before turning to the more recent Multi-level Perspective. 
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The history of how innovation in an agricultural context has been 
approached was then investigated, beginning with extension science and 
moving onto more systems-orientated approaches to agricultural 
innovation like FSR, AKIS and AIS. 
 
Lastly, what is understood about the sources and drivers of innovation was 
discussed. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated a trend away from reductive theories of 
change in recent years, particularly in the realm of agriculture, which, as an 
industry, is increasingly called upon to deliver the competing demands of 
food production, environmental protection and rural development. 
Innovation systems theories have at the same time found a home in 
diagnostic work relating to agricultural problems and have embraced the 
complexity of multiple-actor innovation. 
 
Of particular relevance to this study is the changing nature of agricultural 
extension, which, as noted earlier, has undergone significant change over 
the last several decades in Europe. The call for new forms of organisation in 
order to meet the challenges faced by the modern agricultural industry. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the methodological approach used in the project is outlined, 
with justifications given for the use of specific methods. It begins by 
exploring suitable conceptual frameworks with which to frame the study 
before providing an explanation of the case study method and describing the 
type of data this approach might require. 
 
It then outlines the process of conducting semi-structured interviews, 
including the ethical considerations of this type of study, before discussing 
how the data is analysed using the Framework Analysis approach. 
3.1.1 Methodological requirements 
 
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) has explored the various approaches to 
understanding innovation. It has been studied in a variety of ways and at a 
range of scales. It has been studied by social scientists from various fields, 
including innovation studies, economics, rural sociology, business studies 
and history (Malerba & Brusoni, 2007). It is clear that more than one 
discipline – and different types of data – offer the means to scrutinise 
questions about innovation. Those disciplines most relevant to this project 
(i.e. those that concern innovation in an agricultural setting), such as AKIS 
and AIS, emphasise the importance of interaction amongst constituent parts 
of the agricultural “system”, appreciation for the diverse sources of 
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innovation in agriculture and the learning processes at the heart of 
innovation. However, it is important to outline the exact methodological and 
empirical needs arising from the research questions. As Schensul (Schensul, 
2008, p. 517) notes, research methodology:  
 
“… consists of the assumptions, postulates, rules and methods – the blueprint 
or roadmap – that researchers employ to render their work open to analysis, 
critique, replication, repetition and/or adaptation and to choose research 
methods.”  
 
This chapter outlines the methodology taken to answering the research 
questions underpinning this project, which are: 
 
1. What are the sources of innovation in the UK fresh produce industry? 
2. What are the barriers to innovation in the fresh produce industry? 
3. How can innovative capacity be enhanced? 
 
Given the emphasis of the relevant literature, and focus of the research 
questions on the contextual circumstances of innovation, several 
interconnected requirements emerge with regards to methodology and the 
data it should provide: 
 
1. Guiding framework or theory: ‘innovation’ has been studied in 
numerous ways, each with a specific focus. In order to situate itself 
theoretically, some kind of conceptual/analytical framework or 
working theory is required to properly hone the research 
methodology. 
 75 
2. Data of sufficient ‘resolution’, or depth: certain approaches to 
understanding innovation processes do so at ‘low resolution’ in order 
to understand broad trends. However, the research questions 
suggest a need for data that can provide a contextual, specific 
understanding of innovation processes in the UK fresh produce 
sector. 
3. Applied in practice: since the project seeks to provide 
recommendations to real-world organisations, it should be rooted in 
a ‘real world’, applied setting. 
A suitable research methodology that was capable of providing the 
necessary data to answer these questions was established through a series 
of research decisions informed by published literature. It combined several 
approaches to social enquiry from different, but often-complementary fields 
that can be broken-down into three components: 
 
1. Conceptual framework: an Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) 
approach. 
2. Methodology: an embedded case study of innovation in UK fresh 
produce. 
3. Data generation and analysis: primarily applied qualitative research 
using Framework Analysis to generate case data. 
 
These decisions are explained below, beginning with the broadest 
assumptions of the project and moving onto the particulars of the research 
design. 
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3.2 Conceptual framework 
 
In terms of guiding framework, several stand out as potentially suitable on 
the basis their relevance to innovation in agricultural settings: Technology 
Transfer/Diffusion approaches, Agricultural Knowledge and Information 
Systems (AKIS), Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) approaches, and Farm 
Systems Research (FSR), each of which is summarised in Table 3. 
 
Of these frameworks, AIS provides the most coherent, yet flexible, analytical 
framework to explore contemporary agricultural innovation. 
 
As Table 3 indicates, the “Technology Transfer” (TT) paradigm associated 
with the Diffusion model of technological adoption (first column), can be 
used to examine innovation in agriculture, but does so from the now rather 
limited position of the research-extension-farmer model of agricultural 
development. It treats as decided the sources of innovation – namely, 
research and researchers – and, at least in early iterations of the approach, 
ignores the context in which such technologies must be placed.
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Table 3 Outline of four approaches to agricultural innovation, adapted from Schut et al. (2014b) 
 Technology orientated Systems-orientated 
Approach Transfer of Technology (TT) Farming Systems (FSR) Agricultural Knowledge and 
Information Systems (AKIS) 
Agricultural Innovation 
Systems (AIS) 
Era 1950s – 1980s 1980s – 1990s 1990s – 2000s 2000s - onwards 
Key objectives Transfer, diffusion and adoption of 
technology 
Contextualise agricultural 
research and technology 
Build local capacities, 
empower farmers 
Enhance systems capacity to 
generate and respond to 
change 
Scope Increase global agricultural 
productivity 
Identify and alleviate 
livelihood constraints 
Collaborate and integrate 
different types of knowledge 
for sustainable development 
Generate institutional change 
Core elements Technology packages, efficiency of 
research transfer 
Locally adapted knowledge 
and technology 
Joint knowledge production 
and learning, value chain 
approach 
Institutional analysis, 
stakeholder analysis 
‘Flow’ of innovation Top-down Top-down Bottom-up Multi-directional 
Key intervention 
approach 
Extension to disseminate 
technology 
Mass media to facilitate adoption 
Farmer consultation to 
inform research 
Surveys to develop farm 
typologies, impact of 
innovation 
Participatory research 
Joint learning activities 
Establish multi-actor 
innovation platforms 
Role of farmer Adopters of technology Adopters of knowledge and Experimenters Partners 
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technology 
Sources of information 
Experts Entrepreneurs 
Part of innovation network 
Role of research and 
researcher 
Develop knowledge and 
technology 
Experts Capacity builders 
Facilitators of learning 
Actors to enhance innovation 
capacity 
Members of innovation 
network 
Strengths Enables rapid technological 
progress 
Enhances agricultural productivity 
Technologies are developed 
in context 
Integrates different types of 
knowledge, skills and 
experiences 
Contextualises the approach 
and considers dynamics of 
value chain 
Multi-level focus 
Considers institutional and 
political dimensions of change 
Enhances resilience of the 
agricultural system 
Weaknesses Disregards farmers in technology 
development 
Disregards adoption context 
Focus on farm and field level; 
limited attention for multi-
level interactions 
Local focus; limited attention 
for multi-level interactions 
Ignores structural power 
inequalities between actors 
Entails high costs 
Complicates delineation of 
system 
Lacks empirical evidence of 
practical impact and value 
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Approaches associated with Farm Systems Research (FSR) (second column) 
display a narrow focus on farm context(s), and less on wider, multi-level 
issues. However, on-farm issues routinely transcend the farm itself, and 
whilst more recent FSR has incorporated an understanding of those very 
issues, it is increasingly aligned with the AIS perspective and other systems 
approaches (Darnhofer et al., 2012; Klerkx et al., 2012b). Agricultural 
knowledge and information systems (AKIS) are primarily concerned with 
the development of knowledge and information in the agricultural system, 
and particularly on the functioning of extension services. A lot can be taken 
from this perspective that is, in many ways, a natural sibling to AIS. 
However, the AIS tradition departs from AKIS in placing emphasis on 
interaction amongst all the various actors within the agricultural domain 
that contribute to innovation. Innovation systems approaches have been 
employed to identify and offer solutions to complex agricultural problems, 
variously termed “barriers”, “bottlenecks” and “systemic problems” in 
agricultural systems in both the developed (Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012) 
and developing world (Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Kebebe et al., 2015). As 
such, AIS is a product of considerable research into agricultural innovation, 
and is an appropriate vehicle for exploring the barriers to innovation in the 
UK fresh produce industry at this time: 
“… the AIS approach has proved its value as a comprehensive framework for 
analysing strengths and weaknesses in agricultural innovation systems in 
different contexts.” (Klerkx et al., 2012b) 
 
It was noted earlier that there are also several ways of conceptualising the 
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AIS depending on purpose (Section 2.4.2), there being a infrastructuralist, 
process and functionalist view of innovation systems. Turner et al. (2015a) 
and Kebebe et al. (2015) both represent very relevant examples of the latter: 
by developing an analysis of systemic barriers in specific innovation 
systems, the authors were able to pinpoint problem areas and offer targeted 
policy recommendations to relevant parties. Given the similar goals of this 
project, the functionalist view of innovation systems offers a clear way 
forward.  
 
There are several implications that stem from the choice of ‘innovation 
systems’ thinking and, to a lesser extent, a functionalist view of such systems. 
3.2.1 Adoption of ‘systems thinking’, ontology and epistemology 
 
Systems thinking encourages the researcher to make claims about the topic 
under scrutiny, both at the ontological and epistemological levels: is the 
system of interest an actual system – i.e. “real” in the ontological sense – or 
is the use of the word “system” merely a heuristic device to help us 
understand complex phenomena? As Darnhofer et al. (2012, p. 12) point out: 
 
“The system is thus defined for the particular purpose of the study, but not 
assumed to exist per se. It is only a heuristic device that is effective in 
describing, classifying and discussing, thereby allowing the enhancement of 
understanding. This approach is based on a dynamic understanding between 
the researcher and the situation that is studied.” 
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In this project, the use of ‘systems thinking’ is considered an epistemological 
device (systems as epistemology), a tool used to frame one’s understanding 
of a complex set of interactions and processes that make up an industry 
(Ison, 2010). As such, one might describe the underlying ontological 
position as constructivist: innovation is a co-negotiated process between 
different system actors, with different world-views and agendas, whose 
activities are shaped by ‘environmental’ factors such as policy, which they 
may attempt to reform (Klerkx et al., 2010). As noted earlier (Section 2.4.2), 
recent systems thinking in agriculture has tended towards viewing systems 
as “soft”, implying that the actors that make up a given system will 
understand the boundaries and purpose of that system differently, 
potentially leading to conflicts (Klerkx et al., 2012b). 
 
The focus on system actors corresponds to critical or subtle realism8. As 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 13) note, critical and subtle realism – developed 
by Bhasker (1978) and Hammersely (1992), respectively – argue that: 
 
“…social phenomena are believed to exist independently of people’s 
representations of them but are only accessible though those 
representations.” 
 
                                                        
8 Given the assumptions of the epistemological positions already described, critical 
realism is the preferred ontological position for this project; whereas subtle realism 
assumes that, although social phenomena do exist independently of the observer, 
interpretation of those phenomena is limited to one’s own experience of them, 
critical realists assume that the more interpretations one can account for, the closer 
to that “reality” one gets. 
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Indeed, Koustouris (2012) explicitly calls for the use of critical realism in AIS 
analysis. Such a position was chosen because this project seeks to 
understand “real world” phenomena, whilst it must be acknowledged that 
this can only be done by interacting with people who have experience of 
those phenomena (e.g. barriers to innovation in the fresh produce industry). 
As such, the research participants’ representations of these issues – the 
meaning they attach to them – are an inevitable product of researching the 
topic. It is both the interpretation of these phenomena and what those 
interpretations can tell us about the “real world” that are of interest. 
Systems thinking is also useful in a methodological sense, because it enables 
the researcher to define, in conceptual terms, what Schensul (2008) 
describes as study site (where and when the research takes place), study 
population (the groups or individuals of interest to the researcher with 
respect to research question) and study sample (the units of analysis, often 
people but can include events and other phenomena of interest). 
 
Another facet of ‘systems thinking’ is reflexivity. Embedded, as the project is, 
in the social sciences, reflexivity enhances academic rigour by inviting 
researchers to make clear their position on certain factors before, during 
and after primary data collection and analysis. The importance of reflexivity 
is enhanced in light of the ‘systems as epistemology’ viewpoint. If the 
‘system’ is heuristic a tool to understand the world, then the researcher is, 
themselves, a component of that system and therefore not a neutral 
observer of it (in contrast to how a biologist my think of themselves with 
regards to an ecological system, for example) (see Ison, 2010). As Ritchie & 
Spencer (2003, p. 13) observe: 
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“Some early commentators believed that the social world was similar to the 
physical world and was governed by universal, causal laws. Most 
contemporary qualitative researchers maintain that the social world is 
regulated by normative expectations and shared understandings and hence 
the laws that govern it are not immutable.” 
 
Other important considerations of the ‘systems’ approach concern 
boundaries9. A boundary denotes the limits of the system of concern. It helps 
the practitioner determine what is inside and outside the scope of research, 
and can be used a tool for determining study site, population and sample. 
However, determining the limits of certain systems can be troublesome 
(Ison, 2012). 
 
As the title of this project indicates, the focus of concern is the current UK 
fresh produce industry, which represents the study site. However, in the 
interests of defining boundaries, a more comprehensive description follows: 
 
1. Primary industry: this includes the production of horticultural goods, 
including vegetables, potatoes, fruits, ornamentals 
2. Support services: these include seed and input suppliers, levy 
organisations, research institutes and researchers, non-government 
organisations and civil society groups 
                                                        
9 As an attendee of the ‘Systems Thinking in Practice’ PhD course associated with 
the 12th biennial International Farm Systems Association (IFSA) conference at 
Harper Adams University (Shropshire, UK) in 2016, the author was involved in 
workshops devoted to the design and application of systems thinking in 
agricultural research. 
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3. Processing, packing, marketing and sale: this includes companies that 
receive, process and pack horticultural goods, as well as those that 
market and sell such goods – primarily retailers – and those that 
consolidate supply such as marketing desks and producer groups. 
 
The fresh produce industry can be considered a sub-system10 of the wider 
UK agricultural sector (which includes livestock, dairy, poultry and arable 
industries). Certain actors, it should be noted, transcend not only the 
horticultural sub-sector and wider UK agricultural sector but also permeate 
the international farming industry. Today, many businesses source or 
produce agricultural products both nationally and internationally. As such, 
the scope includes those organisations that interact with the fresh produce 
sub-system in some way, and even though this represents a “fuzzy” 
boundary, it is deemed necessary because these organisations have 
considerable influence on the sector and act as channels through which 
information can travel from beyond the UK. 
 
The range of actors involved in determining innovation processes is large 
(certainly far beyond primary producers and the more obvious support 
services). In this respect, the boundary of the sub-system has continued to 
be shaped by primary data as it was gathered, for as (Darnhofer et al., 2012, 
p. 12) concludes, such choices “… may be revised, whenever it seems 
useful.”. As such, people involved in this sub-system represent a viable study 
population, providing useful inclusion and exclusion criteria for the research 
                                                        
10 “Fresh produce industry” will continue to be used for the remainder of the thesis 
but is considered synonymous with “fresh produce/horticultural sub-system”. 
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design (see below). 
3.3 Methodological considerations 
 
In the previous section, the assumptions stemming from the choice to use an 
AIS approach were made clear: however, as an analytical framework AIS 
does not, itself, provide a methodological outline. Yet there are certain 
methodologies typically associated with the AIS tradition that are used in 
much of the work undertaken in innovation studies with an agricultural 
focus. 
3.3.1 Social research and the case study approach 
 
A number of research methodologies and methods exist in the social 
sciences (Yin, 2009). The choice of which to utilise depends upon: 
 
• The type of research question posed 
• The extent of control the researcher has over actual behavioural events 
• The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events  
 
Yin (2009) distinguishes between five major research strategies, being the 
case study, experiment, survey, archival analysis and historical study (see 
Table 4 for a breakdown of three such strategies). 
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Table 4 A comparison of case study, survey and experimental approaches. Adapted from 
Gomm et al. (2011) 
Case study Survey Experiment 
   
Investigation of a small 
number of cases 
Investigation of a large 
number of cases 
Investigation of a small 
number of cases 
   
Information gathered and 
analysed about a large 
number of features of 
each case 
Information gathered and 
analysed about a small 
number of features of each 
case 
Information gathered and 
analysed about a small 
number of features of 
each case 
   
Study of naturally 
occurring cases or of 
cases created by the 
researcher but where 
primary concern is not 
controlling variables 
Study of naturally occurring 
cases with primary concern 
the maximisation of sample 
representativeness 
Study of cases with 
primary concern the 
control of important 
variables 
   
Quantification of data is 
not a priority 
Qualitative data may be a 
priority, quantification not a 
priority 
Quantification of data is a 
priority 
   
Aim is theoretical 
inference or evaluation of 
an intervention 
To understand the case in 
itself, or 
generalisation/transferability 
to wider domain 
Aim is empirical 
generalisation 
(sometimes as a platform 
to theoretical inference) 
 
Of the approaches outline in Table 4, it is clear that experimentation is not a 
practical solution to the research questions associated with this project: it is 
not possible to control variables in the aforementioned conception of the 
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(inherently social) AIS. Social surveys do offer a means of tackling the 
research question, as questionnaires (commonly associated with survey 
design) provide a means of gathering views on innovation. However, 
surveys also require a prior understanding of the phenomena under 
scrutiny to develop (closed) questions, and as such do not allow the 
researcher to pursue emergent themes that may appear otherwise. The 
focus of this study on contemporary, rather than historical, circumstances 
suggests a study of history is likewise inappropriate. If one were interested 
in tracking the development and adoption of a specific technology or 
practice, then archival analysis as outlined by Yin (2009, p. 8) could be a 
viable strategy. However, this is more in keeping with the 
Diffusion/Technology Transfer approach to agricultural innovation (outlined 
above) and does not offer the means to scrutinise contemporary events. It is 
worth pointing out that archival data can be included in a case study. A case 
study is defined as: 
 
“… a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of 
a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of evidence… the case is the situation, individual, group, 
organisation, or whatever it is that we are interested in.” (Robson, 2011, pp. 
135-136) 
 
Case studies are common in FSR (Darnhofer et al., 2012, p. 106) and AKIS 
and AIS work, as well as the Technology Transfer/Diffusion traditions and in 
international development work. To give just a few examples: 
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• A series of case studies involving 20 innovation “intermediaries” in the 
Dutch agricultural sector (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b) 
• A case study of the Dutch vegetable breeding innovation system (Liu, 
Jongsma, Huang, Dons, & Omta, 2015) 
• A case study of social learning through joint-experimentation in Benin 
(Akpo, Crane, Vissoh, & Tossou, 2014) 
• A case study of socio-economic and policy constraints to dairy 
development in Ethiopia (Kebebe et al., 2015) 
• A case study examining knowledge flows between agricultural 
research and extension services in Italy (Materia et al., 2014)  
 
Why is the case study so popular in agricultural innovation studies? In 
essence, it is because these approaches perceive innovation as a social 
process and require some unit of analysis or frame of reference; one cannot 
study every possible innovation process going on in a certain place at a 
certain time. Cases are therefore used in order to particularise, generalise or 
build theory, depending on the aims of the project in question, often with 
the intention of informing policy. 
 
The case study approach is useful when the research question seeks to 
explain some present circumstance (the “how” and “why” of a social 
phenomenon) (Yin, 2009, p. 4). Case studies are often used where variables 
cannot be controlled and the researcher cannot influence events. Qualitative 
research in general and the case study approach in particular reject in part 
or completely the notion of immutable, generalisable laws (at least in the 
social world) (Lincoln & Guba, 2011). As such, “local conditions” prevail. In 
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circumstances where little is known about a specific topic – where a priori 
issues have not been explored, say – case studies provide a means of 
identifying important issues, being expansionist rather than reductionist in 
nature (Gomm et al., 2011, p. 24). 
 
As Gomm et al. (2011, pp. 3-4) note, case studies can differ markedly in their 
aims and content, in the number of cases and their respective level of detail, 
whether the case is longitudinal or not, the extent to which researchers 
document the social context of each case and whether analysis goes beyond 
description and explanation to evaluation and prescription. However, 
Gomm et al. (2011, p. 5) also point out that such parameters are determined 
by the aims of the project, and if the focus is “… some problem in the 
situation investigated, then the discussion will be geared towards 
diagnosing that problem and identifying its sources and what can be done 
about it”. Yin (Yin, 2009) delineates four types of case study: 
 
• Single-case designs with one unit of analysis (holistic) 
• Single-case designs with more than one unit of analysis (embedded) 
• Multiple-case designs with one unit of analysis (holistic) 
• Multiple-case designs with more than one unit of analysis (embedded) 
 
It is tempting to think of multiple-case studies as conferring greater 
reliability by using more than one case (and increased transferability) (see 
Yin, 2009, pp. 53-54). Yin goes on to outline the rationale for choosing 
amongst these options: single-case studies are used when the subject under 
scrutiny is considered average, unique, deviant, revelatory or as a test for 
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existing theory: multiple-case studies are common in situations where one 
wishes to test theoretical predictions through literal or theoretical 
replication. 
 
Two of these options were considered potentially relevant: the “embedded” 
single-case design with more than one unit of analysis and the “holistic” 
multiple-case study with one unit of analysis. In the former, the UK fresh 
produce sub-system itself could be considered the case study within the 
wider agricultural sector, with embedded components and multiple data 
sources. In the latter, multiple cases could be selected from amongst the 
parts of the innovation system for analysis and comparison with one 
another. 
 
However, multiple-case studies have a heavy focus on theory, which is 
necessary to guide the literal replication of cases (where they are presumed 
to confirm predicted results) or theoretical replication of cases (where they 
are presumed to offer contrasting results) rather than applied outputs. 
Secondly, if representation through proper sampling is needed from a target 
group, say, people involved in an innovation sub-system, each case would 
have to include information about both the context of that case (such as 
detailed background information) and the relationship between that case 
and the phenomena under scrutiny, throwing up an “impossibly” large 
number of variables (Yin, 2009, p. 56). As such, a single case study with 
embedded units of analysis is preferable: being able to use different units 
of analysis under the umbrella of a single-case study permits the use of 
various data sources in direct reference to the case, where appropriate. 
Likewise, if some form of representation in a possible sample of subunits is 
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required – which is appropriate given the nature of innovation as perceived 
through the AIS lens – then some measure of sampling from amongst those 
subunits is necessary (see below). 
 
The case can be considered to be intrinsic – a logical extension of the 
research questions, which, as stated, describe the case: innovation in the 
fresh produce industry. With respect to ‘systems thinking’, the case 
corresponds to what Ison (2010) calls the situation, which should not be 
confused with the heuristic device of the system. 
 
Here, it is worth bearing in mind Yin’s (2009) warning: if too much attention 
is given to subunits of the case, larger, holistic aspects of the case begin to 
be ignored, and thus the focus of the study will “shift”. If this shift is justified, 
Yin notes, it must be expressed explicitly. In response to this, it is possible to 
defer to an earlier pragmatic epistemological assumption: that “…social 
phenomena are believed to exist independently of people’s representations 
of them but are only accessible though those representations.” As such, to 
understand this case we may have to accept that the sub-units, if they are 
people, may ‘shift’ the research in their direction. 
3.3.2 What type of data? 
 
The strength of the case study approach lies in the broad range of empirical 
evidence that can be used to contextualise, explain and evaluate the 
phenomena under study. However, thought must be given to what types of 
data can best inform a case study of the UK fresh produce innovation system. 
Case studies often use certain qualitative methods of data generation, 
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particularly interviews but also document analysis and participant 
observation. 
 
Of those disciplines that focus on innovation, two groups emerge: those that 
rely primarily on quantitative data and those that primarily rely on 
qualitative data. The former is often considered to sit in the positivist or post-
positivist paradigm in which objective knowledge can be gleaned by 
observation in a “value-free” way; the latter based in the constructivist view 
that social properties are ‘constructed’ through people’s interactions, rather 
than existing separately (see Robson, 2011, pp. 20-25). As Dörnyei (2007, p. 
24) suggests, this is perhaps the best-known distinction in research 
methodologies.  
 
In economic approaches, used in pure economics and in some business 
studies, large-scale quantitative data are used to chart broad trends in 
agricultural productivity and technical change (see Alston et al., 1999; 
Alston, Beddow, & Pardey, 2009). Such methods tend to rely on numerical, 
archival data, and do not typically offer the depth needed to explore sector-
specific barriers to innovation that can be social in nature (such as policy or 
level of farmer education). 
 
Certain quantitative approaches have been used in high-resolution studies, 
but concern farmer behaviour, adoption of technology and those adoption 
factors that can be quantified to produce some kind of model (see Ghadim & 
Pannell, 1999); these miss ‘systemic’ factors that have been identified as 
important in other disciplines (Klerkx et al., 2010). In such cases, the 
research-extension-farmer (or Diffusion) model of innovation tends to 
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dominate, because the uptake of a particular technology or practice can be 
quantified either in an absolute sense (Calleja et al., 2012) or amongst a 
certain population (see Röling, 1988, pp. 1-18). Hall & Rosenberg (2010) 
outline current economic thought in a range of areas, including agricultural 
economics, but it is clear that economic approaches, as valuable as they are 
at scale, have limited capacity to elucidate the operational context of 
innovation. Likewise, these data are longitudinal rather than cross-
sectional. In the case of Technology Transfer/Diffusion research, such data 
are used to plot the adoption of a specific technology or practice over time. 
However, as Dörnyei (2007, p. 78) notes, cross-sectional methods provide a 
“snapshot-like” analysis of a target phenomenon at a particular point in time 
that allows the researcher “…to establish relationships between variables”, 
which is an important consideration in light of the research aims of this 
study. 
 
Some studies use both quantitative and qualitative techniques of enquiry 
(mixed-methods research): Temel, Janssen & Karimov (2003) combine the 
assumptions of systems thinking (i.e. how components of a system interact 
is important) with ‘graph theoretical’ techniques to provide a breakdown of 
the relative strength of the linkages between components of the Azerbaijani 
AIS. However, this method, which is not yet widespread, relies on closed 
questionnaires to provide the bulk of the data with which to generate a 
matrix of innovation system performance (though semi-structured 
interviews provide supplementary data for weighting). As such, this method 
relies on receiving good, representative recipient response rates to the 
questionnaire. Also, the closed-nature of the questionnaire restricts the 
researcher from identifying emergent issues or to probe for deeper 
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responses. 
 
An alternative to these approaches is found in methodologies associated 
with applied qualitative or social research, which tend to be more common 
in the AIS diagnostic work given the theoretical, constructivist assumptions 
of systems thinking outlined above. As the name suggests, applied 
qualitative research relies primarily on qualitative methodologies, and 
provides a means to answer complex questions in a robust manner; in 
particular, these methodologies can answer questions of both an evaluative 
nature (i.e. how well is a certain process working/how can this be 
improved?) and a generative nature (i.e. can new solutions to existing 
problems be found?) (see Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, pp. 30-31). This approach 
fits well with the aims of the project. 
 
Given the need for depth and application to real-world problems, applied 
qualitative research within a case study design, underpinned with the AIS 
framework, offers a suitable methodology for approaching the task of data 
collection, analysis and summation. However, the choice of framework 
brings with it several implications, as does the decision to adopt an applied 
qualitative methodology. 
3.4 Research design 
 
The research design refers to the specific methods used to collect and 
analyse primary data in order to answer the research question(s). A good 
qualitative research design has a clearly defined purpose, with coherence 
between the research questions and the methods used to answer them, and 
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which also generates valid and reliable data (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 47). 
Research design in qualitative research is not fixed, but responsive to the 
specifics of the research setting and unanticipated issues. As such, it is an 
iterative and continuous process that is not fixed at the earliest stages of 
research. While the ideas present at the start of a project inform the initial 
research design, the “… relationship between design, data and theory is a 
multi-direction one” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 49). 
3.4.1 Case Data 
 
Thought must be given to the appropriate means of generating case data and 
what form this should take. As Mason (1996, p. 36) suggests, the use of the 
word “generate” is more precise than “collection” with regards to data, as 
most qualitative perspectives reject the notion that the researcher can be a 
neutral “collector” of data; indeed, sufficient or relevant data cannot always 
be assumed to exist independently (of the researcher). 
 
Mason (1996) also forms a distinction between methods of generating data, 
and the sources of data that those methods rely on. In qualitative research, 
the sources of data are often people, but can include a range of artefacts such 
as visual images, organisations or events. Here, it is important to ensure that 
choice of data source and methods to generate data from it are consistent 
with the ontological and epistemological positions of the research (Mason, 
1996, p. 37). A number of ontological and epistemological assumptions stem 
from the choices made so far with regards to methodology: a ‘system’ is a 
heuristic device to delineate the boundaries of the topic of interest, and from 
this perspective an agricultural innovation system is made up of 
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heterogenous social actors whom interact to further their agendas and 
shape their environment (constructivist ontology): however, because such a 
system is, necessarily, made up of people11, one can only understand the 
system through people’s interpretations of it (critical realism). Therefore, 
people do represent viable sources of data because their experiences, views, 
interpretations and interactions are meaningful properties of that system 
(Mason, 1996). In turn, the methods used to generate data from them must 
provide the means to interrogate their perceptions of the topic under 
scrutiny. 
3.4.1.1 Qualitative interviewing 
 
Informed by the initial literature review, requirements of the data and the 
explanatory power of applied qualitative research, it was decided that in-
depth, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews provided a robust means to 
generate case data. Not only is this the most common – or at least 
complementary – method of primary data generation in AIS approaches 
(Dolinska & d'Aquino, 2016 for example; Klerkx et al., 2010; see Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2008b) but in qualitative research in general (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003, p. 36). Turner et al. (2015a, p. 3) observe that most diagnostic AIS 
work relies on semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews 
provide a focus on the individual (case study sub-units or informants in the 
design) and, importantly, an in-depth understanding of the personal 
experience of the research phenomena (see Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). 
                                                        
11 In some systems theories, artefacts such as technology and/or infrastructure 
form important components of the ‘system’, such as in the Mutli-level Perspective 
(see Geels, 2005). 
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Qualitative interviews can explain social processes, change, organisation 
and meaning (Mason, 1996). 
 
A key strength of semi-structured interviews is an emphasis on flexibility, 
which permits the researcher to explore emergent issues as and when they 
arise during an interview, thus tailoring each interview to the specific needs 
of that social interaction. Several assumptions arise from this choice of 
method, which are outlined by Mason (1996, pp. 41-42). For instance, 
researchers adopting such an approach to data generation tend to view 
depth and complexity as preferential (over broad, superficial surface 
comparisons). Likewise, they promote reflexivity as a means of analysing the 
role of researcher in the research process (see Section 6.2). 
3.4.1.1.1. Interview Protocol and Guide 
 
Once the decision to use individual interviews had been taken as a means to 
generate primary case data, an initial interview “protocol” was designed to 
layout the goals of the project and the means by which data were to be 
gathered (see D. Madsen & Lewis-Beck, 2004). It was also used to secure 
ethical approval from the appropriate parties (see below). The protocol 
outlined the nature of the questions to be asked during the interview, which 
were then further developed into an interview “guide” and basis for more 
explicit research design. The guide is an aide memoire, a list of topics or 
themes to be covered in a semi-structured interview that provides fluidity 
and organisation to the developing social interaction between interviewer 
and interviewee (Mason & Lewis-Beck, 2004). 
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The guide should enable the interviewer to make on-the-spot decisions and 
decide, for instance, whether something the interviewee has said should be 
followed up. An interview guide differs from an interview “schedule” in that 
the former is flexible – permitting the modification of questions and use of 
prompts as the situation dictates – as opposed to the latter, which consists 
of a series of formal questions to be asked verbatim (Fowler & Lewis-Beck, 
2004; see Mason & Lewis-Beck, 2004). The interview guide was designed to 
explore topics that might provide data relevant to the research questions, as 
well as a priori issues stemming from relevant literature, outlined in Table 
5. 
Table 5 Topics, aims and example questions as used in the interview guide 
Topic Aim Example questions 
Nature of 
innovation 
To open the interview with 
general questions about the 
perception, importance and 
impact of innovation in the 
industry 
• How important is 
innovation? 
• What drives 
innovation? 
• What has been the 
most impactful 
innovation of the 
last twenty or so 
years? 
[probe/repeat] 
Sources of 
innovation 
To identify the origins of 
innovation 
• Who/what 
contributes to 
innovation? 
[probe/repeat] 
Enabling and To explore what constrains • What holds back 
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disabling factors 
for change 
innovation, and what can bolster 
it 
innovation? 
[probe/repeat] 
• What can enable 
innovation? 
[probe/repeat] 
Communication in 
the industry 
To expose the mechanisms by 
which different actors in the 
industry communicate their needs 
• “Where do [you] or 
others go for 
solutions when 
they have 
problems?” 
[repeat] 
• “Is there a lack of 
communication or 
cohesion in the 
industry?” [probe] 
• “What 
relationships work 
well?” [probe] 
• “Whose 
responsibility is it 
to share [what] 
knowledge?” 
Challenges for the 
industry 
To determine the emergent 
challenges to the industry 
• “What are the 
biggest challenges 
for the industry 
going forward?” 
[repeat] 
 
Given the emphasis placed on iteration in qualitative research – the back and 
 100 
forth between data collection and analysis (see Dörnyei, 2007, p. 124) – as 
certain topics and questions became saturated (see below) new issues began 
to take prominence. Several other questions were targeted at specific people 
in specific roles: for instance, researchers involved in supporting the fresh 
produce industry through scientific projects and those associated with 
intermediary organisations such as levy boards or agronomic consultancies 
were asked about the process of translating science into practice, whereas 
growers were more commonly asked about the processes of implementing 
innovation on-farm. As Mason (1996, p. 40) suggests, in order to achieve 
data that are comparable it can be necessary to ask different questions of 
different people. 
 
As advised, the interview guide was ‘piloted’ with the project supervisors in 
as close-to-real circumstances as possible (Mason & Lewis-Beck, 2004). 
Although piloting is deemed more important in quantitative studies, it is 
useful in qualitative research both in terms of calibrating the researcher’s 
‘tools’ and developing interview skills (Dörnyei, 2007, p. 75). Likewise, 
testing the interview schedule allowed the researcher to identify 
weaknesses in the proposed questions and adjust them before the study 
proper began. 
3.4.1.1.2 Ethical considerations and confidentiality 
 
Whilst it was felt that the types of subject to be discussed with interviewees 
as part of this project were not overly personal or harmful – as can be the 
case with, say, medical research – ethical considerations are important, 
especially in the social sciences, where social research inevitably concerns 
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people’s lives (Dörnyei, 2007, p. 63) (see also Appendix 3). 
 
The initial project protocol was used to secure ethical approval from the 
University of Warwick Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics Committee 
(BSREC); approval was granted in August 2014 (REGO-2014-1041), 
allowing interviews to commence. An ‘information pack’ was also designed 
and sent to potential interviewees before they took part in the project to 
ensure participants knew what kind of study was being undertaken, their 
role in said study and how the data they provided would be used. This 
included information about BSREC and their rights as participants in the 
project (see Appendix 3). 
 
A separate consent form was also created to obtain the interviewee’s 
consent to the use of their views in the study, to confirm that they had 
understood that they could withdraw from the study at any time – and 
thereby remove any data they have provided from inclusion in the analysis 
– and ask if they prefer to remain anonymous12. Together these documents 
ensure that the interviewee has granted informed consent as to their 
involvement in the project (Dörnyei, 2007): 
3.4.1.1.3 Data recording, management and protection 
 
As Schensul (2008) notes, the recording of qualitative data is important – it 
forms the primary data that will be analysed later. A Sony Dictaphone was 
                                                        
12 This was initially phrased as a question, but, when it became clear that some 
interviewees did wish to remain anonymous, this became the default position for 
data collection and management. 
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purchased to record the interviews in MP3 format for later transcription and 
written “fieldnotes” were taken during the interview itself for later 
consultation. As Ritchie & Spencer (2003, pp. 132-133) points out, fieldnotes 
are useful for recording what a researcher sees and hears during an 
interview or focus group, as well as ideas for later fieldwork and information 
that may become relevant at the analytical stage. 
 
In the interests of confidentiality, the collected data were stored on a 
personal, password-protected University-managed laptop and backed-up 
via University of Warwick email client storage. Qualitative data analysis 
software, Nvivo 10 (for Mac), was used to manage the data analysis. The 
study protocol also dictates that the digital recordings and transcripts be 
deleted at the end of the project. Signed consent forms are held by the 
researcher in a secure location. Any personal identifying information was 
removed from the transcript at the time of transcription, and the author 
carried out all transcriptions. 
3.4.1.1.4 Sampling 
 
In qualitative research involving people, thought needs to be given to the 
method of selecting interviewees. The strategy employed in selecting 
participants is referred to as “sampling” or “recruitment”, the process by 
which a researcher identifies and invites people to take part in a study (Eide, 
2008). 
 
Given the system boundaries defined in Section 3.2.1 and the assumption of 
Framework Analysis, described below, that practitioners involved in the 
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project, business or sector of concern are the subjects of attention, two 
criterion sampling strategies were chosen to generate case data: 
 
1. Purposive sampling: this strategy targets candidates based on certain 
characteristics – for example, their role and position in the fresh 
produce industry – rather than trying to achieve neutral, 
‘probabilistic’ sampling. Several assumptions stem from the choice of 
this method, namely that ‘the best’ sampling strategy depends on the 
context in which the researcher(s) is working, and the specific 
research objective in mind (Palys, 2008). As Palys (2008, p. 967) 
notes, purposive sampling is “virtually synonymous with qualitative 
research”, in part because qualitative researchers are less interested 
about the “central tendency” of a larger group and more interested in 
case study analysis (i.e. what a specific group thinks about a topic or 
the role they play in dynamic processes). A second presumption here 
is that who a person is and where they are located in a system of 
interest is important, rather than them being freely interchangeable. 
A benefit of this approach is that people in certain roles and specific 
locations can be targeted for inclusion in the project to ensure that a 
wide-range of voices is heard from across the sub-system to improve 
data adequacy (described below). The criterion used for selection in 
the study were: 
 
a. that they have a role in the fresh produce sub-system and 
knowledge of its workings (e.g. grower, researcher or 
agronomist) 
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b. geographic location of operations (i.e. based in different parts 
of the UK) 
c. scale and position within business or organisation (e.g. 
technologist at large, international retailer or researcher at 
relatively small UK university) 
 
An attempt was made to maximize the diversity of individuals 
included in the study. A variety of roles, geographic locations within 
the UK and scales of operation were targeted to provide far-reaching, 
system-focussed data collection. Such an approach also enhances the 
internal validity of the project. 
2. Co-nomination sampling: commonly known as “snowball” sampling, 
this strategy relies on the participants themselves to suggest other 
candidates for inclusion in the project (Eide, 2008). Considering the 
many barriers to recruitment (see Eide, 2008), it is important to build 
“strong coalitions and networks based in the culture and 
community”. Key contacts can provide assistance in the recruitment 
of potential participants, having people in this “liaison role” can be 
important for the success of participant recruitment and the overall 
success of the project. 
 
Purposive and co-nomination sampling are recruitment strategies that fulfill 
the first essential criteria of two outlined by Eide (2008): appropriateness 
and adequacy. The chosen sampling techniques ensure that appropriate 
people, those who can best inform the study, are approached for inclusion 
in the project. However, guaranteeing the adequacy of the research relies on 
gathering enough data to provide a rich description of the phenomena under 
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study; saturation – the continuation of data collection and analysis until no 
new information emerges – is a method used in qualitative research to 
determine when and if data collection is satisfactory. As Saumur & Given 
(2008b) point out, some researchers consider a sample of 15-20 sufficient 
to achieve saturations of themes, but note that sample size will inevitably 
vary from study to study. 
 
It is worth noting that, due to the nature of recruitment, only those willing 
to respond to emails or calls and participate in the project can inform the 
research, so although this sampling strategy makes use of purposive and co-
nomination sampling, the recruitment process resembles convenience 
sampling in a number of ways (see Saumure & Given, 2008a). A convenience 
sample is chosen on the basis of accessibility, proximity, availability and 
(crucially) willingness (Dörnyei, 2007, p. 99). Equally, as Eide (2008) notes, 
researchers must consider who, by virtue of their recruitment strategy, 
might be excluded from the study unintentionally (see Section 6.2). 
3.4.2 Data analysis 
 
All qualitative data can be manipulated and coded (Schensul, 2008), but the 
choice of protocol to do so is dependent upon the research question and 
study design, as well as the data itself. Qualitative research is far from a 
‘uniform’ approach, but, as Dornyei (2007, p. 242) points out, nowhere is 
this diversity more apparent that when it comes to data analysis. Despite 
this diversity, there are similarities between different forms of qualitative 
analysis, being: primarily about the analysis of language (text), an iterative 
process that involves nonlinear, back-and-forth movement between data 
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analysis and generation, and striking a balance between strict, formalised 
methodologies and intuitive, fluid analytical positions (Dörnyei, 2007). In 
any case, data reduction, display and interpretation are required. 
 
For this project, Framework Analysis was chosen as a suitable means of 
interrogating the generated interview data. Developed by Ritchie & Spencer 
in the late 1980s, it sits within a broad family of analysis methods called 
thematic analysis or qualitative content analysis (Gale, Heath, Cameron, 
Rashid, & Redwood, 2013), which, although now closely associated with 
qualitative research began life as a quantitative method of analysis (Dörnyei, 
2007, p. 245). Such approaches identify commonalities and differences 
amongst data, permitting the researcher to draw descriptive and/or 
explanatory conclusions around themes derived from the data. As Ryan & 
Bernard (2003) point out, theme identification is one of the most important 
tasks in qualitative research. A defining feature of the method is the ability 
to cross reference cases – typically an individual interviewee – with codes – 
indicators of meaningful information – in a matrix. This provides a structure 
for systematically reducing the data. Cases here refer to the units of analysis 
in the Framework Analysis approach, and not the case of a case study; the 
interviewees are sub-units of the case study. As an approach to qualitative 
data analysis, Framework Analysis was ‘designed’ for research projects that 
have: 
1. Specific questions 
2. A limited time-frame 
3. A pre-defined sample (e.g. those associated with a company, 
programme or sector of concern) 
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4. A priori issues (e.g. themes that one can expect to occur as a result of 
the characteristics of the phenomenon being studied, already agreed-
upon definitions and constructs and decisions made in light of 
existing theory (see G. W. Ryan & Bernard, 2003) 
This research project has specific questions, a limited timeframe, sensitivity 
to certain a priori issues (i.e. those that stem from using AIS as a conceptual 
framework) and a pre-defined sample (people involved in the UK fresh 
produce innovation system). Framework Analysis is primarily concerned 
with analyzing the substantive, common-sense meaning in qualitative data, 
rather than focussing on the use of language itself (as in discourse analysis, 
for example) (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 202). Whilst Framework Analysis 
may contribute to the generation of theory its primary function is to explain 
what is happening in a certain situation, particularly where an expected 
output is improved policy measures (Srivastava & Thomson, 2009). In this 
respect, Framework Analysis ‘lines-up’ with case study methodology. As 
such Framework is a suitable option for the reduction, display and 
interpretation of the data, considering the context of the research questions 
and aims. 
3.4.2.1 Using Framework Analysis 
 
Ritchie & Spencer (2003) describe the process of transforming what is often 
at first messy, voluminous raw data into a more abstract, analytical form as 
conceptual scaffolding or “analytic hierarchy”. This process enables the 
researcher to make sense of the data and provide an analytical account of 
what is happening. 
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In short, familiarisation with the data is used to develop an initial set of 
themes: this is the ‘framework’ by which subsequent data is categorised 
(indexing). Once no new information comes forward (i.e. once no new theme 
emerge) saturation has occurred and data collection can end. Charting is 
used to find cross cutting themes in the data, which involves creating a 
matrix of cases and exemplary thematic codes, by reading across cases and 
looking for similarities and differences in the framework, enabling the 
construction of higher-level concepts. 
 
Each of these steps is described in more detail below: 
• Familiarisation with the dataset: the researcher should familiarize 
themselves thoroughly with the data before any further analysis. If 
the researcher has been involved in transcribing the interview, then 
this provides an opportunity for early familiarisation. Ritchie & 
Spencer (2003) consider this the foundation of the analytic 
hierarchy. 
• Identifying initial themes or concepts: the goal here is to establish a 
framework or ‘index’, drawing upon recurrent themes in the data and 
issues introduced into the interviews though the interview guide 
(these might be a priori issues). These early themes can then be 
sorted according to different levels of generality so that the index has 
a hierarchy of ‘main’ and ‘subthemes’; they should also stay close to 
the data in terms of language and substantive meaning (i.e. themes 
should be derived from the data and not superimposed from ‘above’ 
through theoretical positions). Indexes vary from those that have a 
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semantic focus, to descriptive categories that remain close to the 
data, to more abstract classifications (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 222). 
• Indexing: this involves understanding what is meant by textual data 
and classifying the whole dataset according to the ‘thematic sets’, or 
categories, of the index established above. There is more than one 
way of carrying out this process, but it can be done using ‘computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software’ (CAQDAS), which ensures 
that the source of a particular piece of information is not lost. Of 
course, data is often interlinked, and it is worth noting where these 
interspersions occur for later analysis; likewise, some data may need 
to be assigned to more than one category. 
• Charting and synthesis: next, it is possible to create a matrix to chart 
the main themes (and important associated subthemes – see Table 8 
in Chapter 4) against cases (that is, individuals involved in the study). 
This allows the researcher to read across themes and cases to 
develop ‘higher-order’, analytical categorisations of the data. It is 
important here to retain the language of the respondents without 
quoting data verbatim (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). 
Once these steps have been taken with the whole dataset, it is possible to 
begin more a thorough process of developing explanations for accounts by 
reading across the synthesised data; Framework Analysis permits the rather 
rapid appraisal “up and down” the analytical hierarchy to make links 
between different concepts (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 256). However, 
developing full explanations for observed phenomena requires the 
researcher to also draw upon exiting literature and other theoretical 
frameworks to explain what they have found (see Discussion). 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, a methodological outline for answering the research 
questions has been provided and justified. This began with an exploration 
of the most fitting analytical framework through which to guide the study, 
including an explanation of the implications adopting a systems approach, 
as well as defining the boundaries of this system, before moving onto the 
case study method and data requirements of this approach. It then outlined 
the process of conducting semi-structured interviews, including the ethical 
considerations of this type of study, before discussing how this data can be 
analysed using the Framework Analysis approach. As such, the methodology 
and methods used in this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
 
❖ Conceptual framework: Agricultural Innovation Systems 
➢ Methodology: embedded, single-case study 
▪ Methods: 
• Semi-structured interviews with industry practitioners 
chosen on the basis of: 
 Their role 
 Their location 
 Their position within business or organisation 
• Data analysis: Framework Analysis 
 
The effectiveness of this approach, as well as its limitations, is discussed in 
in Section 5.4.  
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Chapter 4: Findings 
 
In this chapter, the findings of the case study are explored. It begins by 
describing what was achieved in terms of data generation before moving 
onto the more substantive themes that emerged through the analysis of that 
data. 
4.1 Data generation and analysis 
 
The data generation period of the research ran from May 2015 – January 
2017. 
 
In total, 35 interviews were undertaken; 30 of these with people directly 
involved in the UK fresh produce industry at a position within the 
boundaries of the UK fresh produce sub-system identified in 3.1.2, three 
with experts in agricultural knowledge/innovation systems research13, and 
two with a specific technology in mind (polytunnels). Some 70 people or 
organisations were approached for interview (primarily by internet 
searches and co-nomination sampling) representing a positive response-
rate of ~50 per cent. Of those who were approached but did not take part in 
the research, most did not reply to the request for an interview, and for one 
a suitable time could not be found. Table 6 provides a breakdown of the 
various roles of those interviewed. 
                                                        
13 These were not included in the main analysis but served as guides for 
innovation systems research. 
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Table 6 Breakdown of current role of participants (including expert and technology-specific 
interviews). It should be noted that many people involved in the project have had careers 
spanning more than one category outlined here, and this table serves only as a guide.  
Industry role Count 
Grower/other farm business 14 
Researcher 8 
Producer organisation, NGO or policy 4 
Agronomist/consultant 3 
Retailer 2 
Levy organisation 2 
Breeder 2 
 
Interviews took place at various locations within the UK (including England, 
Scotland and Wales) most commonly at the participants’ place of work or at 
Warwick Crop Centre where the researcher was based. The interviews 
generally lasted around 50 minutes, ranging from 30 minutes to 1.5 hours. 
Of the 35 interviews undertaken in total, five were with women and the 
remaining 30, men. 
4.1.1 Data management and analysis 
 
The digitally recorded interviews were uploaded to the author’s laptop, 
imported to NVivo 10 (CAQDAS) and transcribed within the software. This 
produced over 900 pages of transcript. The transcriptions were assigned a 
‘codename’ to preserve the anonymity of those who chose to remain 
anonymous – the number of each interviewee also follows any quotations 
used below. The transcripts were then analysed in accordance with 
Framework Analysis (see also Section 6.2), which produced 9 ‘higher-level’ 
categories with numerous sub-themes (see Table 7). 
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Table 7 List of top-level categories and sub-themes developed during data analysis 
Top-level categories Sub-themes 
Norms and institutions • Specificity and difference within 
the fresh produce industry 
o Market and industry 
trends 
o Scale and size of farm 
businesses 
o Distinctiveness of fresh 
produce sectors 
• Influence of retailers and other 
actors in the food supply chain 
• The role of the levy board 
• Long vs. short term vision 
Innovation in fresh produce • Defining innovation 
• Observations about innovation 
processes 
• Types of innovation 
• Impact and measurement of 
innovation 
Drivers of change • Economic drivers 
• Retail needs 
• Regulation 
Sources of innovation • Overseas sources of innovation 
• Learning by doing 
• Individual businesses and 
organisations 
• Formal research 
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Communication in the fresh produce 
industry 
• Positive interfaces and successful 
brokerage 
o Networks 
o The role of different 
organisations and actors 
o Specific projects 
• Barriers to effective 
communication and collaboration 
Industry bottlenecks • Systemic barriers 
o Fragmentation 
o Formalised research 
o Economic factors 
o Regulatory constraints 
o Culture 
• Personal barriers 
Enabling factors • Systemic enabling factors 
• Personal enabling factors 
o Interactivity 
o Human and material 
resources 
o Champions as change 
agents 
• Trust 
• The idea of best practice: in 
farming and in extension 
Comparisons with the past  
Challenges  
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In the initial phase of the data analysis, the first five interviews were fully 
coded to generate an early set of codes through which to categorise or 
challenge subsequent data; these were was continuously refined as new 
codes were added to the dataset. Framework Analysis places emphasis on 
familiarisation and determining the larger, substantive themes at the outset 
of data analysis, but Ritchie & Spencer (2003, p. 229) also note that 
interpretation should be kept to a minimum at this point. As such, in an effort 
to remain ‘true to the data’, thematic categories were built up exclusively 
from the coded data in the first instance but were improved upon by 
consolidating themes into thematic categories and using a priori language to 
describe these thematic categories (i.e. “Norms and institutions”). 
4.2 Norms and institutions  
 
A category emerged from the data relating to what we might call the ‘nature 
of the industry’, including observations about industry structure, 
relationships between the various actors involved in the fresh produce 
supply chain, market and industry trends, regulatory frameworks, and 
visions for its future; these have been labelled “norms and institutions” and 
can broken down into five further sub-sections: 
 
1. Specificity & difference within the fresh produce industry 
2. The influence of retailers and other actors in the food supply chain 
3. The role of the levy board 
4. Loss and waste of resources 
5. Long vs. short term vision 
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Each of these sub-sections is discussed in more detail below. 
4.2.1 Specificity and difference within the fresh produce industry 
 
This theme stemmed from observations regarding the specifics or 
peculiarities of the industry – contrasted in the main against other 
agricultural sectors such as livestock or arable farming. It also concerns the 
differences between the sectors that make up the industry, and between 
larger and smaller growers. It is a useful starting point for this chapter, and 
the observations made provide context for subsequent sections; “Scale and 
size of farm businesses” (Section 4.2.1.2), for example, is a topic that frames 
many of those to follow. 
 
The sector is, in general, considered highly innovative (particularly when 
compared to other categories of farming) and requires a high level of 
commitment and dedication to innovation. Connected to this, the fresh 
produce sector was seen to be more ‘industrial’ than other sectors of 
farming: 
 
“So I think horticulture is different from the rest of the industry… because it's 
got a different structure, a greater degree of consolidation within each 
individual sector, and they see in- more in keeping with a typical industrial 
business, they see innovation and intellectual property as an opportunity to 
differentiate themselves in the marketplace.” (8) 
 
At the same time, horticulture is considered to be a more marginalized 
sector – compared to, say, arable farming – and is thought to have “fallen 
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behind” in some way, impacted by less and less support from government 
by way of sector-specific research funding and the loss of institutions 
formerly undertaking that research (see Section 4.9). 
 
Interestingly, there was no consensus on whether those involved in the 
industry were more or less willing to share knowledge: 
 
“… I would say that the fresh produce industry is a very sharing industry and 
a very collaborative industry…” (2) 
 
… or not: 
 
“If they can get an advantage on their colleagues or on their competitors, 
that's what they're seeking to do. They operate… much more in... a sort of 
closed environment where they are seeking to generate intellectual property 
which gives them a market advantage, either because they can do things 
cheaper or because they can produce a better product.” (8) 
 
However, a common observation was that the industry was “small” in the 
sense that there remain close networks of people known to one another, 
and, as described in Section 4.6, these networks form the basis for a good 
deal of the innovation taking place in today’s fresh produce industry. 
4.2.1.1 Market and industry trends 
 
How the fresh produce industry responds to changes in the wider 
marketplace was seen to be a critical component of innovation, particularly 
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in terms of the economic drivers of change (see Section 4.4.1). Marked by a 
high degree of competitiveness at the retail and buying ‘end’, returns to 
growers were felt to be shrinking or at least stagnant: 
 
“We need innovation to reduce costs because the price back to the grower is 
falling in real terms, and they need to be able to produce their vegetable and 
salad cheaper and cheaper each year.” (12) 
  
In turn, the industry is perceived to have consolidated into larger units 
striving for greater economies of scale to serve the needs of large retailers 
(through which most fresh produce in the UK is sold) in both horizontal 
terms – with firms buying firms producing similar products – and through 
vertical integration – with firms buying ‘up and down’ the supply chain to 
ensure greater control of supply. 
 
Now characterized in certain sectors by very large, specialised, 
internationally-minded businesses that have control, in some cases, of close 
to one hundred percent of the market for specific products, the fresh 
produce industry has increasingly high costs/barriers of entry (to the 
market) and scales of investment required to maintain competitiveness: 
 
“... [ability to invest is] the biggest one that stands in the way with all 
innovation I think. We're trying to build structures like this [signals outside 
greenhouse] they're half a million pound each. That's half a million pound 
there. I could do with another eight of those.” (14) 
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“Well we've spent a million pounds on plastic on this farm. That's a big 
number. Somehow I've got to get that back. I didn't spend all of it, but I have 
got to keep spending to try and get it back, that's what I'm trying to do.” [34] 
 
In large part, these increasing economies of scale are driven by the needs of 
the larger UK multiple retailers – the Big Four – and, specifically, the 
competitiveness amongst these businesses, which manifests itself in “price 
wars”. It is these “price wars” that have led to diminishing returns for the 
growers that supply retail markets, who, in some cases, felt that innovation 
was a “treadmill”, in which: 
 
“… most growers [are] running faster and faster and faster to try and stay in 
the same place…” (9) 
 
Others suggested that this was the driving force behind “defensive 
innovation” in the industry, which is taken to mean innovation that reduces 
costs or improves efficiency, often framed against the threat of business 
failure: 
 
“A lot of the innovation on farm that I see in fresh produce is borne about by 
necessity, because the farmer says "if I don't do this, I'm gonna go out of 
business". And that's not how you should be pushing innovation, but that's 
what I see.” (29) 
 
“And essentially, driven by the marketplace which is constantly providing 
product differentiation, the supermarkets are [unclear] each other- they all 
look the same, but of course they're always pushing each other forward… and 
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the view was from people- very senior people, elite leaders of large 
consolidated businesses in the industry, they were saying "yes that does drive 
innovation, but it's actually quite a defensive, quite a limited sort of 
innovation". So you probably do have less step-change.” (31) 
 
A notable feature of the industry is a shrinking repertoire of approved pest 
control products. This presented growers with a number of problems, 
though inasmuch as this acts as a barrier to innovation (see Section 4.7.1.4) 
it was also seen as a way of fostering more sustainable farming practices. 
Comparing the viewpoints of a large-scale producer of field vegetables: 
 
“We've lost a huge percentage of our active ingredients in the last ten years. 
And because we're innovative and resilient we always find ways around the 
problems. I don't think we've actually stopped producing anything in this 
country because of that... yet. But I think, erm, we're probably not a million 
miles off. Something like onions for instance, if we lose any more herbicides 
it'll be virtually impossible to grow here.” (1) 
 
… and a small-holder selling through a local farm shop: 
 
“Yeah I think it's great 'cos it encourages better farming practice. And also 
encourages innovation if you like, 'cos it makes it more difficult. I- the reason 
I'm still here is 'cos I expect nothing.” (16) 
 
… serves to highlight the range of attitudes towards this issue, though a clear 
similarity emerges: a pragmatic attitude towards change, which is common 
throughout the industry. 
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More and more tasks previously fulfilled by the public sector are now 
increasingly in the hands of private business and NGOs (or left to such 
organisations), with research and agronomy now being practiced entirely 
within the private sphere: 
 
“I would expect [AHDB] to be here on my field doing proper commercial 
trials, and you know who we get here? Independent companies. I get phone 
call after phone call, independent companies want to trial their- ten metre 
square plots in the middle of our- commercial trial...” (14) 
 
Others, however, felt that private businesses had not stepped into the ‘gap’ 
left by formerly public research and extension services: 
 
“I suppose the government expected companies to pick it up, which they 
didn't really do.” (30) 
 
Today, the AHDB remains responsible for many of the functions previously 
undertaken by public research and extension services, and this is discussed 
in greater detail in Section 4.2.3. 
 
Interestingly, the 2007/08 Financial Crisis and subsequent Recession14 has 
had a lasting impact on the sector, with newer actors such as large retail 
“discounters” Aldi and Lidl gaining market share at the expense of the “Big 
                                                        
14 A period of sustained economic contraction in the UK ran from Q2 2008 – Q2 
2009 (15 months) according to the Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
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Four” (see Section 2.2). In response to this, the previously dominant 
multiple retailers have sought to: 1) control supply to a greater extent by 
taking over certain operations and 2) reduce the number of product lines 
they sell to diminish overhead costs and maximise stock of high-selling lines, 
in essence “copying” the discount model. This has the potential to shape the 
direction of innovation: 
 
“… there is also quite a cost to the retailer of establishing the market for a 
new product and when they were making big margins and they were 
profitable they will have been prepared to take some of that pain of 
establishing a new product and waiting for the time for people to start seeing 
buying it and then repeat purchasing it, so I think we're also seeing as s side 
effect of the rise of the discounters that there is less choice in fresh produce in 
the big four…” (2) 
 
It is clear that there is a perception that the commercial fresh produce 
industry is becoming increasingly consolidated into larger units, in part 
driven by the demands of the retail markets through which most produce is 
sold. As such innovation in this environment tends to be “defensive”, focused 
towards maximizing profit in an intensely competitive environment. At the 
same time, a notable trend is the reduction of available pest control 
products, which threatens to drastically alter certain methods of production.  
4.2.1.2 Scale and size of farm businesses 
 
Strong emphasis was placed on the variation in the size and scale of farm 
businesses, which was seen to have led to or determined: 
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• Divergent “research agendas” 
• Ability to influence research direction 
• Ability to communicate research needs 
• Ability to fund in-house or collaborative research 
• Access to and attitude towards science 
• Attitude towards collaboration 
 
In an industry that is evidently becoming more and more consolidated, 
smaller growers, where they exist at all, are less able to put their research 
agenda forward either due to a lack of influence and/or communication, 
stemming from inadequate resources in time and money. Larger 
organisations are in a better position, both in terms of finance as well as 
human resources, to influence research agendas, and crucially, to be 
involved in research projects through joint-funding initiatives with, for 
example, the AHDB or through in-house research, engineering and farm-
level experimentation. As one researcher put it: 
 
“… so one project we've got, it's an [joint industry- levy-funded project] 
looking at field mapping and looking at precision farming... [company 
involved] can make that happen. If you went to one of the smaller businesses 
they couldn't use it. So there's some innovation that's only gonna work at 
scale and then there's other thing like innovation like IPM, or new breeding 
lines for example. They could be picked off the shelf by anybody. So there's a 
scale-dependent sort of response when it comes to innovation.” (19) 
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A further, connected issue concerned farm businesses’ openness to sharing 
knowledge, though this remains a somewhat “fuzzy” issue, with opposing 
viewpoints. On the one hand, it was suggested that larger firms, competing 
for market share with fewer but larger rivals, were disinclined to share 
anything that might give them a commercial advantage. However, in the 
absence of competition – or, vitally, in the case of perceived shared problems 
– the prospect of sharing knowledge was considered less problematic. In 
part, this appears to stem from the fact that it is difficult to conceal 
innovation: 
 
“I think generally the big growers are happy to share their knowledge once 
they've got the competitive advantage, had it for a few years, and then it's- 
you know... it's very difficult to keep a secret in this industry…” (15) 
 
However, there are differences not only between operations of different 
sizes and scales but amongst the various sectors that make up the industry. 
4.2.1.3 Distinctiveness of fresh produce sectors 
 
There is a high degree of specificity within the horticultural industry with 
regards to diverse crop types, growing methods and growing environments. 
A researcher in Wales, a nation with relatively little commercial 
horticulture, summed up these issues concisely: 
 
“And of course a large carrot grower in Lincolnshire, or Lancashire, or a 
brassicas in Lincolnshire is going to be very different from somebody trying 
to grow things on an Aberystwyth coast.” (18) 
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Importantly, this specificity is reinforced by certain institutional 
arrangements such as the levy board panel structure through which 
research funding is distributed; grouped by crop type, pooling funding 
across sectors remains challenging and reduces the ability of the levy board 
to fund ‘larger’ projects that might benefit swathes of the industry at once; 
 
“Not everybody's been aware of it, quite often we might be developing 
technology that's applicable to a whole range of crops but one panel will be 
doing it, but the other panels are blind to it, they haven't shared their costs, 
and then they don't share the learnings.” (31) 
 
Distinctions such as relative production time-scales (a perennial apple or 
cherry tree, for instance, vs. a non-perennial cabbage), the relative market 
value of the various sectors, the diversity of growers within a sector and 
their characteristics were deemed to influence other factors, being: 
 
• The willingness to share knowledge 
• Ability to ‘self-fund’ innovation 
• Attitude towards change 
 
For example, the capacity for experimentation that is found in protected 
cropping – glasshouse and polytunnel systems – provides an ideal 
environment for testing new forms of control (as in other industrial 
settings). As one participant put it: 
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“I mean the horticulture system is also more amenable to manipulation in a 
sense, you put a glasshouse, you can control for every- so it's partly it's the 
kind of production system that is involved…” (3) 
 
The move to substrate-planted, potted crops (grown in polytunnels) also 
permits a level of experimentation not seen in the field: 
 
“We put some fields sometimes in at one density and at year two especially 
with raspberries we're altering the density… but certainly our systems- when 
we're in the substrate grow pots, it is just a unit you can move, you can 
change densities quite easily whereas when we're committed to the soil, we 
just have to go on a density that we know.” [35] 
 
As such, protected cropping systems were seen to be leading the way in 
terms of innovation. Likewise, there appeared to be a sectoral, rather than 
cross-industry, basis for innovation, with divergent interests when it comes 
to research priorities (or, perhaps importantly, the perception that interests 
are not shared). 
4.2.2 Influence of retailers and others in the food supply chain 
 
A number of supply chain actors were seen to shape the industry for better 
or worse depending on viewpoint. A major theme was the impact that 
retailers – and primarily the “Big Four” – had on the sector. Such 
observations were generally negative, though some lamented the tendency 
of producers to blame the retailers rather than examine where they might 
themselves improve their own businesses: 
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“I mean a classic example of how it's not working- on the way in I was having 
a conversation with somebody about a grower meeting that's been organised 
in one area, I won't say too much, and a meeting that essentially seems to be 
set up to complain about lack of money from the multiples, too much money 
being charged by the middle people and not enough money going back to the 
growers. So, it's essentially "everybody else has got to do something different 
so arguably we can continue to do the same thing" rather than "what are we 
going to do- what is it that's under our control that we could change that 
would affect our fortunes?".” 
 
In the main, however, the sheer power of the retailers over their suppliers, 
and competitiveness with regards to each other, was seen to have led to 
several detrimental outcomes, including: 
 
• Increasing price pressure or even “price gouging” 
• Scrutiny of grower innovation 
• Squeezing profit margins in light of innovation 
• Costs being “pushed up” the supply chain 
• Restricting the scope of innovation (“defensive” innovation, see Section 
4.4.1) 
 
Controversially, perhaps, the larger multiple retailers are able to wield such 
power due to there being, on the one hand, many more growers than 
customers – an oligopsonic market structure – and, on the other, what was 
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seen to be an oversupply of produce driving the price downward. Some have 
concluded, therefore, that the number of primary producers is now too high: 
 
“… [in] the industry there's just too many participants, so the supermarkets 
always have the upper hand because there is in general an oversupply rather 
than an undersupply…” (23) 
 
Where retailers were supportive of innovation, this was seen to be mostly 
self-serving; retailer buying-behaviour is “at odds” with supporting 
innovation, in this view, because constant pressure on prices undercuts the 
ability of farm businesses to adequately re-invest in their operations (see 
Section 4.7.1.3). 
 
However, multiple retailers are not the only actors influencing the industry. 
Government and other organisations – or “politics” as it was often referred 
to – can also shape aspects of the sector. The European Union (EU), for 
instance, received the blame for the withdrawal of certain pest control 
products but regional politics play a role as well: 
 
“… rather than be led by public opinion, it was time that the Scottish 
government actually had the balls to stand up and shape public opinion. And 
lead public opinion rather than follow it… I mean it'll never happen 'cos 
we've got an election next May, which is why GM's [genetic modification] a 
hot topic in Scotland just now... there is no basis in science for us opposing the 
ban. It is purely political.” (22) 
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The consumer holds significant sway over the functioning of the fresh 
produce market (the same being true for any market). How the consumer – 
and the value of treating the tastes and purchasing power of millions of 
people as one unit is questionable – interacts with and shapes the scope of 
innovation is beyond the scope of the present research. 
4.2.3 The role of the levy board 
 
As the organisation with the most direct responsibility for joint research and 
development projects within the fresh produce industry, the AHDB was a 
common topic of discussion with regards to innovation. 
 
In general, interviewees reflected on the presumed role of the AHDB, 
focussing on this function and whether it was being achieved in current 
circumstances. It is possible to group these observations into two simple 
categories: opportunities and weaknesses (presented as a table below). 
 
Table 8 The perceived opportunities and weaknesses of the horticultural levy board's 
operations 
Perceived opportunities Perceived weaknesses 
Ability to “pull together” resources Panel structure results in reactive, risk-
averse, non-strategic thinking 
Ability to slow rate of consolidation by 
sharing knowledge 
Panel structure/sectoral funding regimes 
causes difficulty in pooling strategic 
funding 
More strategic approach being fostered 
within the organisation 
Re-branding of AHDB-funded research 
dilutes perceived impact 
Businesses looks to the organisation for 
‘generic’ solutions 
Loss of expertise over time 
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 Large, bureaucratic organisation 
 AHDB communication not aimed at an 
‘operational level’ 
 “Louder voices” dominate grower panels 
 Reliance on voluntary engagement with 
panels 
 
Many of the themes identified in Table 8 constitute barriers to innovation in 
their own right, and combine with other factors to impede innovation 
(discussed in Section 4.7). 
 
It is clear that there are significant differences in attitudes as to the relative 
responsibility of the levy board and what that responsibility entails. A 
complex issue, embedded in the wider landscape of changing research and 
extension regimes, where one actor’s responsibility ends – and another’s 
begins – in commissioning, delivering and communicating the outcomes of 
research remains a contested area. In a rather uncontroversial manner, it 
was stressed that the levy board should focus on problems common to 
multiple sectors of the industry occupying “pre-competitive” space: 
 
“… there's a lot of you know movement of funds between sectors, trying to get 
it fair... but actually a lot of the work they perhaps do, needs to- and are 
doing now with the soils project, is actually go back to basics and try and 
challenge some of the fundamentals common to everybody.” (13) 
 
“Yeah I mean the one area in horticulture where there is pretty much 
unanimous about it's all worthwhile and for the common good is crop 
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protection work, so we'll all lump some money in to make sure we've got the 
chemicals we need.” (15) 
 
However, some felt that the levy board had taken on tasks beyond this more 
explicit remit: 
 
“… they have a function in life to manage and to support the research 
program, but what they actually seem to want to do is get embroiled in all 
sorts of other areas… extension work we don't want, spending [unclear] on 
organizing meetings which we don't want to have, pulling together packages 
which aren't necessary. Going to bloody- marketing, getting involved in 
marketing ventures and ideas, and is disruptive of the marketplace and is 
unhelpful…” (21) 
 
That “louder”, more influential voices were seen to dominate grower panels 
reflects the disparity in size and influence of fresh produce businesses, but 
this was perceived by some to be natural – or at least hard to avoid – and 
just in the sense that those who seek to influence the levy board research 
agenda deserve to receive the fruit of that effort: 
 
“… you'll never please everyone. And if some people are more vocal and 
proactive, in terms of seeking research or promoting research, then it's fair 
that they should- I mean that is life isn't it?” (13) 
 
However, if we acknowledge that the ability to influence this research 
agenda varies from business to business, and disproportionately favours 
larger businesses, we re-encounter the issue of scale (see Section 4.8.2.2). 
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Despite the perceived problems with the levy board’s structure or 
operations, those involved in the organisation are aware of a number of 
these issues: 
 
“So we're all failing to ask ourselves "how do we maximize innovation?" 
We're all saying "how do we spend this money?" or "how do we get our bit of 
that money that's being spent in order to keep our little bit of this thing going 
forward?" and we all hope that we do interesting things, but it's not really a 
recipe for driving innovation.” (31) 
 
It was also presumed that without an institution such as the levy board, the 
disparities in size would grow larger: 
 
“If there was no HDB, now, erm, it's just- it would accelerate the big growers 
getting bigger.” (15) 
 
In summary, the role, capabilities and structural setup of the levy board was 
brought into question by many participants due to its position within the 
wider innovation system; its proper remit was challenged, but there is broad 
agreement as to ‘safe space’ for research.  
4.2.5 Long- vs. short-term vision 
 
An important distinction was made between, on the one hand, the 
ramifications of short-term thinking on the industry, and, on the other, the 
 133 
need for longer-term thinking. Such distinctions were manifested in three 
main issues: 
 
• Reactivity of levy board 
• Need for foresight in R&D 
• Sustainability 
 
As documented above, the panel structure of the levy board, whilst being the 
primary mechanism by which growers exert influence over the research 
process, leads to “reactive” or “responsive” – rather than strategic – 
decision-making. As one grower noted: 
 
“The one problem with that is that the growers who sit on those panels 
they're thinking about today's problems: "what's my problems this year?", 
"what am I struggling with this year?" and not thinking about "what are my 
problems gonna be in ten years time?", and if you want to get into R&D and 
really deliver R&D, you need that horizon view.” (1) 
 
Given some of the emergent challenges to the industry (see Section 4.10) 
foresight in research is considered vital. However, this issue is no secret and 
has been recognised by those at the levy board: 
 
“… we're going to move away from this completely responsive mode we take 
the levy annually and we split it up between the sectors and then they've 
already got commitments so they've got what they've got left and then "what 
can we afford?"… we need a strategy- now there's going to be nothing 
magical about the strategy it's going to simply be a clear articulation of what 
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the longer-term challenges are, and then a framework so that we can take a 
serious look at what money we put onto the table for different challenges...” 
(7) 
 
“… it's about trying to get people to lift their eyes to the horizon really, 
because most businesses seem to be very focussed on their day to day issues 
and getting over those, and the innovation, getting the innovation into that is 
something which is quite a difficult thing to do because they are very much 
taken up by their day to day concerns.” (8) 
 
So too is the long-term viability of UK farming threatened by short-term, 
monetary gain: 
 
“The problem is all the best land is already in the system... and privately 
owned. And people are going to put a short-time gain of growing high value 
crops now, whilst the cereals and other crops aren't of any value. That's their 
main income, that's their cash crop.” (13) 
 
It is clear that there are voices calling for longer-term vision in the fresh 
produce industry, particularly with regards to research and development. 
However, as discussed in the next section, predicting the impacts of future 
innovation can be extremely challenging. 
4.3 Innovation in fresh produce 
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A more explanatory category emerged with regards to innovation processes 
in the UK fresh produce industry, revolving around several connected 
themes: 
 
1. Defining innovation 
2. Observations about innovation 
3. Types of innovation 
4. Impact and measurement of innovation 
5. Areas for future innovation 
 
These themes are explored in more detail below. 
4.3.1 Defining innovation 
 
Some participants sought to clarify the meaning of innovation (whilst many 
did not) or exclude certain things from their definition of innovation. 
 
For example, the director of a large farming business took a wide view of 
innovation: 
 
“Anything you change, for the better, that’s innovation.” (1) 
 
Others struggled with the notion of novelty, questioning whether something 
that was not ‘new’ or even created by the party implementing the technology 
or practice was innovating: 
 
 136 
“… other sort of precision farming techniques have come in, say if you go to 
somewhere like [name of business] they're planting lettuce and the tractor is 
driving itself up and down the field, there's nobody on the tractor but there's 
plenty of people behind, checking the lettuces have actually been planted 
properly, but again this is applying technology which is already there it's 
not... I suppose you could argue it's providing an innovative way of using GPS-
enabled technologies, but it's not sort of erm... it's not revolutionary.” (9) 
 
A question arises here: is something only innovative at the point of creation? 
Likewise, does innovation have to be “revolutionary”? It is possible of 
course, to capture value from something ‘old’: 
 
“Now of course the innovation might be going back to an old variety so it's 
not necessarily something new. It's doing something that's different. That's 
what I understand as innovative.” (15) 
 
A further question concerns the contribution of science and whether this 
constitutes innovation in its own right: 
 
“… yeah, so scientists have been a huge source of um...” [doesn’t finish 
sentence] (2) 
 
We also hear echoes of Kline & Rosenberg’s (2000) observation that 
innovation is often conceived of as technology of the highly visible kind: 
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“I think it's really hard to define, 'cos it can mean different things and er I 
think probably what most people at a growing base mean by innovation, they 
mean new bit of equipment or something new that they can do.” (19) 
 
In summary, the definitions provided by participants of this project mirror 
the litany of ways and nuances used to describe the phenomena found in the 
literature outlined in Section 2.3.1. 
4.3.2 Observations about innovation processes 
 
A number of important observations of a general kind were made about 
innovation processes. For example, its importance was stressed in strong 
terms: 
 
“Innovation as I see it is hugely important. It's a mainstay of our own 
business, and it needs to be the mainstay of any horticultural business.” (11) 
 
“Vital. Fundamental. Innovate or die.” (27) 
 
The importance of innovation for the industry was often invoked with 
reference to the competitiveness of the sector; keeping pace with ones’ 
competitors is a key driver of change (see Section 4.4.1). The term 
“innovation treadmill” was used to describe this continuous process. Indeed, 
it was likewise observed that innovation leads to further innovation: 
 
“… 'cos you get these breakthroughs and you get lots of secondary innovation, 
which can often be hugely significant. You know, but it's a follow-on from the 
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first thing. So if you put strawberries under covers, then you create all sorts 
of pest and disease challenges, you also make it easier to develop solutions 
and so the whole thing ramps on, you start to move new varieties forward 
erm... and yeah I mean it's absolutely, you know without that you just don't 
get to hold your market, because it is extremely competitive.” (31) 
 
As such, innovation causes further innovation to complement, or make 
viable, prior innovation. One participant described innovation as a “jigsaw” 
that forms a whole. Some participants described the impact of innovation 
elsewhere as “knock-on” effects – such as the increase in the price of straw 
due to the breeding of dwarf varieties in cereals resulting in less straw – best 
exemplified in the case of polytunnel usage and the changing pest/disease 
profile that has developed simultaneously. The evolutionary, incremental 
nature of innovation in fresh produce is reinforced directly: 
 
“… often it's going to be incremental change and that means you're gonna 
move on from where you are, not going from having 20 hectares to 2000 
hectares as a consequence of one step.” (19) 
 
A further factor here is what we might call “relative visibility”, which refers 
to the differences, and relative value, of one ‘type’ of innovation over another 
with respect to how it is perceived by others. As one grower put it: 
 
“… you can have innovation but innovation at our end is not necessarily 
gonna be something that's perceived as beneficial to the consumer.” (22) 
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Compounding any efforts to change, innovation is a starkly unpredictable 
and uncertain process: 
 
“... the reward to the innovator is very uncertain… it's easy for the people 
towards the end of the process to see how they get their award, but how is 
that initial innovation being awarded when only ten percent of the ideas 
might make it through?” (19) 
 
“… ultimately you can run the scenarios but until something's actually 
physically happening and occurring, you know, certainly in fresh produce it's 
such a- today, now sort of industry you can have the best laid plans but 
they're constantly having to evolve.” (33) 
 
Interestingly, though, this does not diminish, but perhaps enhances the need 
for, a plan: 
 
“So obviously plans change all the time, that's what farming is, that's what 
any job is, but farming particularly, you make a plan and you change it. The 
real cock up in farming is to not have a plan.” [34] 
 
One soft fruit business that had taken the decision to grow blueberries under 
polytunnels for the first time; although it is now not uncommon for soft fruit 
growers to use polytunnels in blueberry production (Scotland boasts the 
world’s most northerly blueberry producer thanks to such tunnels), this 
particular company, which is affiliated with a large UK producer 
organisation, felt that the time was right to transition from outdoor to 
indoor production. For this, a fairly detailed plan was outlined: 
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“… we're going to have a go, yes. We've gone for a later-cropping variety 'cos 
we want to avoid the glut of the European production and especially Poland. 
And so we're trying to come in late- we're trying to look at a crop that'll 
arrive in mid-August and crop into September for us. So we'll use varietal 
choice because we're part of the marketing group we have a choice of sort of 
a logo-branded variety that is only available to our members… it's already 
been tested and trialed and accepted by our customers… we'll use a north 
facing slope- north west facing slope to delay the field anyway naturally… 
these blueberries will go into hydroponics, so they'll be going into cocoa-
fiber…” (35) 
 
Yet before the blueberries had even been placed under the tunnels, the farm 
manager had found it necessary to adjust the precise components of the 
potted substrate used in their on-site nursery. 
 
Not only does this represent an interesting source of innovation – on-farm 
experimentation (see Section 4.5) – it displays the continuous need for 
adaptation during innovation processes, even one for which a detailed plan 
is in place and where those involved have prior experience with potted fruit 
growing, polytunnel production and the particular crop in question. Such 
experience, however, should not be discounted (see Section 4.8.2.2).   
4.3.3 Types of innovation 
 
A number of ‘types’ of innovation emerged during analysis, which can be 
broken down into a loose typology: 
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1. Product innovation 
2. Engineering, automation and infrastructure 
3. Management 
4. Marketing 
4.3.3.1 Product innovation 
 
Innovation in a particular product was the most commonly discussed ‘type’ 
of innovation, suggesting a good deal of attention is paid to the development 
of new products in the industry. In particular, varietal development was 
seen as the “life-blood” of the industry, reflecting the need for product 
differentiation (sometimes called “points of difference”): 
 
“… you can reduce your cost of production in comparison with your 
competitors, or you have some sort of added value for the customer, whether 
that is longer shelf life, improved taste, improved texture... so sort of novelty 
product. It's some sort of provenance like organic. It's some sort of 
differentiation within the marketplace.” (8) 
 
Indeed, this appears to be true across all sectors of the fresh produce 
industry, from strawberry producers: 
 
“Sonata's been the main... and especially in Scotland the Sonata- and that 
was really- although nobody was really able to put their finger on it what the 
difference was- just a better shape, better size and shape than El Santa…” 
(25) 
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… to carrot producers utilising an “old” product: 
 
“The Chantenay [carrot variety] was basically the reinvention of an old, good 
idea. The Chantenay carrot was originally grown for canning, because it 
fitted the can. But then canning went out of fashion, so Chantenay went out 
of fashion, and people used to say "oh I want a carrot that tasted like it used 
to taste”… but it needed a bit of refinement, it needed re-breeding.” [1] 
 
The drive for new products was intimately associated with the needs of the 
retailer (i.e. those points of difference described above, such as shelf-life or 
improved taste). The drivers of innovation are dealt with in the next section. 
The importance of marketing in conjunction with varietal development was 
also stressed. As a potato grower and breeder noted: 
 
“I think probably at the marketing end the biggest er innovation was really 
Rooster, which made people become much more aware of individual 
varieties of potatoes…” (22) 
 
Innovation in marketing is considered below. New crop varieties may or 
may not require change at the agronomic level: 
 
“I would say breeding's brilliant because you breed a new variety that's got 
disease resistance or pest resistance or better keeping quality and things like 
that… there's no added costs to growing it… your combine, your drill, things 
like that, everything- every bit of kit, other technology you've got works with 
that… you're not asking the farmer to change his- well, often you're not 
 143 
asking the farmer to change his growing system, that's not one hundred 
percent true, so when F1 hybrid leeks were developed, so they were developed 
here, by my colleague [name] and when they were first released the farmers 
tried to grow them exactly the same way as they'd grown the old open-
pollinated ones, and it was hopeless, they were useless, 'cos you had to 
change the spacing 'cos they were more uniform and things like that so there 
was some agronomy needed to do that but once that's worked out a new 
hybrid is grown exactly the same as the new hybrid. So when it's a- there are 
some more disruptive- there are some disruptive changes in terms of 
breeding…” (7) 
 
Indeed, the fewer changes required of an innovation, the more easily it can 
be put into practice (see Section 4.8.4). 
4.3.3.2 Automation, engineering and infrastructure 
 
The automation of certain processes – and even whole operations – is an 
ever-growing area of innovation in the fresh produce industry. As a breeder 
pointed out: 
 
“Automation is coming in right the way along the product handling line, so 
more and more we're seeing less people dealing with the product and it's all 
being done by conveyor belts, magic eyes, sorting equipment, bagging 
equipment, it's all automatic.” (30) 
 
Given the high labour costs associated with many fresh produce sectors, this 
is perhaps not surprising: 
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“Yeah well, for our business, er... the challenge is always trying to take the 
cost out of what we're doing, and one of the biggest percentages of costs are 
labour. So innovation around how we can reduce our reliance on labor and 
what we're doing out in the field and also within our packhouse as well.” (28) 
 
However, engineering with respect to bespoke harvesting (and now 
packing) rigs, is not only reducing labour but ‘shortening’ the supply chain 
by consolidating tasks: 
 
“… one of the most significant [innovations] is actually the move from 
packhouse operations to field-based packing where it's just taken out a whole 
stage of the supply chain and people and process associated with that...” (21) 
 
Despite the encroachment of automation/mechanization across the 
industry, this is tempered in certain cases: 
 
“There are some operations where you've got machines working hard and 
you need somebody there [unclear] a hundred percent of the time. Machines 
break down.” (14) 
 
If we see the gradual substitution of human labour for mechanical processes 
as the continuing ‘industrialisation’ of the fresh produce industry, then this 
relies on ‘uniformity’ of crop to facilitate mechanised operations. As such, 
breeding programs and production systems have demanded uniformity as a 
means of facilitating control over production to ensure quality and 
efficiency: 
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“Erm... I think innovation in my lifetime has been about productivity and has 
been about large-scale. So the innovation has been going towards more more 
mechanized system that's giving more uniformity.” (19) 
 
This represents a dynamic link between different categories of innovation 
in order to achieve systemic change. As described in Section 4.2, there are 
increasingly high capital costs associated with the fresh produce industry. 
In part, this is due to the infrastructural requirements to produce and/or 
process horticultural products (at least in large-scale operations). 
Glasshouses, used in some salad production, for example, are prohibitively 
expensive: 
 
“That's half a million pound there.” (14) 
 
It is the utilisation of polytunnels, however, which represents the most 
profound area of change over the last decades for many sectors of the fresh 
produce industry. The scale at which they are now routinely employed 
incurs considerable cost, not only in monetary terms but also in time and 
manpower demands: 
 
“… to be honest now my preferred route is to have forty people and to wallop 
up forty tunnels in a day…” (34) 
 
As an infrastructural innovation, polytunnels have spurned “secondary” 
innovation in the form of alternate pest and disease control, for instance: 
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“Yes, we say we're in control and we do find that it reduces our reliance on 
fungicides, not necessarily insecticides but it allows us to establish biocontrol 
products and use biocontrol fungicides, or actual releasing biocontrol 
products. Beneficials, that's the word.” (35) 
 
The greater degree of control offered by protected systems is discussed in 
Section 4.2.1.3. 
4.3.3.3 Management and farming practices 
 
Innovation associated with how operations are managed on-farm, was a 
further discernable category of innovation. This is in contrast to what we 
might call physical ‘inventions’ that often have greater relative visibility (as 
described above). Yet some consider new management practices innovative 
in and of themselves: 
 
“Some of the innovation we have in the business is around how we manage 
our people, how we motivate our people, how we engage our people. That 
can drive massive productivity gains in its own right.” (1) 
 
Given the consolidation and specialisation being seen across the industry, 
some have suggested diversification is a key management innovation; 
indeed, one participant in the project had diversified away from large-scale 
single-crop production – due to not being able to compete with larger, 
consolidated businesses – to sell a variety of local produce through a farm 
shop, demonstrating the kinds of strategies that are available to growers. 
For one cherry grower, a significant expansion of operations brought with it 
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new challenges, particularly around the ‘skinning’ in tunnels during a 
narrow window in the spring. A good deal of planning went into the 
management of labour resources during this time: 
 
“… we went from the thirteen tunnels to seventy three. So if you want a good 
word, we had to innovate. We had to find a way to do more and to do it 
quicker. And I was talking to people like Haygrove who have sort of stats 
about putting up tunnels and taking them down, and they said er "in theory 
one man should be able to put up one tunnel a day"… and what I do now is I 
hire in- I get on contract twenty or twenty five people from another farm that 
has lots of strawberry tunnels. So I get them to come here to bolster our gang 
for the cherries. So that gives us basically we're aiming to have thirty five 
forty people on the farm four thirty in the morning for two days of the year to 
put the tunnels up.” [34] 
 
The use of biological control, as opposed to ‘conventional’ pesticide 
practices, is also an area of increasing interest, driven in part by the loss of 
active ingredients and greater control in protected environments, but also 
pesticide resistance in certain pests: 
 
“… the reason why biological control is now widely used in glasshouses for 
pest management, tomatoes, cucumbers and so on, is because in the 1960s 
insecticide resistance was such a problem they had no alternative but to 
move into that- that mode of operation if you like. A lot of that work was 
done at what was then the Glasshouse Research Institute down at 
Littlehampton, which eventually became part of HRI.” (9) 
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“So outdoor crops we would have sprayed more, we're almost adopting 
organic crop protection principles because we can under polytunnels, i.e. 
using biofungicides a lot, whereas outdoor we're getting weather events.” 
[35] 
 
Likewise, predictive models – which represent an important area of 
innovation in and of themselves – are routinely used to determine the 
expected pressure of a particular pest, supporting on-farm decision making; 
a parallel exists for those storing produce, with sensors providing real-time 
data on stored goods, allowing them to better control supply: 
 
“So you then have these sensors throughout the store, and you can sense 
instantly if something is changing rather than waiting on a visual inspection, 
which may not be due for another three weeks, or a month, by which time- 
you know fifteen percent of your crop is gone…” (32) 
 
Indeed, greater precision in large-scale commercial farming takes a 
number of forms: 
 
“So the innovation that we've done around this area- I mean we've done 
other things like, for example, we were the first to start using variable rate-
spacing on potato planting, using soil sampling of soil densities across the 
field and then variable spacing it.” (27) 
 
Of course, some kind of managerial decision normally precedes the adoption 
of any new practice or product, making management an important 
component of the innovation process. 
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4.3.3.4 Marketing 
 
As noted above, marketing was considered important with regards to 
varietal development; it serves a key function in supporting other 
innovations, which, as described in Section 4.3.2, reflects the 
‘interconnected’ nature of change. Marketing reinforces the differentiation 
sought after by retailers. Likewise, some suggest more could be done to 
advertise the industry’s health credentials: 
 
“There is no doubt that if you eat a diet that is rich in fruit and vegetables, it 
is better for you. And the industry as a whole from start to finish, needs to do 
more from an innovative perspective to get people to access fresh fruit and 
vegetables on a more regular basis across all the eating occasions in the day.” 
(10) 
 
A grower of ornamental plants in England expressed the power of marketing 
innovation in clear terms: 
 
“… so the whole industry has changed quite dramatically over the last ten 
years from- if you go into a garden centre- the best analogy would be 
Waterstones bookshop. Right, so if you're not a regular garden centre 
visitor… the same thing's happened. If you go to Waterstones bookshop, 
around the walls is the A to Z and even sections of the walls now, they've 
turned into promotional areas, so that the walls are the A to Z, and the 
benches- the tables in the middle of the floor are the promotional, free-
display areas… so they'd do the "summer collection", they'd do the "books to 
read in the winter" or stuff like that on the walls, and within the walls they'd 
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do "recommended by the management of the shop" or recommended by the 
staff- yeah, "we love because...", handwritten "we love because...". It's 
brilliant. Right so the same thing happened in garden centres. Garden centres 
used to be A to Z, so Abelias at one end and God knows what at the other- at 
the other end, and they- we started- it was actually driven by the suppliers in 
that the suppliers first went out there and said "look rather than putting this 
- in our case it was a Hebe called Rosie - rather than putting Hebe Rosie in 
the H section of the plant area, why don't you just put them on a bench, and 
we'll sell you fifty of the them, not the ten that you would normally have, 
about fifty of them. Put them all on there and they'll sell... far better than any 
of your other Hebes because we've put a bespoke label in there, we've got a 
pink pot, we've got a poster for you. Whole thing. That's what they did. So 
they agreed, they said yes, and it worked.” (17) 
 
It is clear that marketing innovation at one ‘end’ of the supply chain can have 
impacts upon other parts of the supply chain, and that the source of a given 
innovation – as in the case highlighted above – may be product of interaction 
between these different parts (see Section 4.5). Of course, there are also new 
ways in which people purchase produce. As a participant representing a UK 
retailer noted: 
 
I think with internet shopping and how people engage with buying food- 
these sorts of innovations change and think ten years ago the idea of having 
your food delivered to your home, and not having to go out… so how do you 
create innovation to a customer that's shopping on a tablet rather than 
coming into your shop…? (33) 
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Quite how this impacts upon other parts of the supply chain – other than 
offering the potential to boost sales – is not precisely clear, but does 
represent innovation at the ‘end’ of this chain and should not be ignored. 
 
In summary, although we can categorise innovations into a loose typology, 
what becomes apparent is the co-dependent nature of innovation (or 
perhaps “innovations”). They are not always discrete products, but larger 
processes of change. The use of polytunnels in successful cherry growing, 
for instance, required numerous follow-on innovations around human 
resource management, learning activities and invention. 
4.3.4 Impact and measurement of innovation 
 
The outcomes and measurement of change within and across the categories 
of innovation described above form an important theme in the data. Such 
observations were often made with a specific innovation, or suite of 
innovations, in mind. For example, a potato grower pointed out the benefits 
of precision farming techniques (such as GPS monitoring to facilitate field 
mapping and variable spacing during planting): 
 
“It's allowed us to produce a much more consistent high-quality crop than in 
the past. It's helped us reduce the numbers and scale of the problems that 
crop up in farming.” (27) 
 
Of course, the impact of using polytunnels in soft (and now stone) fruit 
production has been dramatic, both in terms of increased output and, as one 
agronomist noted, extension of the growing season: 
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“So you know they can potentially crop from May through to October... if you 
go back twenty years, twenty five years, the strawberry season was- early 
varieties in mid-May, through the late varieties into mid-July.” (15) 
 
How we might feasibly measure impact is considered a complex and difficult 
issue: 
 
“… that's the most difficult thing in the world to do.” (6) 
 
However, the difficulty in assessing the impacts of innovation appears to 
depend on the ‘type’ we are interested in examining. For example: 
 
“… in the case where we're saying apply less nitrogen or sometimes apply 
more nitrogen, then you can say well, you basically saved the cost of fertilizer 
if there's no effect on yield so you can actually make a financial case.” (6) 
 
Yet the task becomes more challenging when considering the interlinked 
nature of innovation, which may rely on ‘separate’ innovations from a 
number of different areas to instigate wider technical or social change. Given 
the AHDB’s role in funding relevant research for the industry, the notion of 
impact and its measurement is of practical concern. As one participant 
suggested: 
 
“That for us always has been the ten million dollar question. I think if you go 
to talk to people in similar positions elsewhere in the world they have exactly 
the same problem… it's a complicated area, I think it's partly about scale, so 
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at what scale are we trying to measure this impact? So if you take one 
particular piece of work focussing on one particular issue you could argue 
"well we found a solution to a pest or a disease or whatever" and then how do 
we show that growers have actually taken that technology and used it. At 
very simple level you could look at pesticide statistics and see if that 
particular product has been taken up or whatever... doesn't necessarily prove 
anything. You can talk to growers and ask them if they've done anything with 
it and we do try and do that sort of thing. On the other hand you could scale it 
up and say OK, we do programs of work which cover crop protection, 
horticulture in general, how do we measure the impact of that?” (9) 
 
Others noted that the use of narrative (i.e. personal accounts of change) 
were useful in explaining impact to funding bodies for instance. The 
director of a project aimed at bolstering horticultural innovation suggested 
this was useful: 
 
“… And in fact we use narrative really I suppose as much as anything to 
investigate the success- we have feedback forms from each event, people put 
the comments on and they will say things like they didn't like the lunch much, 
things like that. But they'll also say "I've never thought of that before it was 
really good" or "I brought a friend because they happened to be staying with 
me and they were able to tell me much more about this" and so on. So you get 
much more from narrative than you do from metrics.” (18) 
 
Given what has already been said regarding the unpredictable nature of 
innovation and that measuring the impact of innovation can be so 
challenging, it is interesting to observe that certain actors, especially 
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researchers, are routinely asked to ‘predict’ the impact of their work on the 
wider world: 
 
… this is a problem with funding bodies 'cos they always want to know what 
the benefits are of what they've put into research and they also want you to 
predict it before [author’s emphasis] they start the research... so you make 
things up usually. (6) 
 
Ultimately, very little in the way of practical, proven techniques for 
measuring the impact of innovation were forthcoming (see Chapter 5). 
4.4 Drivers of change 
 
What drives innovation in the fresh produce industry? An emergent 
category was derived from, in part, direct answers to this question and 
responses from participants made during the course of the interviews as to 
what encouraged people to change. Three sub-themes emerged: 
 
1. Economic drivers 
2. Retail needs 
3. Regulatory drivers 
 
Each of these categories is explored in more detail below. 
4.4.1 Economic drivers 
 
One participant was able to sum up the driving forces behind innovation in 
the fresh produce industry rather succinctly: 
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“So I think there's really only two things that'll make growers really change, 
sit up and change their minds, one is: that it's going to make them some 
money or it's going to save them some money… and the other one really is it's 
going to continue to give them a license to operate, and by that I mean it 
enables them to overcome legislative hurdles if you like…” (9) 
 
Given the competitive nature of the industry, and what might be described 
as the oligopsonic structure of the UK fresh produce industry, it is 
unsurprising that change is largely driven by economic incentive; as such, 
much has been done in the name of improved efficiency: 
 
“… the history of fresh produce in the UK has been aggregation, bigger and 
bigger or cooperatives as well which has all been driven by need for efficiency 
and cutting costs.” (7) 
 
Staying ‘one step ahead’ – of competitors – is important, but such 
competition is not only domestic: 
 
“… one of the things that's driving the success of the soft fruit sector, is a big 
improvement in imported produce, so people are eating more berries because 
the standard of berries that they're importing has gone up significantly, and 
so berries is becoming completely a twelve month of the year thing…” (32) 
 
The increasingly high cost of labour for produce businesses is driving the 
push towards greater automation and reduced costs: 
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“You've never really stood still, and I think the main driver for that is labour. 
You know 'cos labour costs are constantly moving…” (25) 
 
“I mean we have to get our harvesting- unit cost of harvesting down, which 
we're constantly trying to do, and to be able replace the human being or at 
least assist the human being in more efficient work must be an aim.” (11) 
 
However, a downside of the constant search for innovation to remain 
competitive is that it has led to “defensive” innovation (i.e. reducing cost or 
improving efficiency) that some participants felt limited the capacity of the 
industry to affect ‘revolutionary’ or ‘disruptive’ changes. As one participant 
noted: 
 
“A lot of the innovation on farm that I see in fresh produce is borne about by 
necessity, because the farmer says "if I don't do this, I'm gonna go out of 
business". And that's not how you should be pushing innovation, but that's 
what I see.” (29) 
 
Of vital importance to fresh produce are quality and control. Innovation, 
‘defensive’ or otherwise, is often carried out in the name of either ensuring 
that the quality of produce is maintained or enhanced, and for greater 
control over the growing environment: 
 
“So for instance on of the projects which we're doing is looking at novel weed 
control systems… we currently have a massive problem with weed control in 
our crops where the alternative is hand weeding, which is expensive and 
difficult to do. So there's a big opportunity if we can come up with solutions 
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to that there's a significant commercial driver within our business to make 
that happen.” (21) 
 
“… [blueberries & blackberries have] got a high-sale point so for the 
economics of covering them mean that we can assure the timing of the 
harvest. And we can assure the quality a lot, lot easier. It's within our- more 
of our control than having a weather event.” (35) 
 
The quality standards seen in today’s fresh produce industry are in large 
part driven by the needs of the retailers through which most produce passes. 
4.4.2 Retail needs 
 
A related category of ‘driver’ stems from the demands of large retailers. 
Many of these can be linked to those economic factors described above: 
 
“… it's this constant battle with the retailers who are constantly pushing 
down on price, constantly looking for more efficiency, scrutinizing the level of 
profit you are making out of them.” (9) 
 
Certain ‘tasks’, such as packing and labeling, have been pushed ‘up’ the 
supply chain by retailers, which has resulted in producers, processors and 
even breeders having to develop solutions to these processes: 
 
“… they have pushed a lot of their operation down onto the growers… the 
whole head lettuce was being harvesting, and pack- trimmed and packaged 
in the field… no longer being done in a pack-house, no longer bei- labels and 
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everything, not being labelled by [retailer] or anything like that, they pushed 
it all down and said "this is your function", and so the innovation had to come 
because the grower's having to do some of the... processes that were 
previously done by the next person in the chain.” (7) 
 
“Oh yeah, absolutely it's all about saving money and if you can push part of 
your responsibility... the technical team that I work for has… halved in the 
time- in the last twelve months, as more and more has pushed back on the 
suppliers to actually do…” (29) 
 
The drive for quality also appears to originate or at least be maintained by 
retailer buying standards: 
 
“… we've been working with probably a few more suppliers and businesses to 
give us that confidence that you're going to have that availability at the right 
quality 'cos you can't just sort of- ultimately we're a [high-end retailer] and 
you've got to make sure your sourcing strategy enables you to get the very 
best quality product you can.” (33) 
 
It also apparent that retailers play a significant role in ‘challenging’ others 
to innovate, discussed in Section 4.8.1. 
4.4.3 Regulation 
 
A further driver of change is regulation. Those involved in the industry must 
conform to regulation governing various aspects of land management and 
food production. In this sense, change is obligatory, but not necessarily easy. 
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For example, increases in the National Minimum and Living Wages was 
considered burdensome from the growers’ perspective, as labour costs 
already represent a large share of costs. Such regulation may force produce 
businesses to adopt new practices or technologies (or risk harm to profits – 
see Discussion): 
 
“… at the moment one of the big areas is the living wage and as good as it is 
and a good idea as it is, we're never gonna get that money back out of the UK 
marketplace…” (26) 
 
“… they're thinking of hiking the hourly minimum wage from £6.50 to £7.30. 
That's massive, and companies out there are not going to be able to stomach 
it, a lot of companies. They just won't be able to do it. So that will make 
innovation even more important.” (14) 
 
Likewise, the loss of certain pest control products (a result of regulation) 
presented growers in particular with agronomic challenges. As a researcher 
discussing the loss of crop protection products pointed out: 
 
“… that will have a huge impact and that's why thing[s] like agro-ecological 
integrated pest-management is now coming back on the radar…” (7) 
 
Interestingly, regulation is also cast as a barrier to innovation (see Section 
4.7.1.4). In the same vein, retailers have a role to play in supporting their 
suppliers with regards to regulation or certification: 
 
 160 
“… it's trying to convince everybody that we're not trying to push everybody 
towards organic- but integrated pest management, it does include synthetic 
chemicals appropriately and targeted, a lot more monitoring, certainly from 
my own perspective, I have adjusted the specifications of a lot of the products 
we have to include not just on our specifications, which will be red amber 
green as to whether they're excepted by depots, to actually differentiate 
between beneficial insects and pests.” (29) 
 
Support for innovation – and the forms it takes – is discussed in more detail 
in Section 4.8.1. 
4.5 Sources of innovation 
 
‘Where’ innovation originates in the industry is one of the main research 
questions of this project. Interestingly, its sources are diverse but also non-
discrete; learning by doing, for example, is a clear source of innovation, 
although more traditional ventures at private firms and research 
organisations are also nominal sources of innovation. However, it was 
innovation from other countries that was most commonly cited. 
4.5.1 Overseas sources of innovation 
 
Innovation in the UK fresh produce industry is often inspired – or directly 
‘imported’ – from abroad, a process that is facilitated by several factors 
(study tours, UK-based firms having production sites overseas and strategic 
alliances between domestic and international firms). The Netherlands, in 
particular, is the source of many horticultural innovations: 
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“… there's go-to places from a plant perspective and from a technology 
perspective and so it's generally Holland…” (17) 
 
“… if you want to see innovation- you probably want to go to Holland to see 
how all that works, to see how they are so successful with their innovation, 
'cos that's where a lot of it comes from isn't it?” (27) 
 
“… late 1980s, early 1990s, the in-thing were multi-row beds for apples so 
planting bed of eight, then an alleyway and another bed of eight etc. And it 
was copying and innovation that the Dutch growers had gone down. That 
was- we were doing it just as they were pulling all theirs out 'cos they decided 
it didn't work very well.” (15) 
 
However, other participants described trips to the United States, Canada and 
Australia as being both personally formative and a source of new ideas, 
some of which were later implemented at home: 
 
“When I was twenty-one I travelled the world, as a young farmer, farming my 
way 'round Australia and America. Erm, and I found a machine called a 
hydro-cooler, which was basically using very large volumes of very cold 
water flowing over a carrot crop to take the field-heat out, to give it shelf 
life... and nobody'd ever heard of them in the UK, so when I got home, my old 
chap said 'right you're in charge of carrots now', twenty-one years old, in a 
tin shed in the middle of [location] and I bought a hydro-cooler, and it cost 
£55,000, and we didn't have £55,000... I sort of ordered it without asking him 
[laughs]. But this machine completely revolutioni- has, completely 
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revolutionized carrot production since the late 1980s, so... within three years 
if you didn't have one you weren't in the carrot industry anymore.” (1) 
 
“The board of directors gave me money several years ago to go- I had this 
dream of- I had heard of a scheme in Australia on a cancer-fighting broccoli, 
they allowed me to go and invest in it, here I am some seven years later still 
working on the project… but it's all innovation, new varieties, new harvesting 
techniques, we were in Tasmania looking at new automatic harvesting 
machines, I'm going to Denmark in two weeks time looking at an automatic 
harvesting machine…” (26) 
 
“Strategic alliances” between domestic and overseas firms also the spread 
of certain novel genetic resources (see Section 4.6.1.1). 
4.5.2 Learning by doing 
 
As observed in the previous section, direct experience with new ideas 
abroad is a common means by which innovation is brought to the UK. Such 
instances of learning are perceived as important amongst a range of 
literatures associated with innovation (i.e. AKIS and FSR). Experimentation 
and adaptation of innovation was the most commonly cited of these (often 
informal) learning processes: 
 
“… if you give me something that my customer wants and it has certain 
problems associated with it, in terms of growing problems, I will find a way of 
growing it for my customer.” (28) 
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“So that was a high-end retailer that was still looking for [hand-harvested 
sprouts]. They perceived that hand-harvested sprouts were still better quality 
than mechanical-harvest... but then we did some trials and proved 
otherwise.” (11) 
 
“So it's three to four thousand pounds a hectare. To skin it and un-skin it 
[polytunnel]. Now that is high against the rest of the industry. I think people 
would think they could probably do it for under two grand. We really do it 
properly here. We've learned- this is a very windy spot here. The sea is about 
five miles away. I think just experience has taught us. We ask people.” (34) 
 
Although some claimed that the drive to experiment was ‘innate’ in growers 
– and, indeed, there are many examples of on-farm experimentation and 
adaptation – people in the industry often rely on a network of support to 
achieve their aims (this is discussed in detail in Section 4.6.1). However, 
innovative thinking is not limited to the growers themselves: 
 
“So, a lot of our work process innovation, a lot of our performance 
improvement innovation, has come from the shop floor… the supervisor came 
in one day 'nd said: "they don't half change them tires quick on the Formula 
One car, don't they? Everybody's got a job. I want to try it with my team". So 
he trained his team up, so that when they changed the film then somebody 
was doing something, and somebody was putting the hubs in, and someone 
was changing the print, and they got the time down to about five minutes. 
And that saved about ten hours of running time on a team of eight people 
every week- every day. Every day.” (1) 
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“… we'll get a new rig built and [the operatives]’ll say "you know wouldn't it 
have been better if this had been done?”” (26) 
 
“They're quite good [workers] they come to me with ideas. They often come 
to me with ideas and say [name] can we try this and almost always I say "yes" 
even if I know it's not going to work. 'cos you always learn something. And if 
that's what they want to do you tend to not stand in their way, let them get 
on with it.” [34] 
 
A clear example of on-farm innovation is found in the case of the Kent-based 
cherry producer intent on improving the efficiency with which polytunnels 
were ‘skinned’ in the springtime. As an intensely physical task, often 
involving elevated work, the farm manager and welder designed and built a 
special forklift rig to provide a suitable platform for workers to pull the 
plastic over the tunnel frame safely and quickly (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 6 In-house polytunnel forklift rig to aid tunnel ‘skinning’ 
 
 
Of course, this represents perhaps one of the simplest forms of on-farm 
invention; some fresh produce businesses are now designing and building 
bespoke harvesting rigs involving considerable investment (discussed 
below). 
4.5.3 Individual businesses and organisations 
 
Certain organisations – private businesses in particular – were also 
considered key sources of innovation. The larger, well-known fresh produce 
businesses, for example, are capable of undertaking significant projects in-
house: 
 
“… because [company] have their own workshop to produce their own 
harvesting rigs and so on, they do it themselves. They actually manufacture 
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their own machines. They're in a sector that's so narrow no one else does it, 
and they do that with their own kit.” (8) 
 
“… [private businesses are] doing their own projects, and there's probably as 
much if not more going on funded by the industry itself and kept to the 
individuals for their own businesses, which... accounts for a good deal of 
innovation.” (12) 
 
Likewise, some international firms are held in high regard: 
 
“They're the ones doing all the research. The likes of [company name] for 
example.” (14) 
 
One participant noted that non-governmental organisations, such as food 
associations also have a role to play: 
 
“… so the Chilled Food Association is somebody who will communicate back 
to researchers what it is that is required by industry…  they come into play in 
areas of innovation in relation to food safety.” (2) 
 
However, it is the various forms of industry conglomeration, such as grower 
groups, more formal producer organisations and marketing desk 
arrangements that provide both a channel for innovation (see Section 
4.6.1.2) and a source of new ideas, novel plant material and access to 
funding: 
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“… the genetics and [unclear] plant type, that comes through the producer 
organisation, so our group get a- we're locked onto the Driscol brand so 
that's what we're onto. We're obviously- we've got the access to the P.O. 
funding to help us improve… whether that's improving irrigation improving 
tunnels, machinery, sprayer technology pack house technology, so many 
many improvements that we do undertake as a business because of the P.O. 
and the drawing down of the funding from Europe.” [35] 
 
The role of producer organisations and other groups is discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.6.1. 
4.5.4 Formal research 
 
The role of formal research, often coordinated by the levy organisations and 
UK research councils at the applied and basic stages respectively, is a further 
source of innovation: 
 
“I mean, people who are "oh I've got nothing out the HDC", if I walked them 
round their farm and pointed out "well where did that come from?" or 
"where did that come from?", "where'd that come from?", half of them'd be 
from the HDC…” (1) 
 
“Yes, but you see what we haven't done is talked about the scientists and 
there are some scientists who have made major and significant contributions 
over the years.” (2) 
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Formalised research supports numerous parts of the industry, but it is in the 
realm of pest control, data collection, efficacy testing and ‘cultural’ practices 
that formalised, levy-funded research appears to make the most impact: 
 
“I mean they've been very helpful in relation to the Suzuki Fly. Yeah SWD.” 
[34] 
 
“The cherry crops... the growers are monitoring hard and you'll see the work 
with the AHDB there's been some excellent projects done by then to try and 
improve control strategies... and the research going into it.” [35] 
 
Given the fact that knowledge can move relatively freely in the fresh produce 
industry (see Section 4.6.1.1) the origins of a certain innovation can be 
‘masked’: 
 
“… we have a strong grouping 'round here called Scottish Agronomy, who do 
trials and advice on cereals particularly oats and potatoes and I dare say we 
tackle other crops as well. But... [name] will be at every Potato Council event 
gleaning his overall knowledge... yeah, but by the time it goes to the grower 
it's not carrying an AHDB brand it's carrying a Scottish Agronomy brand.” 
(22) 
 
Formal research is often operationalised through specific research 
programs. If we consider the output of research as a key component in 
innovation, then how these programs are developed and, indeed, how 
innovation is supported in the industry in general is important, and the topic 
of the next section. 
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4.6 Communication in the fresh produce industry 
 
This category concerns how the various actors that make up the UK fresh 
produce industry interact with regards to innovation. It can be further 
divided into two sub-categories – positive interfaces & successful brokerage, 
and problematic areas – that establish the basis for positive and negative 
approaches to innovation (more specific enabling and disabling factors are 
described in the next section). 
4.6.1 Positive interfaces and successful brokerage 
 
This sub-category concerns the interactions (interfaces) and activities that 
facilitate the innovation process between different actors (brokerage). It is 
further sub-divided into three parts, being: 
 
1. Networks 
2. The role of different actors 
3. Specific projects 
 
Each of these is described in more detail below. 
4.6.1.1 Networks 
 
The apparent importance of personal and professional networks to the 
innovation process in the UK fresh produce industry cannot be overstated; 
this was a recurrent theme throughout the data: 
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“I mean go direct to [research institute] because as I say we do have the close 
contacts with the scientists there, sort of say "what do you know about this? 
What can you do about it?"” (23) 
 
“So that means that people's networks and people's... I suppose working 
relationships, mean that there are a lot of collaborations that have just 
occurred over experience, time and just... relationships with how people have 
been working. I can't really comment whether it's any greater or less in other 
sectors, but... certainly it's significant and been very beneficial, and I think 
we've seen more consolidation- everyone's seen more consolidation in the 
sector so there are fewer and fewer, bigger more significant, more 
professional businesses, I don't see that changing…” (33) 
 
“I mean for us we have- the bulk of our innovation will come from a small 
number of people who we have personal trusting relationships with… So we 
work very closely with them and we value what they have to say for 
themselves and so we actually will follow their lead.” (21) 
 
“I actually try and make a point of going to open days or dinners or 
whatever, not because I want to do anything else other than meet people… 
industry networking is very important.” (26) 
 
These examples demonstrate that actors within the industry have a ‘support 
network’ they can utilise to meet their needs. As one participant advised: 
“know what you know, know what you don't know, and know someone that 
does know”. Such networks now commonly extend beyond the UK, 
 171 
sometimes in the form of “strategic alliances” between domestic and 
international companies: 
 
“We have links with a Dutch company…” (30) 
 
“No the seed has been developed by a big company, a big multinational 
company who we have a strategic alliance with and so yeah, they were 
trialling it in the fields and such thing. But as a research and development 
mission we actually have an alliance with a Spanish company and we 
actually used the Spanish- the Spanish winters are very similar to the Scottish 
autumns, so we actually get two years in one.” (26) 
  
Personal and professional networks and strategic alliances offer a platform 
for the exchange of knowledge. The importance of personal networks was 
striking when it came to scientific research: 
 
“Our main benefit from them is keeping in touch with the scientists so that er 
if they are coming up with ideas, and you know just…” (23) 
 
“… some researchers are better keyed in to the industry than others, or better 
known by agronomists, we know they're doing that piece of work, we can 
pick the phone up and say "can you tell us a bit more about it? You gave us a 
presentation, can I- I'd like to have a chat with you about it”” (15) 
 
Likewise, grower groups provide a platform for knowledge sharing, 
innovation brokerage and other functions, such as research agenda-setting 
(depending on the group in question). Grower groups take on various forms, 
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from crop-specific peer groups (such as levy board technical committees) to 
retailer-specific grower groups. These groups are an important conduit of 
innovation and knowledge, and give growers an interface with other 
organisations: 
 
“I'm probably fortunate that I've been part of R&D committees, I get to see a 
lot of proposals coming through and seeing what people are looking at on the 
research side, and trying to make them practical on how they can be applied 
on the field side…” (28) 
 
The more formalised producer organisations play a major role in facilitating 
the spread of innovation and knowledge (see next section). 
4.6.1.2 The role of different organisations and actors 
 
Producer organisations, here taken to mean those organisations that have 
individual grower members but act as one enterprise (such as grower co-
operatives or “marketing desks”), are important entities in the fresh 
produce industry. As noted, these act as a platform for sharing knowledge 
and innovation: 
 
“… we [producer organisation] developed [technology] in-house and we use 
it, every single one of our growers uses it…” (26) 
 
“… [we] probably have ideas, that are the same as like-minded people in the 
group and I think if you were on your own it would come to a- you would 
stagnate and come to a halt. Whereas you know you can sort of link up with 
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ideas and bounce off each other and- or it ends up mixed up a bit and out of it 
all the right idea comes out…” (25) 
 
“So we'll use varietal choice because we're part of the marketing group we 
have a choice of sort of a logo-branded variety that is only available to our 
members… it's already been tested and trialled and accepted by our 
customers. So that’s a good advantage.” [35] 
 
These organisations facilitate the spread of new ideas by using internal 
agronomy teams. Study tours are also organised by producer groups: 
 
“… I mean [producer organisation] have had them to Mexico, to Chile, 
Argentina, the States, obviously and Spain and Holland…” (23) 
 
Yet belonging to such organisation may lock ‘out’ as much as they keep ‘in’. 
As one grower claimed: 
 
“I suppose and that's probably a bad thing I suppose as far as innovation is 
concerned in the industry. Is- is the way that people are becoming very 
focussed into their groups. You lock yourself out of other things... or- well, 
locked in or locked out. But you know it was governmental bodies that were 
all to do with that in the past, so it was open to everybody. Whereas now if 
you have a good idea you keep it to yourself or keep it in the group you 
know?” (25) 
 
Being part of such groups can drastically help reduce the inherent 
uncertainty of innovation. Take for instance the confidence with which one 
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farm manager, belonging to a producer organisation with its own strategic 
alliances and access to proprietorial genetic material, can approach the task 
of putting a formerly outdoor crop under polytunnels: 
 
“…we have a field of blueberries that are outdoor… it's only a little patch but 
it got us going and we've had them in the ground for ten years but we know 
that we'll get much better results with the new genetics and indoors and in 
grow pots.” [35] 
 
These organisations often host their own in-house conferences, aimed at 
transferring knowledge – including market trends, agronomy and 
technology – between members of their growing base.  
 
Other, specific organisations and actors provide platforms for interaction 
and, importantly, brokerage functions such as translation/adaptation of 
scientific research. The AHDB, for example, acts as both a node for wider 
communication and as a translator of scientific research. However, as will 
be shown in Section 4.7.1, this lacks a substantial, formalised process. The 
Horticultural Innovation Partnership (HIP), also serves a similar role and 
the ‘independence’ (i.e. nonpartisan) of both the HIP and AHDB was 
considered to foster trust, which is an important factor for successful 
working relationships (see Section 4.8.3). 
 
The importance of agronomists in this respect is also clear: 
 
“… got to look at who are the influencers of growers' behavior, and 
agronomists are key influences on farms. And that's- if you want to get 
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growers to do something, you got to persuade the people who advise them to 
say "you should be doing this" or at very least looking at this…” (15) 
 
“I [agronomist] read the arable ones 'cos there's always something- they're 
always talking about blackgrass control in wheat, which you think "is that 
actually really important?" but actually it's becoming really important in 
vegetables as well, 'cos we can't control the blackgrass, we need some work 
on blackgrass control. So I'm interested now in what's going on in the arable 
sector, and see if there's any ability to transfer things from the arable sector 
into veg. We're in the veg. sector very much crumbs off the table of the arable 
sector in terms of crop protection.” (12) 
 
“I'm a farm agronomist so for me [AHDB communications are] fantastic, it's 
right up to date. And then we can then use all that- but there's also other 
research that they're doing in other crops, so whether that's heating, use of 
biomass boilers it's lovely to have that knowledge and that understanding.” 
[35] 
 
In summary, there are a number of organisations that, in conjunction with 
agronomists, serve as vital conduits for knowledge. 
4.6.1.3 Specific projects 
 
A number of current and past projects were noted as being particularly 
useful in providing a platform for innovation. The Hort-LINK scheme (ended 
2009) was successful at ‘pulling through’ research for example: 
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“… what it was doing was giving a vehicle for what had been funded in terms 
of blue sky... to get that carry-through to the market place and that it didn't 
get lost…” (2) 
 
“I suppose the LINK schemes were the nearest we had to doing that, to enable 
some of that new thinking to be pulled through into that sort of applied 
thinking loop.” (9) 
 
One participant reported that the establishment of a new platform, the HAPI 
(Horticulture and Potato Initiative) project, is filling the ‘gap’ left by the 
termination of the Hort-LINK scheme. The UK-wide “Agri-tech Strategy” was 
also considered to be filling a gap in the provision for the translation of 
scientific research into operational forms: 
 
“Agri-tech strategy and the Catalyst, has gone some way to fill that gap and 
certainly in terms of the amount of money that's available…” (2) 
 
However, others felt that the Agri-tech Strategy was not sufficient to bridge 
the gap left behind by the privatisation of the previously public national 
extension service: 
 
“… Agri-tech's great, but it's a hundred and sixty million quid, it's a drop in 
the ocean to be quite frank. You know, we got rid of ADAS, the big gap is the 
translation of research into practice... the extension. That's still a massive 
blackhole.” (1) 
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The use of specific projects as ‘innovation platforms’ is discussed in more 
detail in the Discussion (Chapter 5). 
4.6.2 Barriers to effective communication and collaboration 
 
Several issues hamper effective communication and collaboration in the 
industry. As previously noted, what we might call the inherent 
competitiveness of the fresh produce industry prevents certain knowledge 
being shared and also prevents possible collaboration. At the same time, 
demand articulation (the ability to clearly express requirements) was cited 
as a problem: 
 
“So I think- it's a term that's overused now, there's sort of er- making sure 
needs are articulated.” (9) 
 
“… often people will talk about it- there is a problem sometimes in terms of 
the specifics, so often growers will say they have a problem in quite general 
terms, but they don't understand the specific reasons why they've got that so 
you have to actually then go in and tease apart the reasoning of why they've 
got that problem.” (7) 
 
A reluctance to share other kinds of information was also apparent. One 
participant dubbed the reluctance of suppliers to inform their customers of 
the problems they face “positive spin”. Another demonstrated that it could 
sometimes be best to avoid discussing innovation: 
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“… so let's say you innovate to reduce cost... what we will tend to do 
sometimes we won't actually discuses that, 'cos the minute you say to 
somebody "right I've done this innovation you know it's reduced my supply 
costs by two percent" they say "that's fine, I'll drop the price by two percent". 
'cos they don't understand about- you know you've taken a risk made all that 
investment, you should get the whole of that two percent back, they see that 
as an opportunity to make it two percent cheaper.” (21) 
 
Other issues raised concerned the relative lack of fora for communication 
(such as national conferences) and the “drying up” of traditional extension 
regimes: 
 
“… since the demise of ADAS that translation of knowledge through to 
growers has dried up quite significantly.” (32) 
 
The loss of a public extension service is at the heart of many of the systemic 
barriers identified as ‘bottlenecks’ in Section 4.7. 
4.7 Industry ‘bottlenecks’ 
 
Several interview questions probed the ‘barriers’ to innovation in the fresh 
produce industry. Such questioning yielded a large amount of data, and has 
two main categories: systemic and personal barriers. 
4.7.1 Systemic barriers 
 
Systemic barriers refer to factors that “… negatively influence the direction 
and speed of innovation processes and impede the development and 
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functioning of innovation systems” (Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & 
Barnard, 2015a) . Where the literature refers to ‘blocking mechanisms’ and 
‘systemic problems’ or ‘failures’, it general indicates an issue of this nature 
(Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012, p. 4). Some barriers are “personal”, belonging 
to the individual. These are discussed in the next section. 
 
The systemic barriers identified in this project can be further divided into 
five connected themes: 
 
1. Fragmentation 
2. Formalised research 
3. Economic factors 
4. Regulatory constraints 
5. Culture 
 
Each of these is discussed in more detail below. 
 
4.7.1.1 Fragmentation 
 
Fragmentation refers to the weakening of structural conditions that enable 
actors to effectively communicate or collaborate. It takes two forms: vertical 
and horizontal. Vertical fragmentation denotes the lack of hierarchical 
communication and coordination from the government down. Horizontal 
fragmentation refers to a lack of communication between actors of the same 
type. We see examples of both vertical and horizontal fragmentation in the 
UK fresh produce industry, exemplified by complaints about governmental 
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coordination on the one hand, and the lack of collaboration between private, 
competitive businesses on the other: 
 
“I would say that [fragmentation is] something I feel, erm it's hard to 
substantiate.” (10) 
 
“Yeah there's different levels that's just not connected at all.” (13) 
 
“… the research in the UK is too disjointed. Having come from the AHDB 
model where we've got all the Agri-techs, and the HIPS, you know the NIABs, 
and the- erm, AHDB and everybody's sort of doing their own thing, and 
there's nothing actually coordinating it.” (29) 
 
“It's not a barrier to innovation inasmuch as if the individual companies fund 
work and it provides them with you know what they want then that's 
innovation. I think what it does do is cause fragmentation, so you might find 
the same things being done in a slightly different way twice or three times or 
whatever.” (9) 
 
“I don't necessarily see [things] getting more open. If anything things are 
getting more closed, and... there's collaboration within the partners, but 
outside the partners I suppose there are more brick walls, which makes it 
quite hard at an overall sector level but I kind of- I don't see it getting any 
other way at the moment.” (33) 
 
Fragmentation – and its effects – was commonly discussed in relation to 
knowledge, particularly knowledge flows in a post-public extension service 
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environment. A combination of factors already identified, such as 
communication barriers between people of different specialisms, demand 
articulation and industry competitiveness, and the natural diversity found 
within horticultural crop types, serve to compound this issue: 
 
“We've fragmented definitely on sector lines in fresh produce, we're so 
different to say the cereals, or say potatoes, 'cos potatoes- yeah, so it's 
naturally fragmented anyway and what you then get is you get a situation 
where because in fresh produce the requirements are so different between 
growing a tomato and growing lettuce for example, and growing a runner 
bean, totally different technical requirements means that actually the 
challenge is how do you share stuff between them.” (19) 
 
Fragmentation appears to be at least part of the ‘translation problem’: 
 
“You know, we got rid of ADAS, the big gap is the translation of research into 
practice... the extension. That's still a massive blackhole.” (1) 
 
“… so we haven't got the join-up with the basic science anymore, into the 
applied science, in the applied science you've got all the contractors 
separated from each other, and the pull-through doesn't look terrible 
brilliant.” (31) 
 
Indeed, the functioning of formal research in the fresh produce innovation 
system also came under scrutiny. 
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4.7.1.2 Formal research 
 
Several barriers to innovation are found within formal research structures. 
Aside from the privatisation of previously public extension services, which 
has been mentioned, funding for dedicated horticultural research and 
facilities was seen to have diminished in some way: 
 
“In horticulture, I think it is people talking to one another, and I think 
horticultural funding and support from research institutes, has just been 
stripped away… I think that's something that the funding bodies don't 
understand, is we've lost a lot of support and facilities.” (30) 
 
What research is carried out, often involving the levy organisations, is 
subject to questions of fairness: 
 
“… let's say ten growers of lettuce, one of them is hugely dominant, while the 
innovation's being done for them and the others look and say "well we can't 
implement that because we don't have that scale".” (19) 
 
“I think things are changing there, 'cos I think there's these new BBSRC 
projects, these big BBSRC projects that are perhaps helping to some extent, 
but… some of these groups are quite exclusive. Inclusive rather. So if you're in 
the group you're fine, but if you're not in the group, you've hardly…” (6) 
 
As described in Section 4.2.1.2, the consolidation of the industry has led to 
differing “agendas”. Funding bodies and researchers themselves were seen 
to have their own agendas, which are not necessarily aligned with that of the 
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industry at large (although, given the range of crop types represented by the 
levy organisations, finding aligning agendas is inherently troublesome). 
 
The translation of research into practice remained a concern, though it was 
not clear what formal processes – if any – were in place across the research 
establishment to achieve this goal. What can be discerned is a variety of 
views as to “where” translation is required. Some considered translational 
research to be required between crop types: 
 
“It used to be called strategic funding… taking knowledge from Arabadopsis, 
say, into crops and things like that- but you can't do it over and over again… 
[it’s] difficult- 'cos there's a limited amount of funding and expertise, and do 
you want to translate… how do you fund it being translated into every crop?” 
(7) 
 
“… the sort of wheel of virtuous circle is sort of working at the applied end of 
the research spectrum but it's just working in that applied end and that sort 
of communication back from the industry into the more basic end of the 
research spectrum isn't working so well.” (9) 
 
Others suggested that translation was required between applied research 
and the farm, particularly where research needed ‘operationalising’ (the 
traditional focal point of extension activities): 
 
“And in terms if industry I think a big problem is you'll get posters up saying 
"this is the fantastic work we've done" and you'll get a farmer coming along 
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and you know they just look at it and think "oh crikey what on Earth?" it's 
not distilling it into practical information they need.” (24) 
 
A number of observations were made about researchers themselves, many 
of which reinforce the notion of ‘distance’ (or perhaps ‘dissonance’) between 
different actors in the industry. For example, researchers’ understandings 
of on-farm, practical considerations were brought into question: 
 
“They probably don't understand all the constraints and what they see is 
what a good idea it probably is, but what they don't understand is the knock-
on effects or why it's not practical.” (28) 
 
“I think that they talk different languages.” (8) 
 
“And I think the difficulty is the way things are funded and in terms of being a 
scientist, to- you know have the success and move on, you're almost looking 
for different things tha[n] the actual practical application in the industry…” 
(24) 
 
However, it is the researchers’ own professional networks and ability to 
communicate their research that was seen to act as a barrier to sharing 
knowledge for innovation: 
 
“In some instances researchers may be are not particularly well-linked into 
industry.” (15) 
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“Unfortunately we generated a generation of very good scientists who are 
incapable- not incapable, inexperienced and unrewarded for interacting with 
industry.” (19) 
 
“Because it sounds good on paper, but again you've got the problem of a 
research scientist is not necessarily- or the people running the project aren't 
necessarily going to be the best ones to make that delivery.” (6) 
 
“… they don't command the growers’ respect…” (21) 
 
The various processes for establishing research orientation is likewise 
subject to scrutiny: 
 
“I don't think for a lot of people there's a good enough process for evaluating 
the data. Working out what the problems are, and then feeding that into 
“what do we need next?”” (32) 
 
“… if you chop the budget up into little heaps and it's annualized, then there 
they are in a defensive culture, what do you expect people to do? And also 
you've just basically exposed them to a series of little project proposals the 
research community has iterated to fit- 'cos it knows what size the budget is 
as well, so it knows what the culture is, so it knows what to get on the table 
that's got the maximum chance of getting the money.” (31) 
 
A distinct theme emerged regarding the loss of expertise and institutional, 
embedded knowledge in the industry over time, stemming from the loss of 
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expertise, which also lead to the duplication of research by certain 
organisations. 
 
“… most of the people who did anything are either retired or dead with the 
blueberries original in the nineteen- I mean it was planted way back in the 
seventies…” (23) 
 
Closely linked to the loss of institutional/embedded knowledge across the 
sector, two factors seem to be prevent the retention of expertise: 
 
1. The nature of research funding: the limited duration and project-
driven nature of research funding can leave organisations without 
means to retain key staff. Likewise, the time spent drafting funding 
proposals is “wasted” if the application is unsuccessful (and occupies 
a lot of time for many researchers) 
2. Succession planning: particularly within research institutions, it was 
felt that certain expertise was only one ‘retirement’ away from being 
lost, leaving current and future organisations without means to 
leverage that expertise and the duplication of research that might 
have been otherwise prevented had a key individual been involved 
in some way. 
 
The duplication of research – seen as wasteful – was a particular complaint 
amongst researchers, who saw similar issues being explored years apart: 
 
“And I'm now becoming a grumpy old man and yet I see things that are being 
done again that I thought "well, we did that twenty years ago". One of the 
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issues when we went to talk to [company] but they had an issue that had 
been researched on here by colleagues I knew here in the early nineteen 
eighties, but they hadn't found the papers, because the papers aren't 
necessarily in the databases when you search them. But it's there... but when I 
retire, and other people retire, that- you know, me knowing that they've wor- 
did the work in the nineteen eighties will go as well. Because I won't 
probably, there won't be a successor- I doubt there'll be a successor of me.” 
(7) 
 
For some, the loss of expertise and knowledge is not limited to the realm of 
the researcher: some pointed to a “prescriptive” mode of agriculture that 
has become common today and speculated that this amounted to a loss of 
tacit farming knowledge: 
 
“… we've drifted, over the last eighty years, we've shifted from farming where 
there is an intuitive understanding about what you needed to do to do things 
right, to prescriptive farming where people have had the pesticides, and the 
agro-chemicals and they've lost that skill, that intuitive nature and they're 
still in prescriptive mode, but now we're losing all these ag-chems, but they're 
still in prescriptive mode, and they want someone to give them a ticket to sort 
the problem.” (13) 
 
Also evident was a sense that the formal research and development 
architecture, its outputs and institutions, were not at the forefront of 
technological progress: 
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“The problem with [public extension services] from an innovation perspective 
is they were often a long way behind the cutting edge.” (21) 
 
“I think in some instances the research establishment struggle a bit to get to 
grips with what is the next- current or next big issue.” (32) 
 
It is clear that there are blocking mechanisms within the formal research 
domain of the fresh produce industry, including the funding of research – its 
apparent decline and how funding should be spent – and questions of 
fairness with regards to the output of research. The loss of expertise at both 
research institutes (and, indeed, on the farm) is likewise a concern; the 
ability of researchers to effectively communicate with the grower-base and 
their exposure to the industry at large was questioned. A lack of formalised 
processes for translational activities also constitutes a barrier to innovation. 
4.7.1.3 Economic factors 
 
A number of economic factors, some of which have been discussed as 
inherent features of the modern fresh produce industry, also act to deter 
innovation. More than one participant simply said “cost” when asked what 
acts as a barrier to innovation. 
 
The size of the horticultural market, both in terms of number of participants 
and its relative value, was felt to deter investment in product development: 
 
“So if you need to spray something on potatoes then it's worth the chemical 
company producing the thing. If you need to spray it on hardy Geraniums, it's 
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never gonna- they're never ever ever gonna make any money out of that.” 
(17) 
 
“And that's where then horticulture it can be quite challenging, because you 
know, some crops- if we just take the UK market, there aren't that many 
producers of some crops, thing[s] have become highly specialized and you 
can count on two hands the number of growers…” (2) 
 
“The other thing with our industry is that the UK is really quite small as a 
market. So for someone to design a baby leaf harvester in the UK, will be 
really wasting his time. 'cos he won't be able to sell any machines.” (14) 
 
The elevated importance of overseas sources of innovation may stem from 
these conditions. Another economic barrier to innovation is the high capital 
cost associated with many sectors of the fresh produce industry, which is 
itself due to considerable consolidation in those sectors (see Section 4.2.1.1). 
 
Certain business relationships in the industry are also less conducive to 
fostering innovation than others. In general, this centered on the practices 
of retailers and processors with regards to their supply base: 
 
Now when I have this conversation usually I start to get a bit pissed off, 
they'll [retailer] say "it's not like that [name], you've been supplying us for 
twenty years" [laughs] here we go. And you'd have thought that after twenty 
years you would learnt that actually you need to make sure that you assist 
your core supply base to improve its performance for you as a customer. 
What are you doing to help me improve my performance? What are you 
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doing to help me innovate? What are you doing to help me be profitable? 
What are you doing to helping me stick with you as a customer rather than 
go somewhere else which a lot of people have done? Or even just give up on... 
what are you doing to encourage me to continue to work night and day to 
supply you so you'll be successful and make money? What are you doing 
about that? Answer: nothing. (27) 
 
“Erm, I think in effect, I would have to be honest and say that the retailers 
can be a barrier. The retailer, all they want is consistency and cost 
reduction.” (29) 
 
As such, relationships built on a transactional, rather than collaborative 
approaches, are less mutually beneficial and can either impede or at least 
discourage innovative activity (see Discussion). 
4.7.1.4 Regulatory constraints 
 
Regulation is a further factor hindering innovation. The Basic Payment 
Scheme (a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidy for land-managers 
satisfying certain conditions) to land managers in European Union member 
states, for example, was directly implicated in de-incentivising innovative 
activity: 
 
“I've been at a farmers' group meeting on this and almost to a man they were 
saying "we've got to stay in the European Union otherwise we wouldn't get 
our subsidies" and I'm saying "well that's the problem". That's part of the 
problem.” (27) 
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“I think the greatest thing that holds back innovation in this country… is the 
subsidies that you enjoy.” (29) 
 
“You know you get rid of subsidy and you get rid of the laggards…” (8) 
 
“It stifles innovation…” (16) 
 
The removal of certain pest control products was, as previously noted, a 
particularly contentious issue, though this is only a barrier to innovation 
where, as one participant pointed out, companies that would otherwise 
register new pest control products in Europe were being prevented from 
doing so: 
 
“Yeah and the disadvantage the EU is putting EU member states... against 
other parts of the world. It is very apparent that all the major crop protection 
companies are increasingly less willing to spend the money on registrations 
in the EU, because they can effectively get more bang for their buck in other 
parts of the world and maybe if they can earn enough money out of a product 
somewhere else they will bring it in to the EU.” (15) 
 
Most problematic is the mismatch between the rate of removal of such 
products and the level of support offered for finding replacement products 
or substitutes by the very institutions that instigate such measures: 
 
“… the government has an underlying strategy of sustainable growth in 
horticulture. That seems to be at odds with the European Commission's- the 
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fervor in which they're putting into removing a lot of the active ingredients. If 
they're bad, and if they're proven to be bad by all means get rid of them but I 
would also like to see the same amount of fervor being placed into supporting 
research and activity around integrated pest management.” (29) 
 
In summary, it is ‘political’ choices at the multilateral, European level that 
are perceived to constitute the gravest barriers to innovation in the UK fresh 
produce industry. 
4.7.1.5 Culture 
 
The notion of a national culture was also invoked as a barrier to innovation: 
 
“… we've created this terrible culture, which is a contracting, defensive, you 
know, narrow, containing culture.” (31) 
 
A combination of both political choices and the inherent competition found 
in the UK fresh produce industry has led to a “defensive innovation” culture 
in which innovation is ‘limited’ to reducing costs and improving efficiency, 
at the presumed expense of more far-reaching change. Of course, this is 
reflected in other issues, such as the lack of willingness to collaborate on 
issues that might otherwise be mutually beneficial and negative supplier 
relationships: 
 
“And we had a big retailer in the UK, very positive buying team, very effective 
buying team, a hundred and thirty garden centers, good people to supply, 
interesting innovation, interesting new products, great people to work with. 
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New buyer comes in and says "right we've got to turn this into a company, 
really, really makes money. So we need to see- we need to push up the 
margin… we want to see prices come down, and that's the focus". So you 
come and tell me, as we did go and say to them "look we've got a red leafed-
hardy Geranium, I know it's a little bit more than your other Geraniums, but 
ours is a red leafed hardy Geranium. That's why you're paying us 50p more 
than you're paying anybody else for the Geraniums, 'cos we pay a royalty on 
it, it's awkward to grow, it's difficult to propagate, nobody else has got it, we 
are the only growers in the UK, it really works for you" and they'll say "I'm 
not interested in your red-leafed Geranium, I just want Geraniums and I want 
the price down". And they pushed it and pushed it and pushed it, and so it was 
a really- fortunately we only had five, six percent of our turnover with these 
people and they dropped us because it wasn't where we're at…” (17) 
 
These observations were generally contrasted with the past, in which a 
more collaborative spirit was, rightly or wrongly, pervasive. This is 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.9. 
4.7.1 Personal barriers 
 
Personal barriers are those that primarily concern individual actors with 
regards to innovation processes. For example, the inherent uncertainty of 
innovation, and the fear and risk that engenders, was seen to constitute a 
major barrier to innovation: 
 
“The biggest thing that holds back innovation is fear. Fear of failure.” (1) 
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“I think there's a fear of... going into the unknown.” (21) 
 
“Erm the reward to the innovator is very uncertain.” (19) 
 
“I mean it's a brave farmer who actually goes out on a limb and actually 
starts doing something completely different to all his peers. You know they all 
laugh at him and take the piss out of him at the local pub and all of that sort 
of sting.” (8) 
 
“If your livelihood comes from growing a certain crop in a certain way using 
varieties that you understand in production systems you understand, any 
change in that is a business risk.” (10) 
 
Indeed, uncertainty also plays a role in setting the research agenda: 
 
“I think a lot of them don't know what they need.” (13) 
 
“… the growers aren't- they're not necessarily- they might have a little 
problem, but they're not aware that there's fifty people with the same little 
problem…” (17) 
 
“I remember going to one meeting where somebody has said that the top 
fruit industry has no research requirements... what?!” (8) 
 
The traditions, skills and even age of those in the farming community were 
likewise given to be personal barriers to innovation: 
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“… “this is what we've done before, we haven't had any problems with it, why 
should we change our behavior?”” (6) 
 
“… “we've not done it this way before we're uncomfortable with something 
new.”” (8) 
 
However, it is interesting to note that the ‘personal barriers’ to innovation 
remained rather less expansive and thematically consolidated than those 
systemic barriers identified in the previous section (addressed in 
Discussion). 
4.8 Enabling factors 
 
Having looked at the systemic factors blocking innovation, the question 
underlying this section is: what can be done to facilitate it? Again, the 
findings can be divided into systemic and personal enabling factors, but there 
are several distinct themes in this category that sit between and across both 
systemic and personal factors fostering innovation. 
4.8.1 Systemic enabling factors 
 
There are various forms of support for innovation in the fresh produce 
industry, which, importantly, rely on interaction between different system 
actors: 
 
“… we invest a lot of time that actually- working with the very early stages of 
product development, which in produce is the breeders, the plant breeders, 
the nurseries, the seed houses, and that they are often asking: what do you 
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think the market will want in five to ten years time? What do you think about 
this? What do you think about that? Rather than necessarily sitting in an 
ivory tower in a retailer, and going- expecting everything to come to you, and 
then have a meeting sort of thing and people have invested five years of their 
work and you go "oh I don't know why you did that, that was a bit of a waste 
of time" and can be very demoralizing…” (33) 
 
“We collaborated with [research institute]. We had ideas and we got them to 
take it forward for us. A lot of money invested in that.” (26) 
 
“… you had companies that were in different parts of that supply chain 
working together so that when it came to taking that innovation to market 
everybody was already working on it together and some of the cost of course 
was taken care of by Defra…” (2) 
 
Support can also come in the form of financial and/or strategic support 
mechanisms: 
 
“… so our operational program which is funded by the EU… gives us the 
opportunity to invest in these areas.” (26) 
 
Of course, this necessitates action in terms of building networks and seeking 
such opportunities: 
 
“… we've got to have some focus on some of these more challenging areas and 
that might mean we have to put some much larger pots of money on the 
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table, and if we can't afford all of that money then we're going to have to go 
to Innovate UK or BBSRC or [Horizon 2020].” (31) 
 
“… equally people might be pushing ideas to us [retailer] and saying "what do 
you think about this?”” (33) 
 
“I think that comes from, er... interplay between the producer and the 
retailer. It comes from the retailer saying "what can we do that's new?" and 
the producer saying "well I've got this idea, would you sell it?". And the way 
the supply chain is at currently is that the retailers go back to the big 
suppliers- the category managers and say "OK, what innovation have you got 
for us?”” (19) 
 
Some dubbed this “challenging others to innovate”, a more direct request for 
collaboration with innovation in mind, representing a major catalyst for 
innovation in the fresh produce industry: 
 
“Generally speaking how it would go... some of the needs would come through 
our agronomist, so we'll challenge our agronomist with a need.” (21) 
 
“… I look after this pea operation, I act as a company secretary for it, and I've 
just taken a [unclear] and I said to them you are directors of the company… 
you know what are we doing to improve the performance overall, or are you 
happy with the performance? And they said "well no one's happy with the 
performance". "Well what are we doing to improve that?" and- well there 
was kind of a certain resistance, I think because they were being challenged 
as people with roles in the company, they were being challenged about how 
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they deliver those roles and I said "well is the performance good enough 
across the group?" "Well, it is what it is". "Yeah but could it be improved?" 
"Well, I don't know". "Well have you ever asked yourself?" "Well no we 
haven't". And after a while we began to get some kind of agreement that 
actually something might be possible here, and so we took it then to a board 
meeting, and I presented this idea that we needed to challenge everything 
that we were doing a little harder than we currently did. And the board 
actually took this on board, straight away and went "actually this is quite 
exciting, we've never done this as a board.”” (32) 
 
In parallel to the regulatory barriers described in Section 7.7.1.4, the 
promotion of certain policies, or, in some cases, the removal of certain 
policies, can facilitate innovation. Intellectual property protection (IP), for 
example, is a mechanism by which certain actors, notably breeders, protect 
the product differentiation that remains so important to the fresh produce 
industry: 
 
“But you know I wouldn't be doing what I'm doing now if we didn't have IP 
protection... because why develop something- it's a business, and it's quite a 
successful business, but if I can't earn money from selling plants, the royalty 
from selling plants, because it's not protected, it's just an intellectual 
exercise.” (11) 
 
“… more in keeping with a typical industrial business, [horticultural 
businesses] see innovation and intellectual property as an opportunity to 
differentiate themselves in the market place.” (8) 
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As noted previously Basic Farm Payments (BFP) and other forms of subsidy 
are considered by some to deter innovative activity. As such, their removal 
– to create what one participant called a “level playing field” – could also 
bolster innovative capacity (see Discussion). 
 
Quite apart from Section 4.7 (Industry “Blocking Mechanisms”), in which the 
majority of barriers to innovation were found at the ‘systemic’ level, 
enabling factors are overwhelmingly found at the ‘personal’ level. 
4.8.2 Personal enabling factors 
 
Personal factors for change exist at the level of the individual person or 
organisation/business, and can be divided into several further categories. 
4.8.2.1 Interactivity 
 
As should now be clear, innovating actors most commonly rely on a personal 
and professional network of peers and others in the innovation system. 
Actively engaging with these people and organisations is a primary 
mechanism by which innovation is fostered: 
 
“… you've got to get involved in the [AHDB] to get the most out of it.” (1) 
 
“So the more work the more projects which you do and more relationships 
you have actually spending time with the scientists who plug into different 
levels of thinking, so we're talking to somebody about a project but then we'll 
talk more widely about other things, and have a bit of a brainstorm, and 
they're throwing questions at you and then "oh well we hadn't really thought 
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about that but that's quite an interesting idea" and they'll ask us "what do 
you think about this?" and "oh that's quite interesting we hadn't really 
thought about it but do you know what that's quite possible" or "do you know 
what that's a complete and utter waste of time, I don't know why you're 
coming from that" so it becomes a very mutually beneficial exercise.” (21) 
 
“Well I think a lot of the time it does come down to individuals- how well do 
you know individuals in various sectors and the networks that exist and the 
connection between researchers, AHDB, growers, agronomists, and if that's 
all linked up, it can work very well.” (15) 
 
“Right from the bottom up, the entire supply chain needs to start to adopt 
modern methods. They need to look at a co-dependency, through the chain, 
working together in a collaborative way- which they're not.” (27) 
 
However, the choice of how or whether to interact with other industry 
actors relies on human resources such as time and competency, discussed 
below. 
4.8.2.2 Human and material resources 
 
Human and material resources are the resources with which a firm 
undertakes its activities, including knowledge (human capital), assets 
(financial capital in the form of equity) and access to capital (debt capital). 
Such resources play an obvious, but important role in innovation processes: 
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“So I think innovation's not just about the nuts and bolts of the system, or the 
equipment or whatever, it's again the human element.” (15) 
 
For example, “attitude” and (working) “culture” both play an important role 
innovation. These can be embodied in an individual, or a business as a 
whole: 
 
“I mean, thinking about business, the working culture, so you have an 
environment where there is time to be creative... time and permission to try 
different things... and where mistakes are forgiven. 'Cos if you live in a fear 
culture, you'll never try anything new. So culture is absolutely critical.” (1) 
 
Competency is also a factor, with some participants suggesting innovation – 
with its inherent risks and uncertainty – is “not for everyone”. Expertise, 
developed through experience and exposure to industry practices (learning 
by doing) is perhaps an obvious source of such competency. Indeed, core 
competencies make innovation across different categories of innovation 
that much easier: 
 
“… these blueberries will go into hydroponics, so they'll be going into cocoa-
fiber, we've already been growing blueberries in the soil outdoors for years, 
and understanding how they can grow but that's almost grown like our 
blackcurrants and our red currants, however now this will be copying 
differently because a blueberry has different requirements, how we grow our 
raspberries in pots. 'cos we've for probably ten years been growing 
raspberries in hydroponic pots- grow pots, and strawberries for at least ten 
years. So we've got a knowledge of hydroponic watering requirements and 
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the technology. So yeah the blueberry a lot of the knowledge is transferred 
across even the support systems we'll use to hold the crop up and support the 
crop those are borrowed from our raspberry technology.” (35) 
 
Interestingly, despite (or perhaps because of) the importance of competence 
in innovation processes, a reliance on “instinct” and “gut feeling” was still 
evident in some cases: 
 
“Difficult to be certain on that, but that's a gut feeling is that some days you'd 
be better off [putting cherries] outside [to avoid cracking].” [34] 
 
Beyond having greater financial resources with which to invest more in 
expensive technology and infrastructure, larger companies also have the 
human and material resources permitting them to deploy specialist staff 
(such as technologists) in the pursuit of new ideas and to take part in formal 
research forums such as levy board steering committees: 
 
“So effectively the interface is with one business and they've got a lot of 
money, they can afford to employ important, very good technical people so 
they might have one really good technical director and their job is to think 
about lots of things… but one of their priorities is innovation. So they can go 
around and they can keep things going but their one vision, they're the one 
interpreter, they're the gateway- not the sole gateway but they'll have a big 
influence on what's going on in the innovation agenda.” (19) 
 
“… so if you take [companies], they employ people who are highly qualified 
technical people, either people who've worked for us, or research 
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organisations or whatever, but they're only gonna need one or two of them, a 
small team perhaps three at most… and they go round and they're really 
good at foraging, so they look at all the technologies worldwide, you know- 
and they go to lots of conferences, yeah, foraging, and they come back and 
they bring back and plant it in the business as much as can be uptake and 
that's always a good thing…” (31) 
 
Human and material resources are clear elements in innovation processes; 
knowledge, financial assets and access to capital, competence, attitude and 
culture all provide the means with which to innovate. 
4.8.2.3 Champions as change agents 
 
Champions, gatekeepers and agronomists, those that pioneer new ideas and 
influence the direction of innovation through interaction with others in the 
industry, represent important actors in innovation processes. 
 
“There are some inspirational people around.” (1) 
 
“It comes down to the people oh yes. I think people are very very important in 
this. You have to have your captains. Your champions.” (6) 
 
“I suppose it's one of the things that's worth mentioning, is the importance of 
having industry champions. Who can communicate and are well-regarded…” 
(18) 
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“So there's got to be a patron... along the chain, who's gonna champion it, 
and so innovation needs- if you went into a big corporate business, 
innovation would have patrons or champions that would actually take that 
through.” (19) 
 
Agronomists fulfill similar functions (i.e. can be champions or gatekeepers 
in their own right), spreading solutions to agronomic issues: 
 
“… well [agronomist] spends all of his time busy at nurseries and busy seeing 
different- and sometimes it's just the fact that he's seen somebody else with a 
similar problem and they've cracked a solution…” (17) 
 
Of course, the ability of an agronomist or any other champion to influence 
on-farm decisions is derived from in part from trust between their 
customers and themselves. 
4.8.3 Trust 
 
Some enabling factors sit between the systemic and personal realms, but 
intersect both. For example, “trust” is an essential component of 
relationships where innovation is the objective, between people and 
between their respective institutions: 
 
“I think it fosters a partnership and trust which then allows both parties to 
partake in innovation because this is a big problem, if you need partners to 
work together they need to trust each other…” (20) 
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“… being able to collaborate and share knowledge when it's trusted partners, 
it's quite important. I think trust is such a big thing in life in general, but I 
think when you're talking about innovation development, people being able 
to trust that if they share something with you that you're not just going to 
broadcast it on Twitter to everyone that- you know, there are certain things 
that people are very happy to share, there are other things that are very 
bespoke projects that they kind of want to get an idea of "whether do you 
think this is a good idea?" but you have to keep under your hat for a while… a 
lot of it's down to peoples' values in these sorts of things, and business ethics, 
and how business goes about things…” (1) 
 
The term “respect” was also used to describe mutually beneficial 
relationships, indicating the importance of social factors in the innovation 
process. 
4.8.4 The idea of best practice: in farming and in extension 
 
A further factor that arose during the course of data generation is “best 
practice”, which here takes two forms: the notion of best practice in farming 
– that there are better, evidence-based methods of production – and its 
equivalent in extension practices – that knowledge-producing organisations 
can adopt better or worse means of communicating their outputs with the 
growing community. How one relates to the other, and, indeed, whether 
either constitutes a reality in farming at all, is somewhat difficult to unpack. 
For example, despite the apparent need for the establishment of a “best 
practice” model for farming: 
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“… we need to turn all of that output into coherent best practice kind of 
format. So whatever new knowledge emerges become integrated into the 
current best practice model, which is continually iterated and improved…” 
(31) 
 
… it was widely recognised that innovation is a negotiated process often 
involving not just the adaptation of a given product or process to the special 
circumstances of a particular operation (see Section 4.3.2, “Observations 
about innovation”), but appreciation for the right time with the respect to 
market development: 
 
“… there's always a right time for everything…” (1) 
 
As such, it is clear there is no “one size fits all” approach to innovation in 
farming. What we see instead is the “fit” of a given innovation to a particular 
circumstance. It is the appropriateness of new ideas or products in a certain 
context that determines the ease of their implementation: 
 
“Well I think one of the things you learn in applied research is that you can 
do a wonderful piece of research which shows you can do X, Y, Z and it'll have 
some sort of benefit but unless it fits in to whatever system growers are using, 
and unless it actually does something to their bottom line there's not much 
incentive for them to actually do it.” (9) 
 
Furthermore, the nature of the innovation itself will determine what 
“pathways to use” are used by organisations charged with extension 
activities: 
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“… it depends if your innovation's an active ingredient, a germ-line, if it's a 
piece of machinery, control system, decision support, they're all gonna have 
very different sorts of creators if you want and also have different pathways 
to end use.” (19) 
 
The notion of “fit” is a something of a challenge to the idea of best practice, 
representing the diversity of contexts within which innovation occurs in the 
fresh produce industry. Likewise, it has implications for the design of 
research and determining the ‘impact’ of research later on (see Discussion). 
 
The precise methods by which agricultural knowledge could or should be 
shared remained quite general, resting in some cases on the type of 
information one is dealing with: 
 
“We do have the view here that the delivery of information is a multichannel 
activity and it's er, it's a question selecting the right channel or channels for 
whatever message it is you're trying to get out there.” (9) 
 
There was some disagreement, however, over the supposed value of certain 
activities, again reflecting the principle that extension, like innovation, is 
most often context-specific. For example, some claimed “seeing was 
believing”, referring to the need to demonstrate in practice an idea or 
product to prospective users: 
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“I have this with my own growers, if I can show 'em a trial, that I've done, 
that's worked, and I can demonstrate to them... what I've changed has made 
a positive benefit, then they'll adapt it.” (1) 
 
“Demonstration, I think. Best way is to get farmers on a farm. So face to face.” 
(8) 
 
However, others challenged the assumption that demonstration is always 
effective: 
 
“Erm... well people always talk about "oh demonstration farms" and things 
like that. They've been tried on and off over the years. The reality is what 
works on one farm, does not always work on another farm.” (15) 
 
The recognition that digital/mobile communications were becoming 
increasingly prevalent, however, was less controversial: 
 
“Increasingly I'll get something sent to my smartphone in terms of a picture 
from a grower saying "what's this?" you know.” (15) 
 
Given the age profile of the UK’s farming community, though, meant that 
print communication was still considered effective. At the same time, the 
involvement of stakeholders in the research process was seen to provide 
more than the ‘obvious’ benefits of receiving the output from said research; 
boosting research relevance in its initial stages, for instance, and knowledge 
that might otherwise not be published: 
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“I'm probably fortunate that I've been part of R&D committees, I get to see a 
lot of proposals coming through and seeing what people are looking at on the 
research side, and trying to make them practical on how they can be applied 
on the field side…” (28) 
 
“… for every bit of public information, there's probably a couple of bits behind 
the scenes that weren't published which has value and that's one of the 
reasons why we like to do a lot of our own R&D work for [AHDB] or whoever, 
'cos then we learn more than necessarily is published about different 
aspects...” (13) 
 
In summary, whilst enabling factors for change hinge on effective 
communication – facilitated by trust and by peer groups, for example – the 
precise means by which knowledge can best be communicated remain 
difficult to appreciate fully, in part due to the diverse contexts in which 
innovation must occur. Factors such as capital and human resources also 
play an important role, the lack of which can disproportionately affect 
smaller growers. 
4.9 Comparisons with the past 
 
In discussing the current ‘state’ of innovation in the UK fresh produce 
industry, comparisons with past circumstances were common. With regards 
to innovation, the privatisation of the formerly-public extension service was 
clearly a pivotal moment for those involved in the industry: 
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“God it's a long time ago. It took a long while to miss ADAS... but I think we do 
miss 'em now. As an industry.” (1) 
 
“… maybe I'm just thinking [of] it as a golden age, you know looking back and 
thinking how it was good in the old days. It's just different, it's just 
different…” (7) 
 
The changes to agricultural knowledge provision in England and Wales after 
the late 1980s is the precursor to many of the problems found in a number 
of areas across the industry today. In general, this hinges upon the loss or 
disruption of established networks, access to and loss of expertise, loss of 
the ‘boots on the ground’ advisory workers, and a lack of willingness to 
share knowledge: 
 
“… and there was then ADAS you could just approach- I could ring up the 
tomato specialist at ADAS and say “we're interested in doing this, can I come 
and talk to you?”, just generally talk about how we might go about it who 
might be able to help.” (2) 
 
“I think researchers are more isolated from the industry than they used to be 
in the good old days when you did have ADAS and a state extension service 
whose job was to interpret research findings and then put them into practice 
and take them out to the field.” (7) 
 
“… the old boys and girls who were leaving [the industry], they talked about 
the days when someone came and said "here's your contract, go away and 
work out what makes an onion tick" and I think that's it, you had free-reign, 
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you could do what you wanted, and you had lots of people who then were 
growing onions who'd all be coming saying "how does that work then?" and 
then they'd go away and they'd try to implement these systems and there'd 
be lots of them, but now there's not lots of them.” (19) 
 
“… now in this sort of fiercely competitive sort of environment where we're 
not prepared to share as much as we did in the old ADAS days, when it was 
more or less a fair- people used to rock up at events and they would share 
their innovations, so businesses that were leading the way would be quite 
relaxed and comfortable about allowing others to look over the fence and 
there was a lot of that behavior going on, that pulling through the 
followers…” (31) 
 
However, it seemed that whilst the impacts of these changes have been far-
reaching and continue to pose problems for the industry in certain areas, it 
was acknowledged that era of public extension had problems of its own: 
 
“… you know having been inside it, and come in at a stage where- with a sort 
of fresh pair of eyes if you like when it was about to start changing very 
radically, that it had gotten into a rather sort of cosy position and I think the 
idea that ADAS was the primary channel of change in industry was... I'm not 
certain that it did as much as it might be credited for.” (9) 
 
“The problem with ADAS from an innovation perspective is they were often a 
long way behind the cutting edge…” (21) 
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It is clear that comparisons with the past offer participants a frame of 
reference with which to compare current circumstances. The implications 
of political choices – primarily concerning the provision of innovation 
support services – continue to reverberate into the present; we also see a 
form of ‘nostalgia’, represented by the notion of there having been a “golden 
age” in the past. 
4.10 Challenges 
 
Whilst comparisons with the past are interesting in themselves and provide 
context for present circumstances, of more immediate concern are the 
challenges faced by the industry as a collectivity today. These centre on the 
issue of sustainability: 
 
“I suppose you'd sum it up as improving the sustainability of UK businesses. 
And by sustainability, that's economic sustainability and environmental 
sustainability.” (32) 
 
However, factors such as price (return to the grower), availability and cost 
of labour and foreign competition are economic challenges to the 
sustainability of the industry: 
 
“Yeah, remaining competitive is the biggest- that's the biggest challenge, that 
expresses itself many ways.” (1) 
 
“At the moment- today's greatest challenge is return to the producer.” (19) 
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“Price. Supermarkets... it's- I should say the costs of production, but I've 
nothing against the costs of production, we are facing one of the biggest 
challenges we've ever faced and it's price wars.” (26) 
 
“I think one of the big issues for fresh produce which is slightly different from 
normal farming, is labour as well. Not just cost of labour but availability of 
labour as well. I mean you go to... I mean- and that's now getting tied up with 
issues about immigration and things like that so becoming highly political 
issue with the fact that we have a- you know most of our big horticulture 
companies are employing eastern Europeans, because- oh I went to 
[company] a few weeks ago, they have one UK national working on the 
harvesting side of the operation.” (7) 
 
“… there's competition from overseas because there are lots of other 
countries with better environments for growing things, which are scaling up 
their own production…” (6) 
 
The loss of active ingredients – without the registration of suitable 
substitutes – also poses a challenge to the economic sustainability of the 
industry: 
 
“I think the main challenges are crop protection... the government has an 
underlying strategy of sustainable growth in horticulture. That seems to be 
at odds with the European Commission's- the fervor in which they're putting 
into removing a lot of the active ingredients. If they're bad, and if they're 
proven to be bad by all means get rid of them but I would also like to see the 
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same amount of fervor being placed into supporting research and activity 
around integrated pest management.” (29) 
 
Equally, environmental sustainability, particularly with regards to climate 
change, is a challenge: 
 
“Erm, climate. I think climate's significant because there's no doubt that it is 
going to be an increasing challenge.” (16) 
 
“And a final one of mine… would be climate. And that's a long-term one.” (19) 
 
Many of those factors influencing innovation in the fresh produce industry 
outlined in this chapter were considered challenges in their own right. The 
loss of expertise for example, continues to be seen as a threat to the industry: 
 
“I think loss of diversity is a problem. It's a problem in terms of growing, we 
grow fewer and fewer varieties and crops, the genetic pool and it's a problem 
in terms of expertise we've lost diversity in expertise. And so when we have an 
unusual problem, we don't have the unusual person around anymore 
[laughs].” (7) 
 
Changing behaviour is also a challenge, at least with respect to consumers: 
 
“I think there's a communication challenge as well, around the benefits- 
particularly the health benefits of fruit and vegetables that has singularly 
failed to resonate with consumers. I mean everyone knows they're good for 
you, but- you know the communication that's out there hasn't changed 
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behavior, so people might say well we've done a lot of communication and 
we've raised the awareness, but raising awareness if it doesn't change 
behavior is of limited value. So I think that's a challenge.” (10) 
 
In summary, the challenges for the industry centre on its longer-term 
sustainability, both at the economic and environmental level. Changing 
consumer behaviour – by espousing the benefits of produce – could also be 
a means of bolstering the industry’s economic viability. 
4.11 Summary of Findings Chapter  
 
This chapter has explored how the data was generated, including who was 
approached for interview and the roles and geographic locations of 
interviewees, in addition to outlining the steps taken to build up an 
analytical framework in keeping with Framework Analysis; this produced 9 
interlinked themes that have been outlined below. Table 9. 
 
Norms and institutions (Section 4.2) 
This section explored the nature of the modern fresh produce industry, 
including its increasing competitiveness and consolidation, as well as the 
role of key institutions as innovation support services – such as the levy 
organisations – and the influence of retailers. 
 
Innovation in fresh produce (Section 4.3) 
This section examined how those who engage with innovation define and 
measure it. It also explored more general observations about innovation 
processes, including the notion of unpredictability. 
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Drivers of change (Section 4.4) 
 
This section dealt with the drivers of innovation in the industry, which are 
overwhelmingly economic and are primarily driven by the needs of the 
retail sector through which most produce is sold. 
 
Sources of innovation (Section 4.5) 
 
This section explored ‘where’ innovation comes from: this turns out to be an 
intensely social process, but also an international one, given the strong 
emphasis on overseas sources of innovation. Individuals, private firms and 
research institutions also contribute to innovation through formal and 
informal means. Likewise, learning by doing and experimentation is a prime 
means by which new ideas emerge. 
 
Communication in the fresh produce industry (Section 4.6) 
 
This section concerns how actors go about communicating with one another 
and focuses specifically on positive interfaces – including personal and 
professional networks, agronomists and producer organisations – and 
barriers to effective communication, such as the high level of 
competitiveness found in the industry preventing the sharing of otherwise 
useful knowledge. 
 
Blocking mechanisms (Section 4.7) 
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This section explores the barriers to innovation in the fresh produce 
industry by separating them into two groups: systemic barriers and 
personal barriers. Systemic barriers to innovation include fragmentation – 
or lack of vertical and horizontal coordination – and decreased funding for 
horticultural research, differing research agendas and difficulties in both 
demand articulation, from the industry, and understanding of industry 
constraints by researchers. Other systemic barriers include economic 
factors such as the size of the UK produce market that serves to deter 
significant investment and negative commercial relationships between 
suppliers and retailers, as well as an unfavorable regulatory environment 
and “defensive” innovation culture. In contrast, personal barriers to 
innovation hinge on risk, uncertainty and the fear of failure. 
 
Enabling factors (Section 4.8) 
 
This section examined what can be done to facilitate innovation at the 
systemic and personal levels, but also in ways that transcend this dichotomy. 
Systemic support for innovation relies on fostering that interactivity and 
those networks shown to be vital to innovation in preceding sections; 
however, unlike the barriers to innovation, of which most were systemic in 
nature, personal enabling factors rest primarily at the level of the individual 
or organisation. “Getting involved” in projects or with specific institutions 
for example, provides a direct interface with peers. However, it is human 
and material resources that best determine the ability of an individual or 
firm to innovate. Trust is an important factor for innovation, as are 
champions, influential pioneers of innovation. Lastly, an appreciation for the 
“fit” of a given innovation, by understanding its context, is paramount. 
 218 
Likewise, extension practices are context-dependent, requiring different 
approaches not only for different people but also for different “types” of 
innovation. 
 
Comparisons with the past (Section 4.9) 
 
This section outlines the ways in which present circumstances are 
contrasted with, and linked to decisions made in, the past. The privatisation 
of formerly public extension services was understood to be a decision that 
is still being felt, ultimately responsible for the fragmentation of the industry 
today. 
 
Challenges (Section 4.10) 
 
This section outlines the challenges faced by the industry today, centering 
on the idea of sustainability, both economic and environmental. Ensuring 
that new pest control products or practices remains a priority, as well as 
improving the return to producers to bolster re-investment. Changing 
consumer behaviour will also be a challenge in the foreseeable future.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
This chapter will discuss the overarching themes that have emerged from 
Chapter 4 (Findings) and to compare and contrast these with existing 
literature, to provide answers to the research questions that frame this 
research project. It will also outline the way in which the need for rigour has 
been met, and will reflect on the benefits and limitations of the chosen 
methodology used in this study. 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The AIS framework postulates that an agricultural innovation system is “… 
a network of organisations, enterprises and individuals focused on bringing 
new products, new processes and new forms of organisation into economic 
use, together with the institutions and policies that affect the way different 
agents interact, share, exchange and use knowledge” (Turner, Klerkx, 
Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a, p. 2).  
 
Although broad, this definition appears to fully capture the nature of the 
phenomena observed in the previous chapter: the importance of personal 
and professional networks, the mix of organisations, firms and individuals 
in innovation processes, the active search for different types of innovation, 
and the institutional and regulatory norms that shape the outcomes of 
innovation. The study has discerned a number of ways that this 
arrangement has determined – for better and worse – the way actors 
interact, share, exchange and use knowledge. The unpredictability of 
innovation (see Turner, Klerkx, White, Payne, & Everett-Hincks, 2015b) is 
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also corroborated by this project (Section 4.7.1), as is the importance of 
interactivity (Section 4.8). 
 
One way of interrogating the findings of the study, and providing a means to 
further develop recommendations for improving innovative capacity in the 
industry, is through a systematic functional-structural analysis in keeping 
with functionalist AIS diagnostic work undertaken elsewhere in AIS 
research (see Section 2.4.2). This offers a means to explore the findings of 
this thesis and provides a point of reference for where novel or conflicting 
views have emerged in this study. 
5.2 Functional-structural analysis of the fresh produce industry 
 
As described in Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the seven 
functions of innovation systems are as follows: 
 
1. Entrepreneurial activities  
2. Knowledge development  
3. Knowledge diffusion  
4. Guidance of the search  
5. Market formation  
6. Resource mobilisation 
7. Creation of legitimacy 
 
There are also three ‘structures’ that determine the operation of these seven 
functions: 
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1. Actors  
2. Institutions  
3. Infrastructure 
 
Each of the ‘barriers identified in the preceding chapter correspond to one 
of these seven functions, which form the basis for this analysis; likewise, 
each failure concerns actors, institutions or infrastructure. Table 11 (below) 
outlines the contextualised systemic problems affecting the UK fresh 
produce industry (Kebebe et al., 2015; inspired by similar analyses by 
Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a) and offers potential 
systemic instruments to combat problem areas (see Hekkert et al., 2007). 
5.2.1 Entrepreneurial activities 
 
As Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 422) point out: “There is no such thing as an 
innovation system without entrepreneurs”. A strong vein of entrepreneurial 
activity runs through the fresh produce industry; this is shown through 
examples of – sometimes revolutionary – change, as displayed in the case of 
polytunnel use across the UK, but also by more modest experimentation and 
incremental improvements. Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 422) note that, “by 
experimenting, more knowledge can be collected about the functioning of 
the technology under different circumstances.” As such, entrepreneurial 
activity at this level contributes to broader knowledge development (see 
next section) and reinforces the notion that entrepreneurial activity is a key 
source of innovation, in accordance with other studies (Knudson, Wysocki, 
Champagne, & Peterson, 2004). 
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A perception that the fresh produce industry is a more industrial, 
entrepreneurial sector of UK agriculture relative to other sectors is also 
evident Section 4.2. In stark contrast to what Turner et al. (2015a, p. 4) 
describe in New Zealand, where a large number of SMEs lacked the 
resources to undertake entrepreneurial activity,  the UK fresh produce 
industry is increasingly consolidated, through both traditional business 
acquisition and vertical integration, or through producer organisation-type 
partnerships, resulting in the economies of scale required to invest in 
significant projects. The presence of a strong entrepreneurial base is 
considered the sign of a well-functioning innovation system (Hekkert et al., 
2007, p. 422). As Hekkert et al. (2007) assert, the number of new entrants 
and the diversification activities of incumbent actors also serve as indicators 
of entrepreneurial health; given the consolidation of the industry and 
associated high capital costs, the number of new entrants in the industry is 
likely low though this research has captured examples of diversification 
activities by incumbent actors (see 4.3.3.3). 
 
Going further, it is also clear that entrepreneurial businesses and individuals 
rely on personal and professional networks to achieve their ‘innovation 
agendas’. Likewise, growers and other businesses often maintain close links 
with individual researchers and the institutions to which they belong. Whilst 
these farmer-scientist relationships are not free of the tension described by 
Ingram (2014), they constitute a vital conduit for knowledge and were 
expressed in positive terms (see Section 4.6.1.1). 
5.2.1.1 Barriers to entrepreneurial activity and mechanisms for change 
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A range of barriers explored in Chapter 4 prevents or slows entrepreneurial 
activity, some of which overlap with other systems functions. The small 
relative market size of UK horticulture, acts as both a driver of innovation – 
forcing firms to invest in their own specialised equipment – and deterrent 
to further investment, leading firms to look overseas for their needs. A 
diminishing return to growers was cited as a barrier to investment in 
innovation, and a cause of increasing consolidation across the industry. 
Intense competition between firms limits the amount of knowledge shared 
(horizontal fragmentation). In a post-public extension service environment, 
firms have a strong interest in protecting the commercial value of 
knowledge (Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012, p. 16) and knowledge-sharing 
between agricultural advisors has been found to have declined (Klerkx et al., 
2006). As Klerkx observes (2009, p. 853): 
 
“Whereas the public knowledge infrastructure used to be characterized by a 
high degree of interaction, the privatized knowledge infrastructure has 
become disintegrated. Market and system failures have emerged, such as 
information asymmetries, which hinder the setup of innovation networks.” 
 
Some of the negative, exploitative relationships found between suppliers 
and their customers in the industry also represents a barrier to innovation, 
providing less impetus to innovate and preventing the exchange of 
otherwise useful knowledge between different organisations (Section 
4.7.1.3). That ‘lead firms’ seek to control the food-supply is understood 
(Mylan et al., 2014, p. 21). Likewise, the possibility remains, and is perhaps 
evident in this case, that “… large contractors will use their market power to 
depress the prices paid for inputs, and to make other contract conditions 
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disadvantageous for producers” (Young & Hobbs, 2016, p. 432). Rovoredo-
Giha et al. (2012) also found that, in the UK potato sector, the success of 
innovation is highly dependent on the supply chain “leader”, most 
commonly a retailer. In turn, this has motivated producers to form producer 
organisations for the sake of consolidated bargaining (common throughout 
Europe) (Young & Hobbs, 2016, p. 432). As Rovoredo-Giha et al. (2012) put 
it: 
 
“Because the position they are in the supply chain, operating individually 
[farmers] have little chance to start potentially successful innovations of 
their own and their best chance is to operate within a supply chain where the 
chain leader organises growers and proposes innovations that take into 
consideration what customers and consumers want.” 
 
In effect, this corroborates the claims of those participants in this study 
that find supportive commercial relationships more conducive to 
innovation (see Section 4.8.1). 
 
It would appear that a dual asymmetry is present in the industry. The first, 
information/knowledge asymmetry, signifies an imbalance in the relative 
knowledge of different actors, leading to a gap in which they are imperfectly 
informed about possible cooperation partners and what those potential 
partners can offer (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2009). It has been noted that this 
complicates the search for such collaborations and raises the transaction 
costs for businesses (Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012, p. 17). Duplication of 
research or experimentation (as observed in Section 4.7.1.2) is a further 
consequence of information asymmetry. 
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The second, asymmetry of power, indicates an imbalance between actors in 
terms of influence and market strength. Here, the primary focus is on the 
power of retailers over other supply chain actors, which has been noted as 
a feature of the UK agri-food system (Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012). Such 
asymmetries represent market failures, and are often linked to 
fragmentation in the wake of privatisaion of extension services (Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2009; Klerkx & Proctor, 2013; Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012; 
Leeuwis, 2000). As in Lamprinopoulou et al.’s (2012) study of the Scottish 
agri-food innovation system, retailer bargaining power represents a barrier 
to innovation, although it has been acknowledged that retail markets and 
supermarkets can offer opportunities for innovation and constitute a 
significant driver of change in themselves (a dichotomy referenced in 
Sections 4.7.1.3 and 4.8.1). 
 
We might choose to cast the structure of the UK fresh produce industry as 
an oligopsony (see Rovoredo-Giha et al., 2012), exhibiting interaction or 
network failure according to Weber & Rohracher’s (2012) typology; weak 
network failure occurs in instances where a lack of interaction between 
actors limits opportunities to realise complementarities, interactive 
learning and new ideas (see also Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). However, the 
severity of the negative relationships described in Section 4.7.1.3 suggests 
that these problems transcend network failure as outlined by Weber & 
Rohracher. In fact, none of the ‘systemic’ failures described in the relevant 
literature adequately capture the situation in the UK produce sector, which 
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demanded the creation of a special governmental adjudicator 15  and is 
described as “one of the most cutthroat and competitive in retail” (Retail 
Think Tank, 2015). Since “innovation is positively influenced by integrated 
cohesive networks with trust-full relationships” (Mylan et al., 2014, p. 22), 
the lack of trust between suppliers and their customers may indeed pose a 
significant barrier to innovation. The relative gains of innovating are 
nullified by the need for continuous change despite few rewards for the 
effort, destroying a key driver of innovation (see Section 4.2.1.1 and the 
concept of the “innovation treadmill”). 
 
It was observed in Section 4.8.2.2 that human and financial resources were 
a strong determinant of innovation. As such, where firms are incapable of 
leveraging the appropriate competencies and resources, capabilities failure 
is evident (Klerkx & Leeuwis (2009, p. 850) also call these ‘managerial’ 
gaps). This is not the case for all actors or firms, but appears to be subject to 
differences in size. Likewise, this is not to say that all actors must choose the 
same “technological trajectory” as Weber & Rohracher (2012) describe it – 
indeed, as shown in Section 4.8.4, innovation is often context-specific – but 
limited resources may constrain the ability of a business to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Woolthius et al.  (2005, p. 610) warn that this can 
leave smaller firms “locked in” to existing technologies, unable to transition 
away from a given regime. 
 
                                                        
15 An independent, fresh produce (“groceries”) adjudicator was commissioned in 
2013 to oversee the commercial relationship between suppliers and supermarkets 
(see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/groceries-code-
adjudicator) 
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Ultimately, a decisive barrier to innovation is the inherent uncertainty of 
change (see Section 4.7.1). That innovation is an uncertain process is not 
controversial (Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a) but 
there are limited means to reduce this inherent uncertainty (see below). 
 
When it comes to overcoming these barriers, it is apparent that the onus for 
innovation falls on the entrepreneur himself or herself. Take for instance, 
the fact that, of the barriers to innovation listed in Section 4.7, the vast 
majority were ‘systemic’ in nature. However, in Section 4.8, which dealt with 
‘enabling factors’ for change, most were personal in nature. Klerkx & 
Leeuwis (2008b, p. 260) note that in the current literature, commercialising 
a product, process, service or business idea requires an “active attitude” 
towards innovation, implying that responsibility for innovation does indeed 
lie with the entrepreneur or firm. As such, policy measures targeting 
barriers to entrepreneurial activity should recognize the need to improve 
entrepreneurialism where possible – innovation intermediaries (see below) 
have also been promoted to aid entrepreneurs access suitable knowledge 
(Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008a). An apparent imbalance between, on the one 
hand, the AIS emphasis on systemic issues and, on the other, the emphasis of 
this research on personal enabling factors for innovation, may suggest 
further theoretical work is required (see Chapter 6). 
 
Certain systemic mechanisms to bolster entrepreneurial activity are 
suggested in the relevant literature. Innovation intermediaries, 
organisations that sit amongst and facilitate interaction between third 
parties (see below), can counter weak network failure for example (see 
Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012). However, given the intense competition 
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between certain firms in the fresh produce industry, it can be assumed that 
some knowledge will remain proprietorial (even in instances where 
cooperation, perhaps facilitated by an intermediary, could reduce other 
project costs). 
 
It is clear that retailers can and do play a prominent role in innovation.  In 
their investigation into how retailers foster (or not) eco-innovation in dairy, 
beef and bread supply chains, Mylan et al. (2014) show the varying degrees 
to which certain sectors are supported with respect to innovation: whilst 
dairy production has seen significant investment through favourable 
contractual arrangements and economic incentives, the situation in beef 
production is notably different, marked by an “adversarial” relationship 
between supplier and customer. It may be the case that different fresh 
produce sectors have similarly variable relationships with their customers. 
Based on these comparisons, Mylan et al. (2014, p. 27) suggest that:   
 
… enhanced supermarket involvement in distributed eco-innovation requires 
a shift in supply chain governance modes and the effective use of innovation 
coordination mechanisms: economic and information-exchange modes may 
need to be complemented with more subtle modes of governance, such as the 
collective framing of sustainability issues and the development of shared 
visions that reduce uncertainty and provide clarity in the orientation of eco-
innovation.” 
 
Such measures echo the words of one interviewee (Section 4.7.1.3) who 
lamented the lack of supply chain support from supermarket customers. The 
need for – and benefits of – a ‘shared vision’ are discussed below, but it is 
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worth noting here that a number of UK-wide ‘roadmaps’ (2008, 2010, 2015) 
have been developed for the dairy industry that offer a guide to the 
sustainability measures being introduced in that sector. At the same time, 
improving information-exchange between suppliers and customers may 
help remedy the weak network failure identified above; again, of those 
sectors included in Mylan et al.’s research, the greatest level of information-
exchange between suppliers and customers occurred within the dairy 
supply chain. 
 
It is more difficult to envision a means of fostering greater trust – considered 
a vital component in innovation both on the grounds of previous research 
and through the evidence presented in Chapter 4 of this project – between 
actors that view each other in an adversarial way. A known weakness of the 
AIS framework, for instance, is the assumption that there are common goals 
or foci within an innovation system (Klerkx et al., 2012b, p. 464), which is 
not necessarily correct and may represent an area for improvement in the 
approach. 
 
Capability failures may be countered by improving the availability of 
venture/risk capital, as proposed by Turner et al. (2015a). However, several 
participants in this project referred to accessing funding from the European 
Union Fruit and Vegetable Regime through involvement with a producer 
organisation (see Section 4.5.3). This mechanism matches 50% of pooled 
P.O. funding from members to facilitate innovation in a number of areas 
(ec.europa.eu, n.d.). As such, systemic instruments that help producers 
access existing funding mechanisms are preferential. However, producer 
organisations – one example of the increasing vertical integration of the 
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entire agricultural sector – can also facilitate entrepreneurial activity 
through enhanced knowledge sharing. As Young & Hobbs (2016, p. 431 pp. 
431) note: 
 
“… closer vertical linkages with processors may provide producers with 
access to additional information about the requirements of consumers, 
thereby enhancing the flow of market information back down the supply 
chain.” 
 
The effectiveness of such associations in fostering innovation through 
knowledge exchange is clear – P.O.s can also reduce uncertainty by offering 
in-house agronomic advice and providing access to known or registered 
brands for which there is already a market (see Section 4.6.1.2). However, a 
risk associated with pushing growers into one P.O. or another is strong 
network failure, discussed in Section 4.6.1.2 (and below), which may already 
be apparent in UK fresh produce. 
5.2.2 Knowledge development 
 
In line with Turner et al.’s (2015a) description of the knowledge development 
function of AIS, knowledge is developed by both formal and informal 
processes; it is clear that knowledge development in the fresh produce 
industry is no different in this respect. However, the strong emphasis on 
‘overseas’ sources of knowledge that characterises innovation in the UK 
represents a potentially important contribution to the study of AIS. Focusing 
on ‘global innovation networks’, (GINs) Herstad et al. (2014) note that the 
search for knowledge has taken on a worldwide dimension, with the locus 
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of innovation shifting from individual firm to the wider, distributed 
networks in which they sit; the flow of information between ‘epistemic’ 
communities facilitates partnerships and collaboration, which suggests that 
the notion of ‘sector’ remains important (see Liu et al., 2015; Pavitt, 1984; 
Thitinunsomboon, Chairatana, & Keeratipibul, 2011 for example). It is 
possible that, for many countries, an AIS is now a GIS, a concept that is 
gaining traction in Innovation Systems research (see Binz & Truffer, 2017). 
As Metcalfe (2007, p. 442) notes: 
 
“… these [innovation] systems increasingly transcend national boundaries 
and increasingly call into question the idea of isolated national innovation 
policies…” 
 
The significant emphasis on ‘learning by doing’ (Section 2.2.5) found in the 
UK fresh produce industry is mirrored in the innovation systems literature. 
Indeed, at the heart of systems thinking is a focus on learning processes 
(Carlsson et al., 2002). Interaction and experimentation with a product or 
process – ‘know-how’ or “experience-based-knowledge” – is a key source of 
innovation. As Herstad et al. (2014) point out: 
 
“Innovation takes place mainly through the application or novel combination 
of existing knowledge from various scientific and non-scientific sources, often 
in response to the need to solve problems that arise when customers and 
suppliers interact. Knowledge is created more often in an inductive process of 
testing, experimentation and other forms of ‘situated’ practical work.” 
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However, there are factors at work in today’s fresh produce industry that 
serve to impede such processes. 
5.2.2.1 Barriers to knowledge development and mechanisms for change 
 
As identified in Chapter 4, a number of barriers exist in terms of knowledge 
development. Fragmentation, for example, constitutes a barrier to 
knowledge development and its subsequent diffusion (see next section). The 
privatisation of previously public extension services and creation of 
“knowledge markets” is associated with fragmentation (and linear thinking 
about the sources of innovation) (Leeuwis, 2000). 
 
A lack of vertical coordination has led to a situation in which a number of 
organisations undertake research programmes with little or no coordinated 
oversight, and in the name of different innovation agendas (what Weber & 
Rohracher, 2012 might call policy coordination failure). It may not be 
coincidental that, at the same time, there is discernable lack of unifying 
‘vision’ for the industry (see Section 5.2.4). The assertion that “everybody’s 
sort of doing their own thing” (Section 4.7.1.1) reflects a deficit of 
coordination mirrored in other studies (Hermans et al., 2015). It is likewise 
exemplified by the diverse advisory community that has emerged following 
the privatisation of public extension services in England (Hermans et al., 
2015; Klerkx & Proctor, 2013). An issue of this nature can be cast as either a 
problem of capability (none of the existing institutions are able to coordinate 
action at the desired level or have such a mandate) or presence (the lack of 
an institution to coordinate action). However, in contrast to the situation 
found by Turner et al. (2015a) in New Zealand, the government is seen as a 
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participant in knowledge development (through UK Research Councils). 
Hekkert et al. (2007) suggest that three factors determine the strength of 
this system function: 1) R&D projects, 2) patents and 3) investment in R&D. 
However, it is clear that the problems associated with knowledge 
development in the UK fresh produce industry go beyond these simple 
metrics. Matching the supply and demand of adequate knowledge for 
innovation, for example, is a central concern in AIS research (Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2008a; 2008b; Leeuwis, 2000). A range of systemic factors 
complicates this process in UK fresh produce: 
 
1. Demand-side knowledge development is administered through 
sector-specific levy board steering groups, providing immediate (and 
somewhat democratic) relevance at the expense of strategic, cross-
sector, pooled projects. As such, duplication of knowledge is a risk 
(also observed by Sutherland et al., 2013 in the UK context); it also 
signals a divide between long- and short-term thinking that some 
suggested prevented steps being taken to address growing problems 
(such as the withdrawal of certain crop protection products). It was 
not suggested that the levy organisations fail to capture the needs of 
the industry in the short term; in fact, it was the reactivity of the levy 
board to the immediate needs of the grower base that was invoked 
as a problem (Section 4.2.5). As such, this corresponds to a quality 
issue, for whilst provisions are made to capture research needs 
through the aforementioned panels, how well this meets future and 
present demands is subject to question. 
2. Adequate demand articulation, and the wider issue of a lack of shared 
language between different actors and professions (see 4.7.1.2 and 
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4.2.3), can complicate the process of provisioning client-orientated 
knowledge development, which Klerkx & Leeuwis (2008b, p. 261) 
cite as a problem of increasingly ‘closed’ knowledge infrastructures 
(see Section 2.4.1). Weber & Rohracher (2012, p. 1043) call this 
demand articulation failure, where there is a deficit in anticipating 
and learning about user needs. In AIS literature this type of problem 
is generally given to be one of presence; i.e. there is a lack of 
intermediary organisations to facilitate the effective diagnosis and 
analysis of problems and subsequent articulations of latent (farmer) 
needs (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b). However, the levy organisations 
are in place, in terms of both provisioning research and its 
subsequent delivery, to oversee issues relating to demand 
articulation: as such this becomes less an issue of presence but 
quality, and one which must be discussed with reference to wider, 
strategic issues (see below). 
3. Divergent innovation agendas affect the development of knowledge; 
as noted in Section 4.7.1.2, the development of knowledge through 
formalised processes is subject to questions of fairness, due to larger 
organisations, by virtue of having sometimes significantly greater 
resources, influencing sectoral innovation agendas (see Klerkx et al., 
2006, p. 191). In essence this reflects the wider issue of “contested 
agronomy”, discussed in Section 2.4, but at a national, rather than 
global scale. Considering the importance, where innovation is 
concerned, of research ‘relevance’ (EU SCAR, 2012, p. 7), one 
explanation for the dismissal of certain technologies or processes by 
growers is that they are simply not relevant. As Röling (Röling, 1988, 
p. 4) claims: “Diffusion of an innovation can only take place within a 
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‘population’ of intended utilisers who face similar production 
conditions”. In Chapter 4 (Section 4.8.4), this was described as the 
“fit” of a particular product or process. The divergent innovation 
agendas of today’s fresh produce industry, and the disparities in scale 
and sectoral needs, ensure that this ‘population’ requires knowledge 
of different sorts. Not a failure of any particular type per se, these 
differing innovation agendas call for the identification of common 
problems, noted by some participants as “safe space” for the levy 
organisations (see Section 4.2.3). 
4. When it comes to translation of research – at whatever stage it is 
required – there is a notable lack of formalised processes for 
achieving this aim: as with other contemporary issues, translational 
activity appears to have suffered from the privatisation of formerly 
public research and extension services. However, even though key 
institutions may no longer be in public hands, many of the individual 
actors associated with the movement of new knowledge through the 
innovation system, such as agronomists, remain important nodes in 
this process. The problems associated with translation can be classed 
on the one hand as market failure: the knowledge market created in 
the wake of the privatisation of public advisory services has not seen 
the appropriate mechanisms develop to carry out this task. On the 
other, it is a problem of capability: institutions charged with 
provisioning and delivering research activities have not developed 
robust mechanisms for systematically capturing the value of new 
knowledge. Instead, at the present time these tasks fall on individuals 
who are able to match the needs of growers with existing knowledge 
(in the case of agronomists) or perceive the value in translating 
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existing knowledge into new avenues of interest (in the case of 
scientists). 
5. A further potential barrier to knowledge development – and perhaps 
the most simple explanation for any impaired functionality – is 
reduced public funding for agricultural research (see Section 4.7.1.2), 
which has led to increased competition and insecurity, working 
against those conditions that permit collaboration and social 
learning (Hermans et al., 2015). In contrast, authors such as Pardey 
(2006) note that, barring India and China where investment in 
agricultural R&D has sharply increased, developed countries remain 
the dominant funders of agricultural research, the UK being a ‘top 10’ 
investor. Quite what this means for UK agriculture, where innovation 
frequently originates overseas, is not clear, but it does suggest that 
the primary barriers to innovation are not (solely) in levels of 
investment – at least not for agriculture as a whole – but in their 
manner of delivery/funding mechanisms (see Klerkx & Leeuwis, 
2008b for example). As such, this is likely a problem of quality rather 
than presence. 
6. The internationalisation of knowledge development and diffusion is 
not a new phenomenon, nor is it a “failure” in any particular sense; 
that innovation support services remain primarily domestic 
concerns (see Hermans et al., 2015; and Lamprinopoulou et al., 2012 
for example) might be classed as an institutional or perhaps 
infrastructural failure of presence. 
 
How might these interlocked issues be addressed? In AIS literature, 
improving the function of ‘intermediary organisations’ is a suggested 
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solution to many demand-side problems (intermediaries are explored in 
more detail below). However, there are other institutional mechanisms that 
can be brought to bear on problems associated with knowledge 
development: 
 
1. Innovation platforms (IPs): these act as a means to bring different 
stakeholders from a particular sector together to “enable 
transformative change” (Klerkx et al., 2013, p. 185). As Klerkx (2013, 
p. 186) notes, these are deliberate interventions “… to create a 
support network that can foster an effective combination of 
technical, social, economic and institutional innovations”. Most AIS 
literature concerning IPs is based on work in the developing world 
(Kilelu et al., 2013; Schut et al., 2015), but they are already 
considered viable models for change in the UK (UK Government, 
2014). Indeed, as alluded to in Section 4.6.1.3, the HAPI programme 
is a current programme that coordinates far-reaching research 
themes across crop types. However, HAPI is primarily a technical 
programme – perhaps properly referred to as a technology platform 
– and runs the risk of ‘missing’ other stakeholders. On the other hand, 
the Horticulture Innovation Partnership (Horticulture Innovation 
Partnership, n.d.) 16 , established in 2013 has sought to act as a 
platform for interaction amongst various actors in the industry. A 
further strength of IPs is providing a platform for ‘champions’ – key 
informal enablers of change (see Section 4.8.2.3) – to influence others 
                                                        
16 Despite being identified here as an important innovation platform, the HIP’s 
future is not certain, perhaps representing the difficulty in sustaining such 
initiatives. 
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and promote innovation (Klerkx et al., 2013). IPs will invariably have 
to target areas of common concern; the Innovation for Agriculture: 
Soil & Water programme (“Soil and Water,” n.d.) is a good example of 
a national innovation platform that targets common problems – and 
while IPs are more common at local or regional levels elsewhere, it 
has been acknowledged that the local and national institutional 
environment are intimately associated (Hounkonnou et al., 2012). 
One means of facilitating and assessing the impact of IPs is to have 
doctoral researchers measure project outcomes and constraints 
(Hounkonnou et al., 2012), which may also be a means of 
encouraging researchers to engage with industry (cited as a problem 
in Section 4.7.1.2). The involvement of various stakeholders in IPs 
could also serve as a means to provide those stakeholders with the 
non-obvious benefits of cooperation (i.e. the ability to improve the 
practicability of proposals and access to otherwise hidden 
information (see Section 4.8.4). However, as noted above, if the onus 
to cooperate in research programmes falls on the entrepreneur 
himself or herself, then engagement remains a voluntary act and, as 
such, is subject to uneven levels of capability (see Section 4.8.2.2). IPs 
can and already appear to be combatting the vertical fragmentation 
caused by the loss of public extension services, by providing some 
level of functional capability and presence; they may also serve to 
unite disparate actors with different innovation agendas around 
common problems. 
2. As noted previously (see Sections 4.5.2 and 5.2) learning by doing is 
a key source of new knowledge. Making “new insights explicit”, as 
Leeuwis (2000) dubs it, requires experimentation with on-farm 
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operations. However, considering the complexity of most farm 
businesses, and the multitude of possible explanations for observed 
phenomena, making insights explicit is troublesome. Several 
solutions to this problem exist: 
a. Learning in groups: one means of triangulating on the exact 
cause of phenomena is to compare it by talking with people 
who have similar experiences (i.e. peer groups). A number of 
examples of this already exist in the fresh produce industry 
(and wider UK agricultural community). Innovative Farmers, 
for example, UK-based project aimed at bringing together 
farmers from across the country to set up “field labs” in which 
citizen (or, rather, “farmer”) science can take place (Soil 
Association, n.d.). Likewise, study tours – shown in Section 
4.5.1 to be very effective at facilitating the development (and 
spread) of knowledge – are frequently organised by the levy 
organisations, producer organisations and the larger grower 
businesses themselves. Not only do these tours provide a 
means of knowledge exchange and chance to interact with 
new systems of agricultural practice, but represent the 
increasingly internationalised nature of knowledge 
development and exchange. Such measures also facilitate 
network building, which is important in its own right but may 
also give people the opportunity to meet champions. 
b. Feedback and data collection: considered a key component in 
systems studies, the idea of feedback is important when 
conducting experimentation (in both formalised science and 
on farm). It is a stimulus for reflection, and can be compared 
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with data from other sources to draw conclusions about 
certain management practices, for example (Leeuwis, 2000). 
Indeed, better scrutiny of data and feedback is considered a 
means of improving research orientation (see Section 4.7.11). 
c. Leeuwis (2000) notes that farmers and horticulturalists can 
only contribute to knowledge development if they are 
stimulated, challenged and supported, reflecting observations 
in Section 4.8.1 that  ‘challenging’ others to innovate was a 
means of stimulating action. As Hermans et al. (2015) note, “… 
creativity and innovation are stimulated by cooperation and 
active exchange of ideas and this forms the basis for the 
concept of social learning”. 
3. Given the international nature of knowledge development today, 
there are emergent challenges for the domestic knowledge 
infrastructure of the UK, where for certain firms and networks 
national boundaries no longer apply. Although globalising trends are 
not new, the nationally-limited organisations tasked with supporting 
British agriculture must somehow meet the needs of increasingly 
divergent innovation agendas (a situation made more complicated 
by the UK’s impending departure from the European Union and the 
uncertainty this brings to the nature of future European 
collaboration). A good deal of attention has been paid to national 
systems of innovation (Freeman, 2000; Lundvall, 2007), but in 
instances where one particular sector is under scrutiny, it is perhaps 
more prudent to let the influences on that system define its 
boundaries, rather than letting national limits serve as an 
(increasingly) arbitrary boundary. Some have considered regional 
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systems of innovation to be a more appropriate frame for the study 
of innovation systems (Asheim & Gertler, 2005; Cooke, 2001). 
Likewise, there is a good deal of literature concerning the 
multinational firm in innovation (Cantwell & Molero, 2003), but 
much less concerning how the domestic innovation infrastructure 
can support or cope with this arrangement; one possibility is to 
create new forms of cross-border partnership between regional 
innovation support systems. However, of the work done in this area 
(Makkonen & Rohde, 2016) the focus is on cross-border scientific 
collaboration rather than, say, intermediary organisations (see 
below) or extension services, which remain a domestic concern. 
4. In terms of translation, very little research has been undertaken 
within the agri-food sector, barring Pollock’s (2012) call for more 
effective translation of research along the R&D “pipeline” and a 
RAND Europe technical report Translational Research and Knowledge 
in Agriculture and Food Production (Wamae et al., 2011) funded by 
BBSRC and Defra that explores how best to assist in the translation 
of research outcomes into practical applications. Interestingly, this 
report also concluded that the LINK schemes were viable vehicles for 
the translation of research (Section 4.6.1.3). It also concludes that 
issues related to communication and fragmentation, as in this 
project, contribute to problems relating to translation and though not 
cited as a barrier to translation, neither does the report discern any 
robust, formalised processes within the research domain for 
translational activities. As such, many of the suggested measures to 
enhance translational activity – at various stages – are the same as 
are proposed in this research, namely: 
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a. Academic incentive structure: stimulating and rewarding 
translational activity (that is aligned with industry needs) 
through incentives can improve upstream “knowledge 
transfer activities” to help correct market failure. 
b. Joined-up policy: this essentially mirrors the “guidance of the 
search” function of innovation systems explored below, by 
calling for a more clearly articulated national vision for 
agriculture in general (though it is not clear precisely how this 
fosters translation itself). 
c. Strengthen interaction amongst key actors: improving the 
level of interaction between actors in the AIS will help to 
ensure that information asymmetry (discussed above) does 
not impede opportunities for translation; translational 
activities, where they occur at all, rely to a large extent on 
networked interactions (Section 4.8.2.3). In particular, and as 
recognised by staff within the levy organisations, stronger 
mechanisms must be in place to ensure that areas of potential 
overlap are not overlooked by the separate sectors that make 
up the fresh produce industry when allocating research 
funding. Doing so may increase translational capability, 
though it would also rely on having the expertise in place to 
provide an understanding of the potential for cross-sector 
translational science. A further factor that hampers the 
translation of science between crop types is the relative size 
of certain horticultural sectors (Section 4.7.1.3). 
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Certain structures developed by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) in the United States, with the express goal of taking basic 
science discoveries to the ‘bedside’, may also be worthy of 
consideration (see Menary, 2015). For example, institutions devoted 
to this endeavour, such as the National Centre for the Advancement 
of Translational Science (NCATS, established in 2011), have been 
formed. However, medical research receives far more in terms of 
funding than agri-science, making the suggestion that such 
institutions could be created for the agri-food system seem 
unrealistic; so too the onus on best practice, which, although perhaps 
desirable in the agricultural domain, is more developed in the health 
domain (due to ‘duty of care’) and complicated by the markedly 
different environmental circumstances found on farms. However, the 
importance of champions (of specific technologies) is no less 
important in either field (Menary, 2015). 
5.2.3 Knowledge diffusion 
 
In line with Turner et al.’s (2015a) description of the knowledge diffusion 
function, knowledge diffusion in the fresh produce industry relies on 
networks, both personal and professional. Several platforms facilitate such 
networks, such as producer organisations and grower groups, levy board 
panels and steering groups, peer networks and strategic partnerships with 
foreign firms. It is also clear that digital networks, such as social networks, 
are becoming increasingly important as a means of knowledge diffusion for 
growers (see Section 4.8.4). As knowledge moves through these networks it 
is further developed through adaptation and application to different 
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circumstances. A clear example of this – and of innovation “scaling up” and 
“out” – in the fresh produce context is the development of polytunnels and 
‘attendant’, supporting innovation (mapped comprehensively by the 
National Horticulture Forum (2011b)). 
5.2.3.1 Barriers to knowledge diffusion and mechanisms for change 
 
As Klein-Woolthius (2005) observes:  
 
“… a range of factors such as inappropriate structures and institutional or 
capabilities barriers may negatively influence the spread or direction of 
processes of innovation and knowledge exchange” 
 
Indeed, a number of barriers identified in Chapter 4 involve the diffusion of 
knowledge. As noted above, a key theme dominating discussion of both 
knowledge development and diffusion is the transition to a “pluralistic 
advisory system” and the fragmentation this has engendered (Sutherland et 
al., 2013). The commoditisation of knowledge has thrown up several 
problems related to the delivery of knowledge, as Sutherland et al. (2013, p. 
97) note: 
 
“Concerns have been expressed about the profusion of agricultural advice 
providers in England resulting in a lack of coherence and co-ordination. This 
fragmentation results in: duplication among providers; gaps in provision; 
information overload; confusion; contradiction and even misinformation to 
farmers. These problems are exaggerated when advisors are pursuing 
multiple, and sometimes competing, goals.” 
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However, England is not alone in this respect: Hermans et al. (2015) have 
found that, of eight different European AIS, several have made or are making 
the transition to pluralistic (and often private rather than public) advisory 
services. Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 423) suggest that this system function can 
be assessed by mapping the number of conferences and workshops devoted 
to a particular technology group, and mapping network sizes and intensity. 
It was felt that with the loss of public extension services came a reduction in 
the amount of fora for communication (Section 4.6.2) (though a more robust 
count of relevant conferences and workshops might provide clarity on this 
issue). However, as Kash & Rycroft (Kash & Rycroft, 2002, p. 603) point out 
“… a central, but frequently unrecognized characteristic, of our world of 
repeated innovations of complex technologies [is] the requirement for self-
organizing networks” (author’s emphasis). Perhaps then, the focus should 
be on how these networks organise, and what holds them back, rather than 
simply their size or intensity. Several such barriers have been identified in 
Chapter 4: 
 
1. Loss of funding and facilities: Hermans et al. (2015, p. 43) explain that 
England “… has seen a concentration of (dedicated) research 
institutes over the last thirty years”, with very few independent 
institutes left. At the same time, the country has seen increasing 
cooperation between the agri-food industry and universities, 
although this does not appear to have altered the impression 
amongst industry experts that funding has been “stripped away” (see 
Section 4.7.1.2). In turn, this situation has diminished some 
possibilities for interaction and corresponds to an infrastructural 
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failure of presence. 
2. Cognitive gaps: one barrier to knowledge diffusion appears to lie with 
what Klerkx calls “cognitive gaps” (see Section 4.7.1.2), in which 
actors from different institutional backgrounds – and perhaps one 
can add to that professional and sectoral backgrounds – have “… too 
much cognitive distance to adequately learn together… or have 
different norms, values and incentive systems which hinder effective 
communication” (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2009, p. 850). In particular, it is 
the differences in these norms, values and incentives that prevent 
researchers and the grower base from seeing ‘eye to eye’, meaning 
that researchers are not always best placed to engender knowledge 
diffusion. However, as described in Section 4.6.1.1, trustful, working 
relationships between researchers and growers can be extremely 
beneficial to innovation, highlighting the importance of bolstering 
such connections (see A. Hall, 2007). Influential researchers, in these 
cases, might be considered champions in their own right. As 
Oreszczyn et al. (2010) suggest, the importance of informal 
networking may have increased where centralized coordination has 
diminished. A problem of this type is likely to be dubbed one of 
quality: interaction does occur (i.e. presence is not the problem) but 
is hampered by lack of mutual understanding. A further issue relates 
to the incentive systems mentioned above: the nature of research 
funding – and academic strictures in general – favours project-
driven, finite programs that may not include seeing the fruits of that 
science realised in practice (see Section 4.7.1.2). Of course, the 
practical “gap” between science and grower base was once the 
domain of public extension activities. However, routes to impact are 
 247 
now more multifarious and intractable. Klerkx et al. (2006) also 
described output-orientated contracts as “rigid”, with little room for 
maneuver, in contrast to the true, unpredictable nature of innovation 
‘on the ground’. 
3. Horizontal and vertical fragmentation: this impedes the rate of 
diffusion by placing barriers to knowledge exchange – as shown in 
Sections 4.6.1 and 4.8.1, functioning networks are vital to the spread 
of information and, thus, the raw ingredients for innovation. Klerkx 
& Proctor (2013) find that fragmentation has led to problems for land 
managers in composing the right networks and obtaining adequate 
knowledge; likewise, information asymmetry prevents the 
establishment of otherwise suitable partnerships (see Section 
5.2.1.1). 
4. Loss of expertise: the gradual loss of expertise through retirement – 
without adequate succession planning – and retention of knowledge 
over time presents a barrier to the continued spread of the 
knowledge that individuals and particular institutions may hold. A 
secondary effect associated with this loss is duplication of research. 
In the former case, this is a problem of absence (of certain actors) and 
in the latter, an institutional problem related to either the absence of 
suitable mechanisms to store past research or perhaps their quality. 
One possible remedy to this problem is to establish or improve 
databases in-line with Klerkx & Proctor’s (2013) suggestion for 
centralised networks (see below).  
A common solution to problems of this kind – and also those problems 
associated with the development of knowledge – is to examine the role and 
 248 
functioning of so-called intermediary organisations, which are positioned to 
operate in the midst of such issues. 
5.2.3.1.1 Intermediaries 
 
Klerkx & Leeuwis (2008b) point to the dismantling of the Dutch extension 
service as the catalyst for the development of “intermediaries”, or any 
organisation that “… functions in the midst of the users and producers of 
knowledge” (Smedlund, 2006, p. 210). In more specific terms, Howells 
(Howells, 2006) defines an innovation intermediary as “… an organisation 
or body that acts an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation process 
between two or more parties”. The respective governments of the 
Netherlands and England both chose to ‘liberalise’ their formerly public 
extension services at the same point in time and have notable similarities in 
terms of blocking mechanisms for knowledge diffusion (Hermans et al., 
2015). Indeed, many of the problems associated with knowledge diffusion 
appear to stem from this decision, though even in countries maintaining 
strong public extension services – such as France and Italy – problems 
associated with knowledge diffusion persist. Not only are intermediaries a 
significant focus within the AIS literature (see Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008a; 
2008b; Polzin et al., 2016) but have become, in one form or another, an 
important factor in the dissemination of knowledge in the UK fresh produce 
industry (though seemingly less studied than their Dutch counterparts). 
Klerkx & Leeuwis (2008b) delineate the main functions of intermediaries: 
 
1. Demand articulation 
2. Network brokerage 
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3. Innovation process management 
 
Each of these tasks is explored below in further detail. It is also worth noting 
that intermediary organisations can operate at different levels of 
aggregation in the AIS: from targeting the individual entrepreneur, 
collectives, heterogeneous networks of actors, to whole supply chains. 
Likewise, some intermediaries focus on certain sectors, and some operate 
across different agricultural sectors. Such organisations can be public or 
private, and as Howells (2006) points out, take many forms, including 
research councils. 
5.2.3.1.2 Demand articulation 
 
Through the creation of agricultural knowledge markets, extension service 
provisioning has become demand or client-driven, as opposed to supply or 
provider-driven (Klerkx et al., 2006, p. 190). In turn this enhances the need 
to ensure that client needs are properly understood and articulated to 
appropriate parties; without clear demand, it is difficult for knowledge 
systems to be, in truth, client-orientated (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b). Some 
degree of concern was expressed about the ability of current mechanisms to 
adequately capture the more immediate industry needs (Section 4.7.1.2). 
However, it is the longer-term issues that appear to have escaped 
articulation, with calls from growers, agronomists and levy organisation 
staff to operate at a more strategic level (see Section 4.2.5). 
 
Here, intermediary organisations can facilitate the “creative process” to 
generate a strategic innovation plan that encompasses both real needs and 
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avoids “blind spots” (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b). Paired, perhaps, with a 
more all-encompassing, coordinated ‘vision’ for the industry (see ‘Guidance 
of the Search’, below) a strategy can be developed to satisfy both the near-
term and longer-term needs of the industry. Klerkx and Leeuwis (2008b) 
point us to Van der Meulen et al. (2003), who suggest that Science and 
Technology Foresight (STF) can be used to determine long-term science and 
innovation policy. 
5.2.3.1.3 Network brokerage 
 
The importance of networks in terms of knowledge diffusion has been 
highlighted in Section 4.6.1. Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 423) contend that “… 
network activity can be regarded as a precondition to ‘learning by 
interacting’”. A study by Pannekoek et al. (2007) found that most innovative 
ideas in Dutch horticulture came from a firm’s networks and relations. As 
such, network formation is a key concern for innovation. Intermediary 
organisations can facilitate this by providing fora for various system actors 
to interact (Howells, 2006), transparency in R&D and “knowledge-intensive 
business services” (KIBS), and help firms discover financing opportunities 
and by subsidising innovation activities (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b). 
 
Social capital is another concept that is important here: Klerkx & Proctor 
(2013) describe social capital as the features of social organisation in a given 
system, such as its networks, its level of trust and the norms of reciprocity 
and mutual aid that mediate collective action. In the fresh produce industry, 
the picture of social capital is fuzzy: a small, tight-knit community of peers 
is described on the one hand (Section 4.2.1), whilst a highly divergent, 
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defensive culture is portrayed on the other (Sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.7.1.5). It 
is possible to explain these differing perceptions by comparing different 
“types” of social capital (Table 10). 
 
Table 10 Typology of social capital, adapted from Klerkx & Proctor (2013) 
Type of social capital  Main features 
“Bonding” • Trusting, cooperative and dense 
networks 
• Similar social-demographic 
characteristics 
• Strong, informal ties 
• Long-term reciprocity 
“Bridging” • Links between separated (but 
dense) networks 
• Larger, looser networks 
• Weaker ties 
• Formalised collaboration 
• Weaker trust 
“Linking” • Trusting relationships across 
explicit, formalised power or 
authority gradients in society 
• Lack of similarities in terms of 
socio-demographic 
• Characterised by norms of respect 
 
A further distinction lies between networks themselves, and their use 
depends on the precise needs of the knowledge exchange in question. For 
example, centralised networks are adequate for maintaining enough 
operational knowledge for “routine problem solving” in a well-known 
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solution space (Smedlund, 2008). On the other hand, distributed networks 
are those that resemble a community of practice, a network of peers who 
share tacit knowledge through both formal and – importantly – informal 
gatherings. A network of practice is a looser collective of people, connected 
less by a similar profession but joined by a mutual problem (Klerkx & 
Proctor, 2013). A decentralised network, however, is one in which combines 
with individuals outside of established communities or networks of practice 
for the purposes of attaining new knowledge (Smedlund, 2008). As Klerkx & 
Proctor (2013, p. 16) state: 
  
“Because a decentralised network involves contacts with people which are 
outside the established [communities of practice] and [networks of practice] 
of advisors, and there may be boundaries in terms of culture, language, work 
procedures, often so-called boundary spanners or brokers are needed to 
exploit such weak ties and create linking social capital.” (see also Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2009; Oreszczyn et al., 2010)  
 
The AHDB-organised “SmartAg” conference (AHDB, n.d.) is a recent example 
of attempts to link diverse professions for this purpose. One can speculate 
on both the type of network and extent of social capital that participants 
have described based on the kinds of barriers to knowledge development 
they have encountered. It may be a lack of bridging social capital for 
example, that prevents knowledge being delivered to the “hard to reach 
farmer” 17 , who resides in a dense network of his or her own peers. In 
                                                        
17 Some commentators reject this term entirely (see Jansen, Steuten, Renes, Aarts, 
& Lam, 2010). 
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instances where a participant has described a close-knit, reciprocal 
community of individuals connected by common causes, it is likely they are 
part of more trusting professional and informal networks. For others, who 
feel that their relationships with other industry actors are purely 
“transactional”, a weaker, more formalised form of social capital is evident. 
 
Of course, an individual can operate across different networks, each with 
different types of social capital, depending on the demands of a particular 
problem (Klerkx & Proctor, 2013, p. 23). As such, intermediary 
organisations can contribute to network formation by taking account of the 
“types” of networks required to solve a particular problem and targeting the 
appropriate “space” for intermediation. 
 
Klerkx et al. (2009) suggests that “… the effective evaluation of innovation 
brokers would require the development of indicators to measure ‘soft’ 
processes like network formation and institutional linkages emerging in the 
context of innovation and both qualitative and quantitative evaluation 
methods”. Such an approach would also be in-line with Hekkert et al.’s 
(2007) criteria for assessing the strength of the knowledge diffusion 
function in a given system (see above). 
5.2.3.1.4 Innovation process management 
 
As Izushi (2003, p. 771) claims, “where there is a wide gap between 
suppliers and users of technology in the process, there have been 
appropriate intermediary agencies that connect them”. Intermediaries, 
then, organise and manage the networks that make innovation possible, 
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bridging cultural and cognitive differences between different knowledge 
domains, acting as “knowledge brokers” – much like extensionists – but also 
fulfilling functions such as implementation, intellectual property protection, 
and commercialisation of innovation outcomes (Howells, 2006; Klerkx & 
Leeuwis, 2008b). 
5.2.3.2 Intermediaries in the Fresh Produce Industry 
 
It is clear that intermediary organisations can perform much needed 
brokerage functions in an innovation system, but this begs the question: 
where are the intermediary organisations in the fresh produce industry? In 
the Dutch case, intermediaries have proliferated in the wake of privatization 
of public extension services (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008a; 2008b; Van der 
Meulen, Nedeva, & Braun, 2005). However, in the UK it may be more 
accurate to suggest that intermediary functions are carried out by many 
different organisations, none of which can be defined solely by this activity: 
no one organisation is capable of carrying out all necessary intermediary 
processes, yet many have remits that extend into intermediary functions, 
and sometimes significantly so. As such, there may be limited opportunities 
for other intermediary organisations to form (such as those described by 
Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b) – though a number can be identified. As 
Lamprinopoulou et al.  (2012) find in the case of Scotland, and as this study 
corroborates in the English context, intermediaries have developed (or not 
developed) along a different trajectory to elsewhere. 
 
In many respects the AHDB does perform the types of activities associated 
with intermediary organisations; established following the privatization of 
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public extension services to correct for expected market failures, it 
commissions industry-focussed research, extension activities (knowledge 
brokering) and network formation 18 . Indeed, many of those tensions 
identified by Klerkx & Leeuwis (2008b) in the Dutch context have been 
described by participants in this research with respect to the levy 
organisations in the UK. For example, the invisibility and immeasurability of 
service value poses a problem for both intermediaries in the Netherlands 
and in England, where the true sources of knowledge can be “masked” by 
appropriation (see Section 4.5.4). Likewise, unclear images of innovation 
intermediaries (i.e. what their precise functions are) due to operational 
overlap with other knowledge-intensive organisations have been noted as 
problematic (Howells, 2006). The lack of coherent policy between regional 
intermediaries is also evident. A further problem we might add – perhaps 
because of its inherently “public” character – is greater ability of certain 
firms to influence sectoral innovation agendas (Section 4.2.3), which Klerkx 
(2008b) calls progressive client bias, where intermediary organisations 
focus on those entrepreneurs that already possess the means to innovate. 
Interestingly, overreach by public intermediaries and, conversely, their 
overly limited mandates, are both problems affecting such organisations 
elsewhere (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008b). 
 
In England, the levy organisations remain prominent enough to undertake 
the work of what is now – in the wake of the dissolution of the Dutch 
equivalent – tens of intermediary organisations in the Netherlands. The levy 
                                                        
18 Howells (2006) calls such organisations “knowledge intensive business 
services” firms (KIBS). 
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board likewise sits apart, in terms of funding structure and certain aspects 
of its remit (like market formation), from “pure” intermediaries. 
 
Other organisations undertaking intermediary activities include the 
increasingly dominant producer organisations – and certain large firms – 
that act as progressively centralized networks in themselves, with a high 
degree of trust (see Yang, Klerkx, & Leeuwis, 2014). One risk of such an 
enterprise is strong network failure, in which knowledge is locked ‘out’ as 
much as ‘in’ (see Section 4.6.1.2 and Weber & Rohracher (2012)), which can 
lead to institutional “lock-in” in which new, potentially beneficial 
innovations are prevented from having impact within the group by current 
thinking (Hogeland, 2015). Yet these networks disseminate knowledge 
through in-house agronomists (knowledge brokering) and also broker new 
network arrangements through strategic partnerships with other 
businesses, sometimes overseas-based firms. By linking their growers to 
funding opportunities, they are also providing innovation process 
management. A number of those platforms described in Section 4.3.1 
likewise fulfill similar roles, acting as nodes for knowledge exchange and 
network formation (HIP) or innovation process management (Innovative 
Farmers). 
 
In light of the situation described above, it is fair to say that where gaps exist 
in the provision of knowledge development and dissemination in the fresh 
produce industry, they are to greater and lesser extents being filled by new 
intermediary mechanisms (though these are not necessarily formally 
aligned in any way). However, the operations of the levy organisations 
remain such that they undertake significant intermediary functions without 
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the remit or resources to handle the national capacity for all research and 
development needs at once (Brian Jamieson & Associates, 2008). 
Interestingly, tensions over the levy board’s remit (Section 4.2.3) lie at 
points that differentiate it from a “pure” intermediary organisation. 
 
The important role of intermediaries reflects the transition from “linear” 
thinking about the nature of agricultural innovation, with a move towards 
“systemic facilitation”, encompassing the resolution of communication 
problems between groups – and not only between science and practice 
(Klerkx, Schut, Leeuwis, & Kilelu, 2012a). 
5.2.4 Guidance of the Search 
 
Creating a ‘guiding’ vision for the innovation system helps to orientate other 
systems functions, such as knowledge development and entrepreneurial 
activities. In essence, this refers to any activity that improves the “… 
visibility or clarity of specific wants among technology users” (Hekkert et al., 
2007, p. 423). 
5.2.4.1 Barriers to guiding the search and mechanisms for change 
 
Hermans et al. (2015, p. 47) find that “visions” on agriculture have become 
fragmented in a lot of (European) countries. The simultaneous demands put 
upon the agricultural sector – from conservation to rural development – 
have pulled it in multiple ‘directions’. Here, too, the vertical fragmentation 
discussed in Section 4.7.1.1 diminishes coordinated action at a national 
level, with different public bodies seemingly pursuing their own innovation 
agendas. Taking a Multi-level Perspective Weber & Rohracher (2012, p. 
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1041) stress that to be concerned with change is to also be concerned about 
the “direction” of change. As such, the authors complement the systemic 
failures outlined by other authors (Hekkert et al., 2007; Klein Woolthuis et 
al., 2005) by adding another, directionality failure: 
 
“Transformative change… is intimately linked to the question of direction 
and requires the setting of collective priorities; priorities that require a 
strategic policy approach to be in place. We therefore suggest an additional 
type of failure, namely directionality failure. It points to the necessity not just 
to generate innovations as effectively and efficiently as possible, but also to 
contribute to a particular direction of transformative change. This direction 
is defined, for instance, by the identification of major societal problems or 
challenges, for which solutions need to be developed with the help of research 
and innovation.” (Weber & Rohracher, 2012, p. 1042) 
 
What are the problems associated with directionality failure? 
 
1. The liberalisation of extension services in some countries – including 
England – has led to the loss of an important (national) steering 
mechanism for the AIS (Hermans et al., 2015), as well as 
fragmentation. Those bodies that do exist do not necessarily share a 
coherent view of innovation (see above). As such, this is an 
institutional problem of presence. 
2. As Turner et al. (2015a, p. 8) observe, competing innovation agendas 
constitute a significant barrier to the guidance of the search. As 
shown in Section 4.2.1.2, a perceived difference in industry 
innovation agendas – borne from the differences in business size and 
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crop types present in the sector – represents a barrier to a unified, 
coherent vision for the industry. SMEs do not always have the means 
to participate in guidance of the search activities, therefore their 
voice is not heard (Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 
2015a). As such, this problem is one of interaction quality. 
3. An area of conflict is evident with respect to long- and short-term 
vision (see Section 4.2.5). Hermans et al. (2015) also mention the 
trend towards shorter term thinking in policy, leading to incoherent 
policy decisions and a focus on short-term results. As in New Zealand, 
research organisations in UK fresh produce, and closely associated 
levy organisations, were seen to provide ‘longer term’ thinking 
(Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a). Furthermore, 
participants from the levy organisations recognised the need for a 
more ‘strategic’ approach (see Section 4.2.3).  In particular, the call 
for longer-term vision with respect to crop protection was clear 
(Section 4.2). 
 
How might these interlinked issues be remedied? Due to the complexity of 
innovation systems – reflected here in terms of the differences between 
smaller and larger firms, sectors and their often-competing innovation 
agendas – “single policy instruments” are not sufficient to guide 
transformative change. As Lamprinopoulou et al. (2012, p. 3) show: 
 
“… a need emerges for developing policy instruments that operate at the 
system level, instead of supporting the individual components of the system 
(which may be described as the neoclassical approach), and for going beyond 
traditional command-and-control measures”  
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Weber & Rohracher (2012, p. 1043) suggest that the matching of soft 
measures, such as a clearly-articulated vision for the future, with hard 
measures such as a portfolio of policies operating at multiple levels, can 
overcome the inherent inequalities in power found in an innovation system, 
where a lack of consensus is common. As such, it is not only about the wants 
of industry but creating a vision for all parties that can channel activity. 
However, in an increasingly internationalised landscape, the notion of 
limited, national visions stands in contrast to the increasingly globalised 
nature of the fresh produce industry (and other innovation systems) 
(Metcalfe, 2007).  
 
Several practical solutions for developing this guiding vision exist (and 
some, such as Science and Technology Forecasting (STF) have already been 
mentioned) (see above). Turner et al. (2015a) suggest ‘consensus 
development conferences’ can provide a means of overcoming the 
horizontal and vertical fragmentation that exacerbates heterogeneous 
innovation agendas (Section 4.2.3), in turn improving interaction; however, 
this leaves the question of how to engage those individuals or firms that lack 
the capability to input their voice, unanswered. Mylan et al. (2014) point out 
that, for the dairy sector, periodical “roadmaps” have provided “socio-
cognitive coordination”, suggesting this might be the intended outcome of 
any such meeting.  
 
It is not clear whom or what organisations can set out such a coherent, multi-
level vision for the industry backed by hard policies. However, commenters 
have noted the UK’s impending (and uncertain) departure from the 
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European Union – where 80% of the UK’s agricultural legislation originates 
– could be an opportunity to reshape the vision for agriculture (Lawrence, 
2017). Nor should the challenges for the industry, highlighted in Section 
4.10 be forgotten: for example, the long-term sustainability of the sector – 
from both an environmental and economic point of view – was considered 
the key challenge for the future of the industry. 
5.2.5 Market Formation 
 
Market formation concerns the creation of new markets, either for new 
products or existing ones produced in different ways (see Klerkx et al., 2010 
for example). Market formation can often be constrained by “incumbent” 
actors’ vested interests (Smink, Hekkert, & Negro, 2013) – making the 
guiding vision discussed in the previous section all the more important. 
Developing new markets is, however, vital for an industry that thrives on 
newness; product differentiation was cited as the foremost ‘type’ of 
innovation for the industry (see also Young & Hobbs, 2016), and marketing 
of those products an equally important component in the innovation 
journey (Section 4.3.3.4). 
 
It is possible to conclude that market formation activities in the UK are not 
a particularly weak aspect of the system: aside from complaints about 
overreach by the levy organisations with respect to market development 
(Section 4.2.3), and that more could be done to promote fruits and 
vegetables as health foods (Section 4.10), the UK does not suffer from many 
of those issues outlined by Turner et al. (2015a), such as limited instances 
of actors – including research organisations – undertaking market formation 
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(problems of presence). Various organisations, including the levy 
organisations and crop/sector-specific marketing desks focus on market 
development, as well as retailers (see below). Government, too, can facilitate 
market development through policy decisions (see Hekkert et al., 2007, p. 
424) though the UK government has adopted an increasingly “hands-off” 
approach to agriculture (at least in terms of near-market intervention). 
 
However, there several barriers to market formation identified in Chapter 
4. 
5.2.5.1 Barriers to market formation and mechanisms for change 
 
It is something of a paradox that the main barriers to market formation in 
the UK fresh produce industry arise from the primary market for most fresh 
produce – retail markets. As discussed previously, the power of the retailers 
over the supply chain is considerable (see Section 2.1). 
 
The culture of “defensive innovation”, driven in large part by competition 
between the major retailers, has engendered a risk-averse culture of 
efficiency improvement that reflects the “conservatism” noted for 
preventing innovation by Turner et al. (2015a). Given the observation that 
returns to growers have diminished, it can also be speculated that many 
firms – SMEs in particular – lack the resources to engage in market 
formation (a problem of capability). 
 
At the same time, information asymmetry (an interaction problem) also 
clouds market transparency, which is taken to be something that should be 
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avoided (Klerkx et al., 2006; Young & Hobbs, 2016). Exemplified by the 
reluctance of some firms to share information with their customers Section 
4.6.2, Mylan et al. (2014) suggest that the development of “antagonistic and 
distrustful” attitudes towards supermarkets may hinder information 
exchange. As Metcalfe (Metcalfe, 2007, p. 442) points out: 
“… the prevailing constellation of prices, quantities and activities in a market 
economy generate the opportunities, the incentives and tests that must be 
passed for innovations to invade and transform the system…” 
 
As such, the withholding of information – for whatever reason – can distort 
the structures that promote innovation in a market economy. 
 
On the other hand, those relationships founded on trust, exhibiting a “whole 
supply-chain” view, in which different actors “challenge” each other with 
need (see Section 4.8.1), appear to represent the best form of working 
partnership; near-market actors in this instance can focus on market 
development as part of a package that includes support for those further ‘up’ 
the supply chain. 
 
Turner et al. (2015a) advocate some kind of bridging or collaboration 
scheme – with a focus on market development – between retailers and their 
customers, perhaps in the same vein as the annual meetings organised by 
certain P.O.s (and, indeed, some retailer-led grower groups like the Waitrose 
Agronomy Group (“The Agronomy Group,” n.d.)). Not only would this foster 
trust but go some way towards combatting interaction problems such as 
information asymmetry. 
 264 
 
Ensuring adequate returns to growers was cited as a major challenge for the 
industry (Section 4.10). As such, market formation activities have the ability 
to provide new or enhanced sources of revenue to growers. 
5.2.6 Resource mobilisation 
 
As Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 425) point out, resources such as human and 
financial capital are vital components of an innovation system. Funding for 
R&D, whether mobilised through industry consortia or public sources, is one 
measure of this function; whilst it can be difficult to map, Hekkert et al. 
(2007, p. 425) suggest that interviews serve as a means to detect whether 
core actors perceive access to such resources as problematic. 
5.2.6.1 Barriers to resource mobilisation and mechanisms for change 
 
A number of barriers to resource mobilisation were identified in Chapter 4: 
 
1. The size of the horticultural market, which appears to deter 
significant investment and relegates the fresh produce industry to 
off-label or “minor” use of crop protection products19 designed for 
the arable market (Section 4.6.1.2). Such a situation does not 
correspond to any of the structural or functional failures outlined by 
Hekkert et al. (2007) or Turner et al. (2015a). 
                                                        
19  A new facility – the European Minor Use Facility – for off-label use of crop 
protection products was established in 2015, which recognised the low economic 
interest of the agro-pesticide industry in “niche” crops (MUCF, 2015). 
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2. Certain European-wide regulation of crop protection products (and 
the costs of registration and testing these products in Europe) was 
also felt to deter investment in agriculture (Section 4.7.1.4) – though 
one can also argue that this is a driver of innovation as well (Section 
4.2.1.1). In particular, the threat to the “minor use” of these products 
has been noted (Villaverde, Sevilla-Morán, Sandín-España, López-
Goti, & Alonso-Prados, 2013). As such, this corresponds to an 
institutional failure related to the quality of the regulations that 
prohibit the use of the products in question or make them 
prohibitively expensive to register for off-label use. However, 
attitudes towards regulation, particularly where they concern the 
environment, should be tempered with concern for unintended 
consequences of technology: “The necessity to shape innovation 
processes can be demonstrated by the fact that apart from the 
advantage of creating economic growth and societal benefits, current 
use of technologies often has severe negative side effects. Quite often 
these negative side effects are related to the impact of technology on 
the natural environment. The relation between technology and the 
environment is complex and paradoxical. On the one hand, 
technologies use resources and impose environmental stress. On the 
other hand, technologies can also lead to a more efficient use of 
resources, less stress on the environment and even cleaning of the 
environment.” (Hekkert et al., 2007, p. 414). 
3. A further problem is the sectoral division of funds that parses out 
research funding and to some extent prevents more consolidated 
funding for industry-wide problems (Section 4.7.1.2). This 
corresponds to an institutional failure of quality within the levy 
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organisation funding structure and has some similarities with the 
situation in New Zealand (Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & 
Barnard, 2015a). 
 
It is difficult to imagine how one might approach the problems associated 
with the size of the horticultural market – which is not inconsiderable at 
some £4 billion at farm-gate (Defra, 2017) and does produce significant 
innovation. However, the total value of the industry belies the fact that it is 
made up of many, smaller sectors that, when separated, struggle to attract 
significant crop protection product development (see Section 4.7.1.3), a 
situation exacerbated by the high costs of registration for such products in 
the European Union: “Brexit” may offer an opportunity to change the 
approval mechanisms for these products, providing an ‘advocacy coalition’ 
of concerned parties can be convened (Klerkx et al., 2010; Turner, Klerkx, 
Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a). A mismatch between what was ‘taken 
away’ through regulation on crop protection products and investment in 
alternatives was also an issue aired in Section 4.7.1.4. A possible solution to 
this problem is the creation of an innovation platform specifically targeting 
these areas of loss and to also create scenarios for futures with and without 
certain products (though it should also be noted that research on crop 
protection measures like IPM continues unabated). Further measures to 
enhance resource mobilisation in this regard are: 1) the effective translation 
of crop protection methods between crop types, though small market size 
will continue to be a factor here, and 2) cross-sectoral programs designed to 
pool resources for the sake of industry-wide problems (as suggested 
previously and recognised as necessary by senior levy board staff). A 
reestablished SCEPTRE program (SCEPTREplus) seeks to test the efficacy of 
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crop protection products on horticultural crops on a cross-sector basis 
(AHDB Horticulture, n.d.), demonstrating the demand for such platforms. 
 
Subsidies, oft-promoted in AIS diagnostic work (see Table 1 in Turner, 
Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams, & Barnard, 2015a) as a means to bolster desirable 
activity, prove rather unpopular in the horticultural sector (possibly due to 
its entrepreneurial spirit), from smallholders to large-scale businesses and 
even researchers (Section 4.7.1.4). However, subsidies or tax exemptions do 
appear to offer a means of facilitating transitions to sustainable futures by 
providing a niche in which new initiatives can grow free from intense 
market conditions to challenge the regime (Ingram, 2015). 
5.2.7 Creation of legitimacy 
 
Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 425) describe the creation of legitimacy as 
establishing the means of support for new technological trajectories. This 
can include advocacy coalitions, lobbying for resources, or the 
establishment of favourable tax regimes, for example. Of course, as noted 
earlier (Section 2.3.5.3) incumbent actors can treat attempts to disrupt the 
status quo with hostility. Ingram (2015) points out that regimes are less 
structured for transformative change, and more towards incremental 
innovation along ‘established trajectories’.  
 
Klerkx et al. (2010) call attempts to redefine the hard or soft rules of the 
innovation system “effective reformism”. Whilst this is not entirely outside 
the experience of actors in the fresh produce industry (such as persuading 
others of the importance of longer-term, strategic research (Section 4.2.5)), 
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the notion of legitimacy was primarily invoked not with specific technology 
in mind, but relationships. 
 
Much like Turner et al.’s study (2015a), the creation of legitimacy was 
spoken of rarely during this research, reflecting perhaps a weakness in the 
functional/structural diagnostic framework. However several barriers to 
the creation of legitimacy did stand out. 
5.2.7.1 Barriers to creation of legitimacy and mechanisms for change 
 
As Hermans et al. (2015, p. 47) suggest, trust and social capital in 
agricultural innovation systems in Europe is decreasing: this is problematic 
for innovation, which relies on trustful relationships and interaction. A lack 
of trust signals a failure of interaction quality. The notion of trust is visited 
by Sutherland et al. (2013) with respect to advisory services, finding that the 
length of relationships and perceptions of expertise are valued more highly 
than the affiliation (public, private, or charitable) of the advisor, reinforcing 
the importance of individual relationships.  
 
That researchers do not always command the respect of growers (Section 
4.7.1.2) is likewise problematic for innovation, as this reduces the ability of 
the scientific community to create the legitimacy needed to further 
evidence-based agendas (also interaction quality). In Section 4.6.1.1 it was 
stated that, due to trusting relationships between private firms and 
researchers, businesses would “follow the lead” of particular scientists. 
Cooperative research programs are therefore advisable, though these are 
already common in near-market research (such as administered through 
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AHDB programs and to some extent more industry-focussed BBSRC 
programmes such as Doctoral Training Partnerships (DTP) which is one of 
several regional doctoral training programmes that include three-month 
industrial placements for students (see “Doctoral Training Partnerships 
(DTP),” n.d.). 
 
However, unlike the situation described by Turner et al. (2015a), the onus 
for the creation of legitimacy appears to lie with the levy organisations: in 
Section 4.2.5 it was recognised that there was need for longer-term vision 
and that any reactivity in levy steering groups needed to be challenged. 
5.2.8 Summary of functional-structural analysis of the fresh produce 
industry 
 
In this section, a functional-structural analysis of the fresh produce industry 
has been undertaken by combining the findings of the previous chapter with 
existing literature and further developing options for systemic instruments 
to improve innovative capacity in the industry. These are summarised in 
Table 11 (below). However, not all the findings discussed in Chapter 4 have 
found voice through this analysis, and these are explored in more detail in 
the following section. 
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Table 11 A functional-structural analysis of the UK fresh produce innovation system with suggested systemic instruments for change 
System function Structural 
element 
Problem 
“type” 
Description Suggested systemic 
instrument 
Selected 
examples of 
systemic 
instruments 
identified by 
this study 
Entrepreneurial 
activities 
Interactions Quality Knowledge and power 
asymmetry between 
customer and supplier 
New forms of supply-
chain governance 
Fresh Produce 
Adjudicator 
(see Section 
5.2.2) 
Actors Capability Some actors have 
insufficient resources to 
undertake innovation 
Risk capital  
Knowledge 
development 
Institutions Presence Fragmentation due to no 
nation-wide oversight of 
research activities  
Innovation platforms, 
establishment of 
coordinating body 
UK 
Agricultural 
Technologies 
Strategy (BIS, 
2013) 
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Interactions Quality Reactive steering groups Demand articulation, 
widen participation, 
pooled, cross-sector 
projects 
SCEPTREplus 
programme 
(AHDB 
Horticulture, 
n.d.) 
Institutions Capability Lack of formalised 
mechanisms for translating 
research between crop 
types and through stages of 
development  
Improve incentive 
structure for 
translational activity, 
joined-up policy, 
strengthen interactions 
 
Institutions Presence Internationalisation of 
knowledge development 
and diffusion has outpaced 
institutional development 
New forms of cross-
border partnerships 
 
Knowledge 
diffusion 
Infrastructure Presence Loss of funding and facilities 
has diminished 
opportunities for interaction 
Focus on 
intermediary/broker 
organisations, 
innovation platforms 
Horticulture 
Innovation 
Partnership 
(see Section 
5.2.2.1) 
Interactions Quality Cognitive gaps limit the 
quality of interactions 
Cooperative research 
programmes, 
Doctoral 
Training 
 272 
between actors; different 
incentive structures 
between professions causes 
a mismatch in goals 
intermediary/broker 
organisations 
Partnerships 
with industrial 
placements 
(see “Doctoral 
Training 
Partnerships 
(DTP),” n.d.), 
HortLINK 
scheme (see 
Brian 
Jamieson & 
Associates, 
2008) 
Interactions Quality Information asymmetry 
caused by horizontal 
fragmentation leaves actors 
unaware of potential, 
suitable innovation partners 
Intermediary 
organisations to 
facilitate networking 
 
Institutional Presence Loss of expertise and 
specialist knowledge due to 
inadequate knowledge-
Centralised data-
basing 
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handling practices and 
succession planning 
Guidance of the 
search 
Institutional Presence Lack of a national steering 
mechanism to guide AIS 
functions 
Consensus 
development 
conferences, road-
mapping  
 
Interaction Quality Some SMEs do not have 
means to participate in 
guidance of the search 
activities, voices not heard  
Intermediary 
organisations 
 
Market formation Interaction Quality Information asymmetry 
between suppliers and 
customers with regards to 
market development 
Bridging instruments, 
collaboration schemes 
 
Resource 
mobilisation 
Institutional Quality Regulation blocks use of 
certain crop protection 
products and discourages 
their registration in Europe 
Advocacy coalitions 
/lobbying, innovation 
platforms for 
alternative 
products/scenario 
development 
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Institutional Quality Research funding is parsed 
by sectors, preventing 
coherent, industry-wide, 
cross-cutting research 
Cross-sector scoping 
studies, investment in 
formalised translation 
mechanisms between 
crop types 
 
Creation of 
legitimacy 
Interaction Quality Researchers not rewarded 
for engagement with 
industry, lack of mutual 
understanding/trust 
Cooperative research 
programs 
Doctoral 
Training 
Partnerships 
(as above) 
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5.3 Further issues 
 
In addition to those system functions outlined by Hekkert et al. (2007) two 
interconnected issues stand out as important: the idea of best practice in 
science and extension, and the measurement of the impact of innovation. 
5.3.1 Best practice in science and extension 
 
As discussed in Section 4.8.4, the idea of best practice was challenged by the 
notion of “fit” to specific contexts. This is, on the one hand supported by 
questions of relevance (see Section 4.8.4) and the common requirement for 
adaptation (Section 4.5.2). 
 
However, to provide a deeper understanding of the factors at work – and to 
make sense of other aspects of the data that suggest some innovation is 
available “off the shelf” – a more thorough discussion of the nature of 
knowledge is required. Herstad (2014, p. 469) for example, captures the 
gradients of knowledge succinctly:  
 
“Knowledge can be tacit, hard to observe, complex and system-dependent; 
that is, it is usable primarily when applied within a given social context… 
knowledge can also be easy to articulate, observable in use and usable 
independent of such contexts. These dimensions are important in 
conditioning the search process underlying partner identification because 
they determine the sensitivity of search to privileged information access. 
They also translate into differences in outward communicability and 
dependence on proximity during interaction, and may necessitate 
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organizational systems adapted specifically to the task of absorbing the type 
of knowledge in question.” 
 
The situation found ‘on the ground’ seems to reflect this observation: a 
pluralistic advisory service composed of private, public and charitable 
organisations (see Sutherland et al., 2013) engaged in diverse knowledge-
exchange practices, including the levy organisations. How and when to 
impart what types of knowledge is a matter of considerable attention in 
extension science or, as Leeuwis (2004) would like us to term it, 
communication for rural innovation (the totality of which cannot be 
summarised here). However, several insights have advanced in Chapter 4 
with respect to effective forms of communication: 
 
1. Increasing role of producer organisations as communication nodes for 
innovation: as described in Section 4.6.1.2, more formalised producer 
organisations (such as grower cooperatives) routinely employ their 
own, in-house agronomists to disseminate knowledge, as well as 
facilitating interaction amongst their growers through different fora 
including study tours (see below). Also, strategic partnerships with 
overseas firms and research institutes provide direct channels for 
more discreet innovation into the UK. Multiple, overseas production 
sites also permit more year-round experimentation with new 
products (such as plant genetics) and processes (Section 4.6.1.1), 
representing a new area of enquiry for AIS analysis. 
2. Study tours: either due to, or a response to, the importance of 
overseas sources of innovation, study tours were consistently cited 
as important mediums for network formation and knowledge 
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exchange. These often take place overseas, either with partner 
organisations or sometimes as bespoke, personal trips (Section 
4.5.1). Interestingly, there are very few – if any – published articles 
examining the role of study tours in fostering innovation in an 
agricultural context20, presenting perhaps another area of interest 
for extension science and innovation systems inquiry. 
3. Increasing importance of digital and mobile communication: it is 
perhaps not surprising to find that digital media and mobile phone 
communication are now considered primary tools for effective 
communication (although this hasn’t diminished the need for print 
media, reflecting the need for a multi-channel approach to 
communication (see Section 4.8.4)). 
4. Confusion with demonstration farms: it remains unclear as to whether 
practical demonstrations of new practices and technology provide 
effective platforms for knowledge exchange. In practice, this may 
relate to the communicability of the knowledge in question. Context-
independent, discreet innovation – in the form of a new pest control 
product, for example – may correspond to what one participant 
dubbed “off-the-shelf innovation” (Section 4.2.1.2), more easily 
transferred through demonstration. 
 
As Driessen et al. (2015, pp. 11-12) observe, the innovation systems 
perspective recognises that innovation is about much more than the 
“implementation of research results”, claiming that instead it must entail “... 
                                                        
20 Several AHDB publications were featured on the first page of a Google search 
using the terms “research/study tour agriculture innovation” in July 2017 
suggesting it has a prominent role in such events. 
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acceptance that effective knowledge exchange is essentially about 
stimulating the formation and function of [] networks”. In conclusion, efforts 
may be better spent facilitating knowledge flows between and within 
networks – rather than overseeing the precise implementation of that 
knowledge – to enhance innovative capacity across the industry. This 
directly complements more “complexity-aware” theories of change that 
demand a more advanced understanding of impact, discussed below. 
5.3.2 Impact 
 
It was stated that determining the impact of innovation was problematic 
(Section 4.3.4). Indeed, Hermans et al. (2015) suggest that there are missing 
or even unsuitable criteria for evaluation across European AIS in general. 
This research corroborates that conclusion in some sense: very few concrete 
means of assessing impact were discovered (at least via the methods of 
inquiry chosen for the project), representing an area for future research. 
 
The field of impact assessment is large, but in an agricultural context this 
has tended to focus on adoption of research outcomes as equating to impact, 
and, in particular, the absolute number of beneficiaries of a given product or 
process. However, Arkesteijn et al. (2015) provide a summary of why impact 
is so problematic an issue with regards to innovation: 
 
“It is uncertain how or whether an intervention leads to a specific result, 
because of multiple interactions. It is therefore impossible to know 
beforehand what interventions will work and what the effects of 
interventions will be. Even if actors have agreed on a solution, and in 
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hindsight they understand how it worked, a second time the same solution 
may fail. Acknowledging the inherent unpredictability of any change path 
taken is assumed to require an integrative, adaptive management style of 
probing and learning, and a recurrent reflection on emerging patterns.” 
 
As Douthwaite & Hoffecker (2017) argue, a linear, cause-effect view of 
evaluation hampers the ability of research projects to harness such 
complexity. Instead, they argue that impact is “... achieved through building 
the capacity of the rural innovation system to innovate...” – of which carrying 
out research to tackle technical issues is just one component (2017, p. 100). 
 
To deal with the complexities of intervention in innovation systems, which 
are characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity, risks and unintended 
consequences, Arkesteijn et al. (2015) call for more reflexive monitoring of 
change as proposed by Van Mierlo et al. (2010). A recognition that linear, 
results-based forms of project evaluation do not capture the emergent 
properties of change has prompted some authors (Van Ongevalle, Huyse, & 
Van Petegem, 2014) to embrace a complexity perspective to adequately take 
account of emerging barriers to change in a collective manner, in which 
participants of the projects themselves are able to reflexively guide the 
direction of change (van Mierlo et al., 2010; Van Ongevalle et al., 2014). A 
move away from the linear paradigm of problem solving appears to be 
evident in (at least) Scotland and the Netherlands (see Lamprinopoulou et 
al., 2012, p. 15). 
 
Some of the systemic instruments proposed to tackle barriers to innovation 
in the fresh produce industry here will require collective action; no one actor 
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or organisation can solve ‘complex problems’ (Van Ongevalle et al., 2014), 
which are, by their nature, problems that persist over time and lack 
consensus or certainty, but are nonetheless considered problematic 
(Arkesteijn et al., 2015). 
5.4 Rigour, reflections and limitations 
 
It is important at this stage of the Discussion to also assess the rigour with 
which the study has been undertaken, and in context of the results that have 
been found. 
5.4.1 Ensuring rigour 
 
Rigour is achieved through several means outlined by Mays & Pope (2000) 
(see below). However, as Roth (2015) notes, scientific rigidity is the first 
enemy of rigour; indiscriminately applying the same methods of analysis to 
different contexts is, as such, discouraged. Instead, applying the most 
appropriate methodology to a given problem is the first step in rigour. The 
basis for the chosen methodology used in this study is outlined in Chapter 3, 
alongside justifications for the choices made. Mays & Pope’s six ways of 
ensuring rigour are: 
 
1. Triangulation: this refers to comparisons between two or more types 
of data, or two or more data sources. It is for this reason that this 
study has sought a diversity of voices across the fresh produce 
industry, in order to triangulate – via 32 distinct voices – on the issue 
of innovation. To a lesser extent, secondary document analysis 
(primarily ‘grey’ literature related to government policy, such as the 
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UK Strategy for Agricultural Technologies (2013)) and the use of Basic 
Horticultural Statistics also provide some degree of triangulation, 
though in the latter case this represents an area for further 
development at the methodological level (i.e. mixed-methods 
research). 
2. Respondent validation: another method of enhancing rigour is to 
check the researchers’ account (data, notes) with that of the 
participant themselves. This can help reduce errors, and also be a 
form of analysis in its own right. However, respondent validation was 
not carried out in this study, with the exception of two occasions; in 
one case a participant wanted to see the transcript of their interview 
(as per the interview protocol) and in another the author sought 
clarification from a participant regarding on-farm innovation (but 
did not receive a reply). As such, this may represent a limitation of 
the research, though as Mays & Pope (2000, p. 51) suggest, a problem 
that researchers may face in relying on respondent validation is the 
differing intentions of researcher and participant. 
3. Clear exposition of methods of data collection and analysis: in order 
for the reader to be able to judge whether the interpretation 
proffered by the researcher is supported by the data, attempts should 
be made to ensure that the process of generating and analysing that 
data – moving from early, simple systems of classification into more 
sophisticated coding structures – is clear. In this study, such attempts 
have been made; an outline of the precise methodology that was 
followed has been outlined in Chapter 3, and the classification of 
codes provided at the beginning of Chapter 4. However, it should be 
acknowledged that more effort could have been made to provide a 
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breakdown of the evolution of the coding that lead to these 
classifications. 
4. Reflexivity: as noted in Section 3.2.1, reflexivity concerns sensitivity 
to the ways in which the researcher and the research process have 
shaped the generated data (indeed, this section is part of that 
endeavour). Mays & Pope (2000, p. 51) also call for the “distance” 
between researcher and researched to be made clear. With no prior 
direct experience of either interviewing or the agricultural sector, it 
is safe to say that this distance was at first large for the present 
researcher, but gradually diminished. Further reflections on the 
research process are provided below.  
5. Attention to negative cases: a “long-established” tactic for improving 
the quality of data is to discuss those elements in the data that 
contradict emerging explanations for the phenomena under study 
(Yin, 2009). Situations in which the data presents an ambiguous 
picture21 have been discussed at appropriate points, and the larger 
themes identified in Chapter 4 represent areas of broad agreement. 
This is not to say that more attention could not have been paid to 
contradictory cases or included in the text; however, the inclusion of 
diverse voices from across the fresh produce industry is in itself an 
attempt to ensure enough diversity for disagreement, where it exists, 
to emerge. 
                                                        
21  As in Section 4.2.1 regarding disagreement over whether the fresh produce 
industry is one of sharing or protecting important knowledge, and in Section 4.2.2 
and Section 5.2.1 in which the positives and negatives of supermarket ‘dominance’ 
of the sector are elaborated on. 
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6. Fair dealing: in the same vein, the need for multiple viewpoints 
should be explicit in the research design of a study, and at the same 
time, the perspective of one group should not be presented as the 
“sole” truth of a situation. This has been largely achieved through the 
recruitment of a large and diverse sample of individuals, both 
geographically and in terms of their position within the industry. A 
possible limitation connected to this is the failure to recruit any 
English potato growers (several were contacted but none replied to 
the request for interview). As such, only Scottish potato growers 
were represented in the study, though there were no indications 
from other interviews with soft fruit growers that there were any 
major differences – beyond complaints about the weather – between 
the two nations. 
 
The case study approach also carries with it several methodological 
considerations, which have been followed during the course of this study. 
Outlined by Yin (2009), this includes the definition and selection of cases (in 
this instance, the delineation of the intrinsic case of innovation in the fresh 
produce industry) and a “data collection profile” that yields up-close and in-
depth information about the case. The analytic strategy should also be made 
clear, and this has been outlined in Chapter 3. 
5.4.2 Other reflections and limitations 
 
Several other reflections and possible limitations of the research were noted 
during the course of the project: 
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• Framework Analysis: the extent to which the full analytical power of 
Framework Analysis was brought to bear on the data was limited, 
due to the use of the particular CAQDAS supported by University of 
Warwick. As such, the author was only able to read across cases in a 
‘manual’ way, rather than the systematic way offered by a hand-
drawn matrix, presenting a limitation in the application of the chosen 
data analysis framework. However, it was felt that sound explanatory 
themes were nonetheless developed. 
• Using the functional-structural analysis: in contrast, the functional-
structural analysis may have provided a restrictive structure to the 
Discussion (Chapter 5). This was done to give a solid basis to any 
recommendations made, where systemic tools for change – other 
than certain programmes and groups – were not pronounced in the 
Findings (Chapter 4). As such, it was decided to adopt a systematic 
framework for discussion that could provide a means of ‘matching’ 
systemic barriers with those systemic instruments identified 
elsewhere and by combining these insights with enabling factors and 
instruments where they had been identified by this study. 
• Internet bias in sampling protocol: initial identification of possible 
participants was carried out via the Internet through purposive 
(Google) searches (see Appendix 1). Although very practical, it has 
the limitation of filtering out those without an “online” presence. A 
number of people ultimately took part in the research due to co-
nomination sampling, which may have identified individuals that 
otherwise would have been ‘undiscovered’, though today this group 
is likely diminishing. 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, the findings of the research have been discussed within a 
functional-structural analysis to pinpoint systemic barriers in the fresh 
produce industry and match them with appropriate ‘systemic instruments’ 
described in existing literature and those outlined as enabling factors in this 
research. A list of recommendations, based on this analysis, are given in the 
next section. Several original contributions to the AIS approach have been 
identified: the internationalisation of the AIS calls for new ways of taking 
account of cross-border linkages: the importance of producer organisations 
in fostering such links and acting as innovation nodes also seems to be a new 
area of enquiry: the apparent ‘mismatch’ between the promotion of systemic 
instruments for change versus an emphasis (according to this study) on 
personal enabling factors for change. 
 
Finally, the issues of rigour, reflexivity and the potential limitations of the 
research have been outlined, as well as a brief discussion of how the 
demands of the case study methodology have been met. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions, recommendations, areas for 
further inquiry 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to outline how this research has met its initial 
aims, reflect on its original contributions to knowledge and identify areas 
for future inquiry. 
6.1 Responding to the research questions 
 
The questions framing this research were: 
 
1. What are the sources of innovation in the UK fresh produce industry? 
2. What are the barriers to innovation in the fresh produce industry? 
3. How can innovative capacity be enhanced? 
 
This research has shown that there are multiple sources of innovation in the 
fresh produce industry, but a perception that innovation often originates 
overseas – and through direct contact and experimentation with new 
products or ideas – is evident. 
 
There are also a range of interlinked barriers to innovation, primarily 
systemic, that limit innovation capacity and that centre on the lack or quality 
of interactions and institutions. By using a functional-structural analysis of 
this AIS, it has been possible to match such problems with potential 
instruments for change to improve innovative capacity in the industry: 
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1. New forms of supply chain governance can counter the knowledge 
asymmetry between suppliers and retailers described in Section 4.2. 
This suggestion is one best handled by either central Government – 
as in the Groceries Adjudicator – or perhaps by the establishment of 
a certification scheme that guarantees fair dealing in commercial 
relationships (in a similar fashion to the Fair Trade Foundation). 
2. Establishing a means of providing venture or risk capital to SMEs 
may improve their ability to innovate (Section 4.2). Innovate UK or a 
similar organization might be in a position to implement a 
competitive bidding program for such funds.  
3. The fragmentation caused by a lack of nation-wide oversight (and 
alignment) of research activities can be tempered by appropriate 
innovation platforms or the creation of a coordinating body (Section 
4.7.1). Recent policy developments – such as the Agritech Strategy – 
provides some orientation for the wider AIS; the existing All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on Science and Technology in Agriculture 
(APPGSTA) also provides a means for stakeholder dialogue, but the 
extent to which that coordinates action across the agri-research 
sphere is unclear. 
4. Fostering better demand articulation, widening participation in 
steering groups and pinpointing areas for pooled, cross-sector work 
may help to limit the reactivity of steering groups within the AHDB 
organisational structure (Section 4.6.2). The AHDB is ultimately 
responsible for further developing its cross-sector work, and staff 
within the organisation were aware of the need to do so. 
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5. Finding ways to incentivise translational research (Section 5.2.2), 
ensuring that policy is coherent and “joined-up, and providing 
opportunities to strengthen interaction between actors in the AIS 
should lay the groundwork for more reliable translation of research. 
A number of organisations can facilitate these aims, such as AHDB 
(see above) and BBSRC, through prioritization of cross-sector and 
translational work. However, more basic, blue-skies research should 
remain ‘ring-fenced’, as it is here that the breakthroughs of tomorrow 
might occur (see Menary, 2015). 
6. The internationalisation of knowledge development described in 
Section 5.2.1 calls for new forms of cross-border partnership (what 
one might call “institutional innovation”). Such partnerships can be 
formed at a number of ‘levels’ and are not uncommon between 
universities and academic societies. However, the AHDB’s already 
prominent role in study tours and familiarity with producer 
organisations suggests that it could be a key node in such activities. 
7. The loss of funding and dedicated facilities in the sector (Section 
4.7.1.2) requires the establishment of, or support for, other 
mechanisms to foster interaction, such as intermediary 
organisations or innovation platforms. Central Government and the 
UK Research Councils have a clear role here – and have provided 
funding for dedicated facilities in the last few years. 
8. Given that cognitive gaps between industry actors and different 
incentive structures cause barriers to the useful exchange of 
knowledge (Section 5.2.3) cooperative research programmes or 
intermediary organisations can provide platforms for more 
productive interaction. Different institutions – from the AHDB to 
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multi-university training partnerships – can facilitate the creation of 
these platforms. 
9. Where information asymmetry prevents actors finding suitable 
partners (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4) intermediaries might offer a 
means to match appropriate individuals or organisations. 
10. The loss of expertise and specialist knowledge described in Section 
5.2.3.1, calls for the creation of centralised data-basing. This presents 
a significant challenge for any organisation seeking the consolidation 
of knowledge – the AHDB being the most likely candidate considering 
its position within the AIS.  
11. The lack of national steering mechanisms to guide AIS functions 
(Section 5.2.2) requires the development of ‘roadmaps’ or other 
guiding plans through consensus-building conferences. The 
responsibility for this most likely lays with central Government, 
which has already taken a lead in developing certain roadmaps for 
UK agriculture. 
12. Intermediary organisations can act as a conduit for those SMEs 
whose voice is not heard in ‘guidance of the search’ matters (Section 
5.2.3). 
13. Bridging instruments and collaboration schemes can counteract the 
information asymmetry between suppliers and customers with 
regards to market development (Section 5.2.5). Here, UK retailers are 
best positioned to ‘lead’ their supply chains in fostering the mutually-
beneficial sharing of information (the extent to which this is already 
done appears to vary between sectors Mylan et al., 2014). 
14. Where regulation is seen to block the use of or innovation in pest 
control products, advocacy/lobbying groups are required to change 
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policy (Section 5.2.6.1) – alternatively, innovation/technology 
platforms and scenario development might also offer a means to 
generate substitute products. The AHDB’s SCEPTREPlus programme 
is a viable vehicle for ensuring that vital pest control products are not 
lost – or that their withdrawal is gradual rather than sudden. 
15. Issues associated with the division of research funding by crop type 
(Section 4.7.1.2) might be alleviated by cross-sector scoping projects 
to find areas of common concern, and investment in formal 
translational mechanisms. The AHDB – and to some extent BBSRC – 
has a central role to play in this respect, though as noted earlier this 
has largely been recognised and new programs now exist to find 
cross-cutting themes in agricultural problems (see AHDB 
Horticulture, n.d.). 
16. If researchers are not rewarded for engagement with industry, which 
exacerbates a mutual lack of understanding between them and other 
actors, then cooperative research programs may provide a forum for 
improving interaction (Section 5.2.3.1). 
6.2 Original contributions to knowledge and areas for further 
inquiry 
 
In addition to the recommendations made here, and being the first study of 
its kind to focus on the fresh produce industry, this project has also made 
several original contributions to knowledge, particularly with respect to 
diagnostic AIS research: 
 
1. Global Innovation Systems: the increasingly globalised nature of the 
innovation system, in which firms establish overseas production 
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sites or form strategic alliances with foreign businesses appears to 
be an understudied – yet important – feature of the modern fresh 
produce industry. 
2. Producer organisations as innovation nodes: producer organisations 
appear to be vital networks for affiliated growers, acting as conduits 
for innovation through increasingly formalised networks with in-
house agronomists and frequent events, including study tours (see 
below). By partnering with overseas businesses, P.O.s also spread 
proprietorial knowledge and products that would otherwise be 
restricted – and in so doing, further the globalisation of the 
innovation system. However, it was acknowledged that being inside 
such networks might restrict other, “outside” knowledge from having 
impact (closed networks). 
a. Study tours: relatively little dedicated research has been 
undertaken to investigate study tours as a tool for agricultural 
knowledge exchange. Given that this research has indicated 
the importance of overseas sources of innovation, and that 
study tours routinely involve overseas travel, such tours 
represent an area in need of further scrutiny. 
b. Intermediaries: as described in Section 5.2.3 (Knowledge 
diffusion), intermediary organisations in the UK are less 
developed than, or at least different to, their counterparts 
elsewhere. Any intermediary functions undertaken by 
producer organisations therefore require further inquiry, 
because it is clear that certain intermediary duties are carried 
out within such organisations (see Section 4.6.1.2). 
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3. Possible mismatch between systemic barriers and personal enabling 
factors for change: diagnostic AIS works places strong emphasis on 
the systemic factors affecting innovation. However, this study has 
determined that whilst the barriers to innovation are 
overwhelmingly systemic in nature, enabling factors for change tend 
to lie with the individual; entrepreneurialism, trust and leadership, 
for instance, were deemed vital to the innovation process. This 
suggests that there may be scope for further theoretical development 
in the AIS approach, but also perhaps reinforces the divide in focus 
between AIS and higher-resolution approaches to innovation such as 
FSR. Other weaknesses of the approach are presented by Schut etl al. 
(2014b) in Table 3 (Chapter 3) as being the complexity of delineating 
the AIS, and the lack of empirical evidence of practical impact and 
value. The former, the present researcher would argue, actually 
belies a strength of the approach; identifying the limits of a system of 
concern, in order to properly capture the diverse voices within it, is 
justified in that it can provide a self-correcting mechanism for other 
problems identified in the wider literature (such as progressive 
farmer bias (Section 5.2.3.2)). In turn, and particularly when paired 
with the matrices found in the Framework approach outlined by 
Ritchie & Spencer (2003), cross-cutting themes important to a whole 
sector can be identified (as done here). The latter, however, may 
represent a critical failure of the approach, particularly as the 
discipline itself emphasises the diagnosis and remediation of 
problems. A third weakness, as identified here, lies in connecting the 
personal, lived experience of innovation to higher-level themes. 
Equally, the AIS approach – by itself – does not address notions of 
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power, identified in other literatures, such as rural sociology, as 
being a prime explanatory factor determining agricultural outcomes 
(see Goverde, Haan, & Baylina, 2004; Kovách, 2017 for instance). 
With these observations in mind, it is possible to recommend AIS as 
a conceptual framework where research questions concern higher-
level systemic issues – such as those concerning research councils, 
levy organisations and universities. Likewise, applied qualitative 
approaches such as interviewing seem to be adequate means of 
informing AIS diagnostic work. However, in its present form – or, it 
should be noted, in its application in this study – AIS appears ill-
equipped to make use of all forms of data that arise in discussions of 
innovation. That being said, Klerkx et al. (2010) do strike a balance 
between high-resolution case studies (framed as ‘innovation 
journeys’) and the attempts by innovating actors to alter their local 
institutional environment. As such, the AIS approach has most value 
when bridging the personal and the systemic via discrete 
innovation(s) or innovation projects to enhance its practical, 
empirical impact (rather than more expansive, essentially post-hoc 
appraisal of an entire sector). 
 
In summary, this thesis has met its initial aims of discerning the sources of 
innovation in the UK fresh produce industry, as well as what acts as a barrier 
to innovation. In turn, it has developed a series of recommendations as to 
what can enhance innovative capacity in the industry. In so doing, it has also 
identified areas for future study and novel contributions to knowledge, as 
well as assessing the suitability of the AIS approach to answer key questions 
about agricultural innovation. 
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Glossary 
 
Adaptation Modification of a product or 
process to suit (some other) 
requirement 
Adoption The take-up of new knowledge or 
product by a given unit 
Agent/agency The individual, and their ability to 
affect a given situation or 
environment 
Applied research Science undertaken with a 
practical application in mind 
Best practice Optimal use of resources or 
methods of production as 
determined by specific research 
Bounded rationality The assumption that when agents 
make decisions they are limited in 
terms of knowledge and time 
(often contrasted with perfect 
rationality) 
Brokerage The mediation of different 
interests to develop appropriate 
solutions to a problem 
Capital (financial, social or human) 
(economics) 
Anything that can increase an 
individual’s power to perform 
economically-useful work 
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Cases (Framework Analysis) Units of analysis in Framework 
Analysis (often individual research 
participants) 
Codes A discrete label with which to 
describe meaningful information in 
qualitative analysis (usually the 
starting point in such analyses) 
Collective innovation The process of developing 
solutions to a given problem in an 
interactive, collaborative way 
Discounters Supermarkets specialising in low-
cost, “discount” products 
Effective reformism The process by which agents alter 
an institutional landscape to better 
suit their needs 
Evolutionary economics An approach to economics, which 
concerns the processes that shape 
an economy for firms, institutions 
and other actors within that 
economy 
Extension/advisory services State-sponsored organisations 
offering agronomic advice to the 
farming community 
External validity The extent to which research 
findings can be extrapolated to 
wider circumstances 
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Feedback (systems theories) The outputs of a system become 
inputs that form a cause-and-effect 
chain or loop 
First/early adopters Those quickest to begin using a 
certain process or product from a 
given population (see laggards) 
Governance The process of decision-making in 
a given area 
HortLINK (schemes) A four year joint Defra-funded 
program created to address “gaps” 
in crop protection 
Impact Outcomes of using a certain 
product or process 
Implementation Putting new knowledge or 
products into functional use 
Incremental (innovation) Slow, small changes in the way a 
process or product works (often 
compared to “revolutionary” 
innovation) 
Indexing The process of sorting codes into 
higher order themes 
Information/knowledge 
asymmetry  
The unequal distribution of 
information or knowledge (often 
between suppliers and customers) 
Innovation platforms A means to bring together different 
stakeholders to solve a particular 
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problem or promote a certain 
solution 
Institutions Stable, recurring patterns of 
behaviour that confer structure on 
social systems 
Internal validity The extent to which a conclusion 
can be said to be drawn from the 
evidence presented in a study. 
Enhance by rigour, and often 
contrasted with external validity 
Knowledge infrastructure The physical components of a 
knowledge system, such as the 
research facilities and 
communications services in a 
certain locality 
Knowledge markets The market for a certain type of 
information, used in agriculture to 
describe the demand and supply of 
agricultural knowledge 
Knowledge systems (systems 
theories) 
The process of producing, using 
and storing knowledge in a given 
locality or industrial sector 
Laggards Those who are slowest to begin 
using a certain product or process 
from a given population (see 
first/early adopters) 
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Learning process (innovation 
systems) 
The ways in which new knowledge, 
which enables innovation, is 
acquired 
Levy board Agriculture and Horticulture 
Development Board (AHDB), UK-
wide organisation funded by 
statutory levy from commercial 
farming operations 
Linear Model (of innovation) A model of innovation that depicts 
research as the origin of 
innovation, followed by 
development, marketing and sale 
of a specific product (often 
challenged in systems approaches 
to innovation) 
Marketing desk A means of consolidating supply of 
a horticultural good, which also 
perform marketing functions 
Multiple retailers Supermarkets with multiple retail 
sites 
Near-market Industrial/scientific research 
concerned with a product or 
process that is nearing a 
marketable stage (see applied 
research) 
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Neoclassical (economics) An approach to economics 
concerned with output, prices and 
distribution in markets as 
determined by supply and demand 
Norms (society) Informal understandings that 
govern behaviour in social systems 
Oligopsony A market arrangement in which 
there are few buyers of goods 
Perfect rationality (economics) The assumption that 1) agents will 
always act to maximise their utility 
(personal benefit) and 2) do so in 
an informed manner (often 
compared to bounded rationality) 
Points of difference Product differentiation 
Policy coordination failure A situation in which there is a lack 
of policy coordinating mechanisms, 
or where these function poorly/are 
contradictory 
Productivity (economics) A measure of the efficiency of 
producing a given product(s) 
Reflexive monitoring A method that promotes constant 
learning within multi-actor groups 
to cope with complex change  
Regime The established or “normal” mode 
of production or social 
arrangement  
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Revolutionary (innovation) Step change innovation that 
redefines or replaces previous 
systems  
Structure (social sciences) Patterned arrangements in society 
that come from and determine the 
actions of individuals 
Systemic instrument Policy mechanism to solve a 
systemic barrier to innovation 
Technological trajectories A ‘branch’ in the evolving design of 
a particular product or process 
Technology “push” Research and development of new 
products drives their uptake (often 
contrasted with technology “pull”, 
whereby demand for a certain 
product drives research and 
development) 
Thematic analysis A form of qualitative analysis that 
focusses on discovering patterns in 
data that relate to specific research 
questions 
 
 
  
 317 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Literature review 
A literature review was carried out in Spring 2014 using some of the terms 
associated with the initial research questions framing the project. These 
were: 
1. What are the sources of innovation in the fresh produce industry? 
2. How is the fresh produce research and development/knowledge 
transfer pipeline constructed? 
3. What are the issues or problems relating to translation and 
exploitation of research within the supply chain? 
4. Are these problems specific to a particular part of the supply chain? 
5. What methods of knowledge transfer/communication channels 
have been found to be the most effective? 
6. Are there good examples of effective translation and exploitation of 
research? 
7. What possible metrics of exist to measure the degree of success in 
translation of research into use? 
8. How to stakeholders go about communicating their needs to other 
parts of the supply chain? 
9. What incentives exist/should exist for producers to take up new 
technologies or methods? 
10. What possible actions or recommendations would help address the 
issues? 
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These research questions were derived from a report on the concept of 
“research into use” (National Horticultural Forum, 2011b), which examined 
the utilisation of research within two distinct sectors (strawberry and 
brassica production). The search terms used with respect to these questions 
are highlighted in Table 12, and feature an emphasis on general innovation, 
translation and implementation as the core concepts22: 
Table 12 Key search terms and databases consulted during initial literature review 
Topic Search term Database 
Innovation (general) Innovation (in) agriculture Google Scholar 
Agricultural research 
pipeline 
Google Scholar 
Agricultural research + 
translation 
ScienceDirect 
Innovation + horticulture Google + Google Scholar 
 Sources (of) innovation Google + Google Scholar + 
ScienceDirect 
Economics Innovation + economic 
theory 
JSTOR + Google Scholar 
 Technological change JSTOR + Google Scholar 
 Evolutionary economics Google Scholar + 
ScienceDirect 
Translation Translation (of) basis 
science 
Google Scholar 
 Technology transfer ScienceDirect 
 Research translation ScienceDirect 
                                                        
22 These terms were also used in conjunction with a conference paper (Agricultural 
Innovation: Lessons from Medicine) written by the author for the Innovation 
Through Knowledge Transfer 2015 conference. 
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 Translational science + 
agriculture 
Google Scholar 
Implementation Implementation science Google Scholar 
 Implementation (of) 
agricultural innovation 
Google Scholar 
 Extension science ScienceDirect 
 Innovation diffusion Google Scholar + 
ScienceDirect 
 
However, it became clear that these questions were, on the one hand, 
reflective of the ‘linear model’ of innovation, which, as described in Section 
2.3.5.2, has been repeatedly challenged in recent years (particularly where 
agricultural innovation is concerned) and, on the other, presumptive of the 
kinds of problems affecting the fresh produce industry. As such the, research 
questions guiding the project were developed in conjunction with the 
literature that most closely relates to innovation in an agricultural context 
(i.e. Agricultural Innovation Systems). An iteration of the literature review 
took place that emphasised innovation systems terminology: 
Table 13 Improved search terms and databases consulted during literature review 
Topic Search term Database 
Innovation Systems/AIS Agricultural systems 
analysis 
Google Scholar + 
ScienceDirect 
 Agricultural knowledge 
systems 
Google Scholar 
 Barriers to innovation + 
agriculture 
Google Scholar + 
ScienceDirect 
 Facilitating innovation + 
agriculture 
Google Scholar + 
ScienceDirect 
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Appendix 2: Note on Defra’s June Survey of Agriculture and 
Horticulture 
In 2010 Defra changed certain labour thresholds to be more in-line with 
European standards, resulting in less recorded commercial holdings and 
thus excluding the least active farms (Defra, 2012). It also reduced an 
upward trend in the number of small-holdings being registered with the 
organisation, perhaps accounting for both the sudden rise and fall of farms 
in the 2005/2006 bracket. 
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Appendix 3: Ethical principles and relevant forms 
Four ethical principles have been developed to ensure that any research 
involving human subjects is carried out in an ethical manner (see Gillon, 
1994). These are: 
1. Autonomy: there is an obligation to respect the autonomy of 
individuals by being honest in one’s dealings with others and keeping 
promises made to them 
2. Beneficence: this refers to the obligation to provide net benefit to 
others, or at least to do ‘no harm’ to them (non-maleficence)   
3. Non-maleficence: the obligation to avoid doing something that might 
harm others 
4. Justice: this is the obligation to be fair in dealings with others. 
Further to this, and in keeping with the University of Warwick’s own ethical 
guidelines, an interview protocol was developed, in conjunction with a 
participant information and consent form, to ensure that the project 
proceeded in an ethical fashion (see interview information pack and consent 
form below). 
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Study Title: Sources of Innovation in the Fresh Produce Industry 
Investigator(s): Jonathan Menary 
 
Introduction 
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, you need to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take the time to 
read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
(Part 1 tells you the purpose of the study and what will happen to you if you take part.  Part 2 
gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study) 
 
Please ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
PART 1 
What is the study about? 
The aim of the study is to identify sources of innovation in the UK fresh produce industry and 
what barriers exist to its development, spread and uptake. It is hoped that this research will 
contribute to better policy. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely up to you to decide. We will describe the study and go through this information 
sheet, which we will give you to keep. If you choose to participate, we will ask you to sign a 
consent form to confirm that you have agreed to take part (if part of this study is an online or 
postal questionnaire/survey, by returning a completed questionnaire/survey, you are giving 
your consent for the information that you have supplied to be used in this study and formal 
signed consent will not be collected where postal or online questionnaires/surveys are 
concerned).  You will be free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and this will 
not affect you or your circumstances in any way. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked several questions about innovation 
in the horticultural industry via a semi-structured interview. Interviews will typically last one 
hour. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages, side effects, risks, and/or discomforts of taking 
part in this study? 
This study will only capture your opinions about innovation in the horticultural industry, and 
as such there are very few risks; however, if you feel that your opinion may be controversial, 
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you can opt for anonymity. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part in this study? 
There are a number of benefits of this study: 
 
· The study may contribute to new and better horticultural policy in the future 
· The research will provide a modern examination of the horticultural industry and how 
horticultural research is conducted 
· It is the first time a study like this has been done in this field, and as such you could 
be contributing to a novel area of horticultural research 
 
Expenses and payments 
There should be no expenses incurred as a result of taking part in this research. 
 
What will happen when the study ends? 
At the end of the study, the data collected will be analysed and included in the author’s 
thesis; it may also be published in relevant journals. 
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
If you would like your opinions to be kept confidential, we will follow strict ethical and legal 
practice; all information about you will be handled in confidence. Further details are included 
in Part 2. If you do not wish to remain anonymous, then your name and affiliations may be 
included in a thesis and/or academic journals, subject to acceptance. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible 
harm that you might suffer will be addressed. Detailed information is given in Part 2. 
"
This concludes Part 1. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision. 
_________________________________________________________________________  
PART 2 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
The study is organised by Jonathan Menary, a PhD student at Warwick Crop Centre, under 
the supervision of Dr Rosemary Collier, head of the Warwick Crop Centre. The project is 
funded by the University of Warwick, the Horticultural Development Company (HDC) and the 
UK Potato Council. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on being part of the study? 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Refusal to participate will not affect you in any 
way. If you decide to take part in the study, you will need to sign a consent form, which 
states that you have given your consent to participate. 
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If you agree to participate, you may nevertheless withdraw from the study at any time without 
affecting you in any way. 
 
You have the right to withdraw from the study completely and decline any further contact by 
study staff after you withdraw.  
!
What if there is a problem? 
The University of Warwick’s insurance and indemnity cover covers this study. If you have an 
issue, please contact Jo Horsburgh (details below). 
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Due to the nature of the interviews, the interviewer will necessarily know the identity of the 
interviewee. However, if a request for anonymity is made, steps will be taken to ensure the 
confidentiality of the interviewee’s opinions; handwritten notes, if any are used, will be 
digitised and the originals will be destroyed; data related to the project will be kept on a 
password protected computer (owned by the University) that can only be accessed by the 
interviewer and IT support staff; any anonymous data will be deleted at the end of the 
project. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the study will be analysed and potentially included in a doctoral thesis; they 
may also be included in papers published in academic journals, subject to acceptance. If you 
would like a copy of the thesis, or any future papers associated with the project, please email 
the author at the email address below. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the University of Warwick’s 
Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC): REGO-2014-1041 (August, 
2014). 
 
What if I want more information about the study? 
If you have any questions about any aspect of the study or your participation in it not 
answered by this participant information leaflet, please contact:  
 
 
Jonathan Menary 
j.menary@warwick.ac.uk 
+447725754514 
 
or 
 
Dr Rosemary Collier 
rosemary.collier@warwick.ac.uk 
024 7657 5066 
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Who should I contact if I wish to make a complaint? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible 
harm you might have suffered will be addressed.  Please address your complaint to the 
person below, who is a Senior University of Warwick official entirely independent of this 
study: 
Jo Horsburgh 
Deputy Registrar 
Deputy Registrar’s Office 
University of Warwick 
Coventry, UK, CV4 8UW. 
T:  +00 44 (0) 2476 522 713  E:  J.Horsburgh@warwick.ac.uk  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this participant information leaflet."
"
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